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Abstract
This thesis consists of three studies on foreign aid and its allocation by political leaders
within recipient countries. It explores whether this allocation depends on personal motives
and political purposes.
The first study focuses on the effect of aid on government spending using country-level
data, distinguishing between several types of foreign aid that are expected to impact
spending in different ways. The impact of institutional quality on aid fungibility is also
considered since receiving foreign aid could promote corrupt or illegal activities on behalf
of the recipient government by diverting aid into private pockets. The results suggest that
aid fungibility depends on institutional quality, especially for off-budget aid.
The second study focuses on the effect of aid on tax revenues using country-level data,
distinguishing between two types of finance to investigate whether or not aid pays for tax
reductions. The results show that aggregate aid, aid in the form of grants or in the form
of loans leaves tax revenues unaffected at all levels of institutional quality. These results
suggest that aid is not fungible in the context of tax revenues and that aid does not finance
tax reductions.
The third study focuses on the sub-national allocation of foreign aid flows from China and
the World Bank using district-level data. This allocation of aid across regions is up to the
discretion of the political leader. This study attempts to identify the strategy leaders use to
maximise their vote share, or whether or not leaders favour co-ethnic regions. The results
show that in competitive electoral environments, leaders divert aid away from their core
voters and towards supporters of the opposition. In contrast, in non-competitive electoral
environments without strong political motivations leaders favour their co-ethnic regions.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivations and aims
1.1.1 Background and motivation
Foreign aid was first introduced as part of the Marshall Plan, or else known as the European
Recovery Programme (Development Initiatives, 2013, Boschini and Olofsg˚ard, 2007). The
Marshall Plan aimed to help with the recovery of European countries after the Second
World War. Aid initially started off as serving geopolitical interests and in time it aligned
to the needs of developing countries and aimed to improve living standards. The amount
of foreign aid distributed each year to developing countries from various donors has been
rising in developing countries ever since, as shown by the World Development Indicators
of the World Bank (WB) (World Bank, 2015) and this rise occurred in line with the
Millenium Development Goals set by the United Nations for completion by 2015.
Foreign aid has various forms; it may be given to a government in the form of grants,
loans, specified good (such as medicines and vaccines in the case of aid for health), or
technical capacity (such as training projects or the transfer of knowledge) (Singer, 1965).
It may also be targeted to non-governmental organisations instead of a government to avoid
bureaucratic transactions (Severino and Ray, 2009). Aid may originate from multilateral
donors, such as the WB, or bilateral donors, such as individual countries; and it may be
given conditional on certain growth-enhancing policies as in the 1980s with the case of the
Structural Adjustment Policies.
A precise definition of aid or Official Development Assistance given by the Organisation for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) is ‘flows provided by official agencies,
including state and local governments, or by their executive agencies; and each transaction
is administered with the promotion of economic development and welfare of developing
countries as its main objective; and is concessional in character and conveys a grant
element of at least 25 per cent’ (OECD, 2010).
Theoretically, aid aims to build the necessary infrastructure for development by build-
ing and strengthening institutions of both the government and non-government sectors,
through the provision of resources and the technical know-how (Ku¨hl, 2009). Early work
on aid was focused on the two-gap Chenery and Strout (1966) model, which was based on
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resource-gaps for savings and investment faced by developing countries. An extension of
Bacha (1990) added the foreign exchange reserve gap to the model. The gap model states
that aid helps fill the savings gap inducing investment, and therefore growth, until a point
is reached where aid is no longer required for growth.
However, there is no consensus on the effect of foreign aid on economic performance. The
empirical results are mixed and there is no agreement in the literature that aid contributes
to economic growth (Dalgaard et al., 2004, Dalgaard and Hansen, 2001, Hansen and Tarp,
2001, Burnside and Dollar, 2000). Burnside and Dollar (2000) highlighted the importance
of good policies and strong institutions by showing that aid has a positive effect on growth
only in the presence of good policies. This finding has been challenged in the literature, but
has nevertheless emphasised the significance of governance, institutions and politics with
regard to the effectiveness of foreign aid (Easterly et al., 2004). Institutions are defined as
‘a set of rules, compliance procedures, and moral and ethical behavioural norms designed
to constrain the behaviour of individuals in the interests of maximising the wealth or utility
of principals’ (North, 1980). This gives rise to the multi-dimensional notion of governance,
described by Kaufmann and Zoido-Lobato´n (1999) as ‘traditions and institutions by which
authority in a country is exercised’.
These are broad definitions and include various components of economic and political in-
stitutions, such as the imposition of property rights, the distribution of resources and the
implementation of rules and policies. (Acemoglu et al., 2004). This definition includes
various components of governance that are thought to be inter-related. For example, hav-
ing a high freedom of the press and a strong rule of law are found to be significant for the
reduction of corruption since illegal activities can be uncovered and punished (Brunetti
and Weder, 2003, Treisman, 2000). Kaufmann and Zoido-Lobato´n (1999) describe six
dimensions of governance: voice and accountability, political instability and violence, gov-
ernment effectiveness, regulatory burden, rule of law and corruption. Some components
of institutions and their quality have been associated with improvements in economic
growth and development since they affect the structure of society (Acemoglu et al., 2004,
Kaufmann and Zoido-Lobato´n, 1999).
Since aid is primarily given to governments of developing countries, the effectiveness of
aid is likely to depend on how governments behave (Morrissey, 2015a, McGillivray and
Morrissey, 2000, Devarajan et al., 1999). Aid flows increase the resources of the recipient
government and raise their budget constraints, which allow governments to move to a
higher indifference curve. This makes the consumption of more goods possible, depending
on the preferences of recipient governments, which could make aid fungible (McGillivray
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and Morrissey, 2000). Based on the findings of Bra¨utigam and Knack (2004) and Knack
(2004, 2001), foreign aid may not be used as intended and this may in turn worsen the
quality of governance by giving incentives for corruption. Aid is often associated in the
literature as ‘unearned income’ that resembles natural resource revenues (Wright and
Winters, 2010). The curse of natural resource revenues, which promotes rent-seeking
activities and hinders growth, as well as the dependency on such resources are considered
in the literature as being applicable to foreign aid flows as well (Djankov et al., 2008).
Foreign aid flows may be used by the leaders of recipient governments for their own
personal benefits. For example, they could divert aid into their private pockets or they
could spend it in a way that serves their own political interests, or both (Wright and
Winters, 2010). Aid allocation can be seen as a moral hazard problem between the donor
(principal) and the recipient (agent) (Svensson, 2000). The principal diverts resources to
the agent for the purposes of development but the agent uses these resources in other ways
than those intended by the principal donor.
This raises the issue of ‘fungibility’, which is defined as aid not being used as intended by
the donor (McGillivray and Morrissey, 2000, Griffin, 1970). This issue can be described
as situations where government spending or tax revenues fall with aid receipts, when the
pattern of allocation of government spending changes or other components of the budget
are affected by aid receipts (McGillivray and Morrissey, 2000). Additionally, even if aid
is used on a project that was intended by the donor, it could still be fungible if it frees
up public resources to finance a marginal project that would otherwise not be financed
with public funds (Devarajan and Swaroop, 1998). Fungibility is a major concern and
according to the literature, it can be explained by any one of the following reasons: a
difference in preferences between donors and recipients, aid illusion, malicious intent of
recipient governments or the optimal choice of recipient governments to adjust their budget
(Chatterjee et al., 2012, McGillivray and Morrissey, 2001).
A difference in preferences between donors and recipients can be caused because of the
different information the two parties (donors and recipients) have on the country-specific
characteristics of each recipient country, their needs, as well as the current economic and
political situations of each recipient country (Prichard et al., 2012). Therefore, donors
need to be informed of implemented aid projects and about any capacity problems in the
recipient countries. Aid illusion may arise when lack of information by state officials leads
to a misconception about the government budget, thus altering tax collection efforts or
how public funds are allocated (McGillivray and Morrissey, 2001). The malicious intent
of governments may be described as situations where aid flows are leaked into private
accounts or when the presence of aid flows encourages governments to participate in illegal
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rent-seeking activities (Bird et al., 2008, Moss et al., 2006, Bra¨utigam and Knack, 2004,
Knack, 2001). Receiving aid may alter the composition of government expenditure towards
oligopolistic sectors where rent extortion is easier (Mauro, 1998, Lin, 1994). From another
perspective, however, the fungibility of aid may be described as the optimal choice of
recipient governments, where aid flows are considered as external resources together with
internal resources for the allocation of total resources across the budget (Chatterjee et al.,
2012). For example, a prudent government might respond to aid flows by reducing and
repaying debt. It could, also, be the case that aid resources free up domestic resources
that would otherwise have been used for the project that the aid resources finance. This
alternative use of domestic resources may fund a marginal project, which may prove to be
productive and beneficial to the economy (Devarajan and Swaroop, 1998). Additionally, it
could be that recipient governments decide to relieve themselves of the burden of taxation
to fund expenditure. This decision could in fact be optimal from a welfare perspective
since taxes are unpopular (Carter, 2010). Chatterjee et al. (2012) developed a long-
run growth model taking into account the lump-sum transfer of foreign aid that relaxes
the government’s constraint. One of the main assumptions of their model is that the
government does not maintain a budget surplus or deficit: its expenditure on capital and
consumption goods always equate its revenues from taxation and foreign aid. The model
suggests that the effect of aid on growth would be positive, so long the government spends
some of it on investment goods. Nevertheless, recipient governments may treat the transfer
of aid as a substitute of domestic sources and adjust their budget accordingly, rather than
treating the aid flows as an additional source of revenue, thus making aid fungible. The
model shows that the extent of the substitutability of resources would affect the degree of
aid effectiveness and their theoretical results are supported by their empirical findings.
Since the primary recipient of foreign aid is the leader of the recipient government, how
the leader allocates aid would in turn determine aid effectiveness (Morrissey, 2015a). The
empirical literature yields mixed results on fungibility and on the effects of aid on spending
and tax revenue patterns (Dieleman et al., 2013, Van de Sijpe, 2013, 2012, Lu et al., 2010,
Mavrotas and Ouattara, 2006, Gupta et al., 2003, Devarajan et al., 1999, Feyzioglu et al.,
1998, Boone, 1996, Pack and Pack, 1993).
1.1.2 Aims and research questions of this thesis
The literature on foreign aid argues that it can be used for personal motives and political
purposes (Jablonski, 2014, Bra¨utigam and Knack, 2004, Knack, 2001). Following the
theoretical and empirical literature, this thesis examines how aid is used and allocated
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within recipient countries. It attempts to identify whether aid is used as intended or
leaked into private pockets, and also whether aid is used as a means to target and favour
specific groups for personal and political reasons.
Following the theoretical and empirical literature, this thesis uses country-level data to
investigate the extent of fungibility and how foreign aid flows impact government spending
patterns and tax revenue collection efforts in a sample of developing countries from the
regions of Eastern Europe, the Caribbean, Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, North
Africa and the Middle East, East Asia, South Asia, South-East Asia and the Pacific (This
is addressed in Chapters 2 and 3). This is because we aim to understand whether aid is
used as intended, namely whether aid increases government spending as it is expected,
or finances tax reductions. Furthermore, the empirical literature identifies that foreign
aid has an impact on institutional quality and governance (Bra¨utigam and Knack, 2004).
Therefore, the importance of institutional quality on fungibility is also explored. The
main hypothesis is that the extent of fungibility depends on institutional quality. An
environment with low institutional quality and high degree of corruption, where illegal
activities prevail and leaders are less accountable to the public, is more likely to make aid
fungible than an environment with good institutions and a strong rule of law.
Recent developments in data collection methods from the perspective of the donor are
exploited. The Creditor Reporting System (CRS) of the Development Assistance Com-
mittee of the OECD (OECD-DAC) asks donors to report various characteristics of foreign
aid flows. Some examples are the purpose of aid (i.e. education, health, infrastructure
and others), whether aid flows correspond to a specific project or technical co-operation
activities, the first implementing partner of the aid flow or the type of finance. These
developments in data availability allow different types of aid to be examined, either with
regard to effectiveness or fungibility.
In addition to examining whether aid is used as intended, regional-level data are used to
investigate the sub-national allocation of foreign aid flows in 17 African countries (This
is addressed in Chapter 4). Political leaders could use foreign aid for their own personal
or political agendas and divert aid to specific regions, for example to maximise their re-
election prospects and vote share or favour their own ethnic group. We examine whether
political leaders divert aid to their core voters or to supporters of the opposition. Fur-
thermore, we investigate whether political leaders exhibit patterns of ethnic favouritism
by diverting aid to co-ethnic regions.
Novel datasets have been constructed as part of this thesis, which include geo-coded in-
formation on aid flows from various donors. This recent development allows researchers
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to examine aid allocation from the point of view of the recipient. Established geo-coded
datasets on aid flows from China and the WB are used (Strange et al., 2017, AidData,
2016) as well as a newly-constructed dataset on election results that has been geo-coded
for the purpose of this thesis from the constituency level to the district level (Kollman
et al., 2016).
Investigating how aid is allocated in countries and whether or not it is used as intended
can be particularly useful for donor countries that divert large flows of their resources to-
wards developing countries (World Bank, 2015). Examining the fungibility of different aid
flows is important for donors when deciding how to allocate aid to developing countries.
Generally, donors have a target of 0.7% of their GNI to be diverted as aid (Development
Initiatives, 2013). In cases where aid is not used as intended, these resources could have
alternative uses in the donor and/or recipient countries. Therefore, understanding which
types of aid are non-fungible or less fungible could be beneficial for the development com-
munity. The same reasoning applies to aid flows from various donors at the regional level.
Advancements in the availability of geo-coded aid flows allow researchers to investigate
the pattern of aid allocation of different donors as well as different types of aid across
countries. One of the most important recommendations to take away from research on
aid fungibility is donor coordination and transparency since having many projects simul-
taneously on the same areas could contribute in enhancing the issue of fungibility and aid
mismanagement.
Nonetheless, fungibility does not necessarily mean aid resources are wasted or that donors
should stop diverting aid. As Morrissey (2015b) discusses, fungibility and the lack of
additionality of resources on spending it not necessarily a cause for alarm. It could be
the case that recipient governments are not fully aware of the amount of resources they
receive or aid illusion may play a role. As mentioned earlier, receiving foreign aid may free
up domestic resources and enable the financing of another project that the donors have
not considered (Devarajan and Swaroop, 1998), or it could be the case that aid affects
fiscal behaviour in general and optimal governments decide to reduce taxes. On the other
hand, if the evidence suggests that aid flows are leaked outside of the budget into private
pockets and are not spent to generate income, fungibility should be a cause for concern.
Building on the theoretical and empirical literature, the following research questions are
addressed by this thesis:
Chapter 2 - Study 1:
1. What is the effect of foreign aid (aggregate flows, on- and off-budget aid) on total
government spending? Is foreign aid fungible?
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2. Based on the one-sided fungibility tests, what is the extent of fungibility of on- and
off-budget aid (no fungibility, partial fungibility, full fungibility)?
3. Does the extent of aid fungibility depend on institutional quality? Is foreign aid
more fungible with lower institutional quality rather than in environments of high
institutional quality?
4. Is foreign aid for the purposes of education, health or infrastructure fungible? Does
fungibility depend on institutional quality?
Chapter 3 - Study 2:
1. What is the effect of foreign aid (aggregate aid flows, aid in the form of grants and
aid in the form of loans) on tax revenues? Does aid finance tax reductions?
2. Does the extent of aid fungibility depend on institutional quality? Is foreign aid
more fungible with lower institutional quality rather than in environments of high
institutional quality?
Chapter 4 - Study 3:
1. Which districts do political leaders target with aid? Do they target their core voters
or voters of the opposition?
2. Do political leaders exhibit patterns of ethnic favouritism by targeting co-ethnic
districts?
3. Does electoral competitiveness play a role for the sub-national allocation of aid?
1.2 Structure and content of this thesis
This thesis consists of three separate empirical studies discussed in Chapters 2, 3 and 4.
Chapter 5 concludes. The studies are briefly discussed below.
1.2.1 Brief overview of Chapter 2
The first study examines aid fungibility and particularly how the pattern of government
spending changes with institutional quality. The existing literature yields mixed results
for fungibility; however, corruption and institutional quality are not considered in such
models. The hypothesis of this Chapter is that the extent of fungibility depends on
institutional quality in recipient countries, arguing that aid fungibility would be higher in
countries with low quality institutions.
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We take advantage of the extensive information given by the CRS of the OECD-DAC
on data for foreign aid (OECD, 2013), where aid flows are disaggregated into different
purposes, modalities and types of finance. Static and dynamic panel data models are
estimated for a sample of 59 developing countries over the period 1990 - 2013. The
conditional effect of total aid and its modalities are estimated for total public expenditure
and the extent of fungibility is tested based on two one-sided fungibility tests, following
the methodology of Van de Sijpe (2012). We distinguish between on- and off-budget aid
since we expect the two types of aid to impact spending in different ways. On-budget aid
refers to aid flows that are recorded in the government’s budget and are given for specific
programmes, whereas off-budget aid refers to aid flows that are not recorded in the budget
and are given as technical cooperation. On-budget aid is expected to have a one-to-one
impact on spending since government spending, by definition, includes external resources
such as aid, while off-budget aid is not expected to have any impact on spending.
The results of this analysis provide evidence that the conditional effect of aid on total public
spending depends on institutional quality in the expected direction for off-budget aid,
whereas this is not true for on-budget aid. On-budget aid is found to be fully fungible at
all values of institutional quality. Different model specifications and estimations methods
are used and the results for off-budget aid are robust for the case of total public spending,
suggesting that fungibility exists and that institutional quality plays a role for off-budget
aid. The different specifications show that the fungibility of on-budget aid indeed depends
on institutional quality. Furthermore, considering that aid has a heterogeneous effect on
spending based on the level of institutional quality proves to be important in the context
of fungibility. The degree of fungibility of off-budget aid is over-estimated in countries
with high institutional quality if institutional quality is not considered.
1.2.2 Brief overview of Chapter 3
The second study also explores aid fungibility, this time examining revenues instead of
expenditures. The effects of aid on tax revenues conditional on different levels of institu-
tional quality are investigated to shed light as to whether aid pays for development or for
tax reductions. The existing literature does not consider that aid might have a hetero-
geneous effect on taxes based on the level of institutional quality. The hypothesis of this
Chapter is that the extent of fungibility, if it exists, would be higher in countries with low
institutional quality.
This study uses a newly constructed dataset on general government revenues developed
by the International Centre for Tax and Development, which collects tax revenue data
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from various sources, such as international databases and country reports (Prichard et al.,
2014). Following the literature, aid flows are disaggregated into types of finance: grants
and loans. Static and dynamic panel data models are estimated in a sample of developing
countries over the period 1990 - 2013.
The results suggest that total aid flows as well as aid disaggregated into grants and loans,
do not reduce total tax or any sub-components of total tax. In some instances, a signifi-
cantly positive effect of aid on taxes is identified. However, this positive identified effect
does not always remain robust. Nevertheless, the results suggest that aid in the context
of tax revenues is not fungible and it does not finance tax reductions. These results pro-
vide evidence against fungibility with regard to tax revenues at all levels of institutional
quality, suggesting that foreign aid does not pay for tax reductions. This result is robust
to alternative specifications.
1.2.3 Brief overview of Chapter 4
This Chapter investigates the sub-national distribution of foreign aid from China and the
WB to identify whether political leaders use foreign aid for political purposes. The litera-
ture investigating the motives of recipient governments behind the sub-national allocation
of aid across administrative regions is limited to studies of individual countries (Masaki,
2015, Jablonski, 2014, Dionne et al., 2013, Briggs, 2012). Political leaders may use aid
targeting towards their ethnic groups, their birth region or towards areas of their core or
opposition voters, depending on which strategy is expected to provide more electoral ben-
efits (Kasara, 2007, Lindbeck and Weibull, 1987, Cox and McCubbins, 1986). Core voters
are considered those that continuously support the incumbent unconditionally (Cox and
McCubbins, 1986). Swing voters are considered those that have ‘weak party preferences’
and are indifferent to voting for a specific political leader and can thus be easily swayed
into favouring the incumbent (Lindbeck and Weibull, 1987). The effect of competitive
elections is also examined. How political leaders target aid may depend on the degree of
electoral competitiveness and their certainty of getting re-elected (Hicken, 2011).
These types of favouritism are examined using administrative-level data at the district level
for 17 African countries over the period 2000 - 2011. We use a novel dataset on legislative
election results at the constituency level (Kollman et al., 2016), which are geo-coded
at the district level for the purposes of this thesis. Established geo-referenced data are
merged from various sources matched at the district and province levels, such as foreign aid
commitments from China and the WB, night-time light intensity and population measures.
Ordinary least squares regressions are estimated using appropriate fixed effects. The
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different electoral strategies are investigated to understand whether leaders target core
voters, swing districts or voters of that support the opposition. Ethnic favouritism is also
examined to understand whether or not leaders target districts where members of their
ethnic group reside in.
The results suggest that in environments of electoral competitiveness, leaders divert aid
away from core voters and co-ethnic districts and towards opposition voters. These results
are consistent with an intention to maximise re-election prospects by rewarding supporters
of the opposition in an attempt to sway opposition voters into voting for them. In contrast,
in non-competitive electoral environments without strong re-election incentives, leaders
find optimal to target and favour their co-ethnic regions. These results are robust to
alternative specifications and samples.
1.2.4 Brief overview of Chapter 5
This Chapter concludes this thesis, provides areas of future research and discusses some
policy implications derived from the findings of this thesis. Overall, the results of the thesis
support the idea that aid is not used as intended by the donor community, since it is not
found to contribute to spending. The government is not found to be behaving optimally as
the revenue side of the budget remains unaffected with aid receipts. Furthermore, looking
at the sub-national allocation of foreign aid, it can be inferred that aid is used for political
economy reasons and ethnic favouritism.
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Chapter 2
Foreign aid and public spending: The role of institutional
quality
2.1 Introduction
2.1.1 Background and motivation
Spending on social sectors and infrastructure projects is justified not just because it is
viewed as a moral responsibility, but also because of the positive externalities and long-
term effects of spending on health, education and infrastructure (Anomaly, 2013, Gradstein
et al., 2005). Public goods in the form of education, health and infrastructure are provided
to achieve social objectives, higher living standards and economic development (North,
1980). There is some theoretical and empirical evidence of a positive relationship between
public capital expenditure and economic growth as well as between spending on education
and health and development outcomes, especially in the presence of good governance
(Oto-Peral´ıas and Romero-A´vila, 2013, Mishra and Newhouse, 2009, Baldacci et al., 2008,
Rajkumar and Swaroop, 2008, Bose et al., 2007, Michaelowa and Weber, 2007, Gupta
et al., 2002, Tanzi and Davoodi, 1997).
Aid donors and international institutions have put a lot of emphasis on sectors such
as education and health, as is evident by the targeted Millennium Development Goals
(MDGs) set out by the United Nations for completion by 2015. These areas remain
central in the post-2015 agenda for sustainable development (i.e. achieving universal
primary education, reducing child mortality, improving maternal health and combatting
diseases like HIV/AIDS and malaria). Therefore, any distortions in the composition of
public expenditure are expected to affect economic development as well as the effectiveness
of foreign aid targeted in such sectors. However, the empirical results are mixed and
there is no agreement in the literature that aid contributes to economic growth. Aid is
primarily given to governments of developing countries and the effectiveness of aid is likely
to depend on how governments behave (Morrissey, 2015a, McGillivray and Morrissey,
2000, Devarajan et al., 1999). Based on the findings of Knack (2001) and Bra¨utigam and
Knack (2004), foreign aid might not be used as intended and this may in turn worsen the
quality of governance by providing incentives for corruption. This problem is known as
‘fungibility’ in the foreign aid literature.
Fungibility is defined as ‘aid not being used as intended’ (McGillivray and Morrissey, 2000).
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Examples of fungibility include reductions in taxation, reductions in public spending or
the adjustment of spending allocations. This issue can arise due to a number of reasons:
a difference in preferences between donors and recipients, aid illusion, malicious intent of
recipient governments or the optimal choice of recipient governments to adjust their budget
based on the external resources they receive. Based on a field survey in Uganda, Reinikka
and Svensson (2004) show that public funds allocated for the purposes of education and
health do not reach their anticipated targets but are instead captured. Aid funds could
be subject to such capture that would lead to aid not being used as intended by the donor
community (Winters, 2014). The literature on fungibility yields mixed results (Dieleman
et al., 2013, Chatterjee et al., 2012, Van de Sijpe, 2012, Lu et al., 2010, McGillivray and
Morrissey, 2001, Feyzioglu et al., 1998).
Government behaviour is expected to impact aid effectiveness. Government behaviour is
largely dependent on the quality of institutions, as characterised by corruption, the rule of
law and bureaucratic control to name a few. According to Kaufmann and Zoido-Lobato´n
(1999), governance has several dimensions and is defined as ‘traditions and institutions
by which authority in a country is exercised’. Some of these dimensions of governance
are thought to be inter-related: for example, corruption is likely to arise in situations
with weak rule of law, a large bureaucracy or lack of monitoring of government officials
(Svensson, 2005, Acemoglu and Verdier, 2000, Treisman, 2000, Krueger, 1974). Generally,
corruption is a significant problem in both developed and developing countries and it is
viewed as a constraint on both foreign aid and growth-enhancing policies. Theobald (1990)
defines corruption as ‘the illegal use of public office for private gain’. The theoretical and
empirical literature suggests that corruption has several economic effects; one of which
is how it affects public finances. There is evidence that corruption reduces tax revenues
and distorts public spending towards area where higher rents may be extorted, such as on
military spending or infrastructure projects, and away from social sectors, such as health
or education (Delavallade, 2006, Hillman, 2004, Tanzi and Davoodi, 2000, Mauro, 1998).
2.1.2 Research question
The purpose of this study is to explore the relationship between foreign aid, government
expenditure and institutional quality and more precisely to examine the effect that aid has
on government expenditure under different levels of institutional quality. This relation-
ship has important policy implications for both donor and recipient governments. In the
presence of corrupt practices, aid funds, which have displayed a rising trend in developing
countries, would not have the anticipated effect on growth and development and could be
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subject to fungibility. This is an important issue for donor countries and international
organisations, which have been focusing on diverting large volumes of aid to developing
countries to alleviate poverty.
The literature on corruption identifies a ‘quantity’ and an ‘allocation’ effect on public ex-
penditure that suggest that corruption contributes to reducing spending on social sectors
such as health or education (allocation effect), while raising total public spending and
infrastructure spending due to the possibility of available rents (quantity effect) (Delaval-
lade, 2006, Tanzi and Davoodi, 2000, Mauro, 1998). Several papers on aid fungibility
have estimated the effect of foreign aid on government expenditure and how it deviates
from its targets. However, corruption is not a common control variable in such models.
Van de Sijpe (2012) controls for the effect of corruption on government expenditure as a
robustness check in his analysis for education and health expenditure. He finds that the
hypothesis of no fungibility for the sector of health is rejected when corruption is included,
thus warranting the inclusion of institutional quality in such models.
This study aims to explore this suggested relationship by employing an interaction term
between foreign aid and institutional quality. This is done to shed light on the behaviour
of governments in terms of expenditure at different levels of institutional quality in an
attempt to explain whether fungibility is caused by corrupt institutions, a weak rule of
law and a large bureaucracy. This study also distinguishes between different types of aid
modalities and the extent of fungibility of each modality is investigated. Understanding
which types of aid are not fungible or less fungible could prove beneficial for donors.
Total government expenditure is examined as well as its composition, focusing on the
sectors of education, health and infrastructure. A dynamic framework is employed using
appropriate General Method of Moments (GMM) estimation in a panel analysis involving
a large number of developing countries, defined by the World Bank (WB) as countries
with low or middle income per capita from the regions of Eastern Europe, the Caribbean,
Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, North Africa and the Middle East, East Asia, South
Asia, South-East Asia and the Pacific, over the period of 1990 - 2013.
2.1.3 Research findings
The empirical results suggest to some extent that institutional quality plays a role for
fungibility. Total aid disbursements have an insignificant effect on total public spending,
conditional on different levels of institutional quality. The same is found to be true for
total aid disbursements for each sector studied (education, health and infrastructure) at
all levels of institutional quality. These results agree with the literature that fungibility
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tends to be over-estimated if off-budget aid is not accounted for (Van de Sijpe, 2012).
When on- and off-budget aid flows are considered the fungibility results are different.
Total on-budget aid is statistically insignificant for spending and fully fungible irrespective
of institutional quality, whereas the degree of fungibility for off-budget aid is found to
depend on institutional quality. More precisely, total off-budget aid is non-fungible when
institutions are strong and fully fungible when institutions are weak, supporting the initial
hypothesis of the study.
Alternative estimation methods are used as robustness checks, for example estimating a
static model or using a categorical variable for institutional quality. Overall, the results
remained robust for off-budget aid in the model of total public spending suggesting that
institutional quality plays a role for the fungibility of total off-budget aid.
2.1.4 Structure
The next Section consists of a literature review of the relevant topics. Section 2.3 describes
the empirical models that are estimated having as a dependent variable the various types
of government expenditure and the methodology behind each model. The data used in
each model are portrayed in Section 2.4 and the results are discussed and analysed in
Section 2.5 along with some robustness checks. Lastly Section 2.6 concludes this Chapter.
The results are presented in Section 2.7.
2.2 Literature Review
2.2.1 Foreign aid and fungibility
See Section 1.1.1 for a discussion on aid fungibility.
The empirical literature yields mixed results on fungibility and there is no agreement on
the effect of foreign aid on public spending (Liang and Mirelman, 2014, Dieleman et al.,
2013, Van de Sijpe, 2013, Harper, 2012, Van de Sijpe, 2012, Lu et al., 2010, Mavrotas and
Ouattara, 2006, Gupta et al., 2003, Devarajan et al., 1999, Feyzioglu et al., 1998, Boone,
1996, Pack and Pack, 1993). Heller (1975) developed a model of fiscal response to aid
assuming that the public sector aims to maximise its utility by considering its spending
on public investment for development, maintenance and socioeconomic expenditures, as
well as revenue from taxation, borrowing and aid in the form of grants and loans. When
the model is estimated using a simultaneous equation system, the results support the
theory of no fungibility. Based on this theoretical model, Gang and Khan (1990) and
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Khan and Hoshino (1992) find evidence supporting the theory of no fungibility in India
and Southeast Asia, whereas Franco-Rodriguez et al. (1998) find evidence of fungibility
in Pakistan. Ouattara (2006) uses a different utility function than Heller (1975), but still
finds no evidence of fungibility. Panel data techniques are used to estimate the fiscal
response model and the author finds that aid is associated with increases in development
spending on education and health but with reductions in non-development spending such
as consumption expenditure.
Evidence of zero or near zero fungibility is also found by Feyzioglu et al. (1998). When the
endogeneity of aid is considered, aid is found to have a positive impact on total government
expenditure and public investment. Nevertheless, these results break down when total
government expenditure is disaggregated according to sector and aid becomes fungible in
the education, energy and agricultural sectors. Van de Sijpe (2012) also finds evidence of
zero or near zero fungibility for the sectors of health and education. In his models, aid for
the specific purposes is controlled for, the general aid given, income per capita, income
per capita growth, urbanisation, trade, debt service, the debt level and the support to
Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) in the form of aid. As a robustness check, a
number of other variables are included in the models, such as measures of democracy,
corruption, the rule of law, population, bureaucratic quality and other variables. When
corruption is included in the models, the hypothesis of no fungibility is rejected for the
health sector, although this finding could be a result of the change in the sample. This
finding of no fungibility is supported by other studies that look at sector-specific aid such
as Harper (2012), who finds evidence of no fungibility for health aid.
An important distinction made by Van de Sijpe (2012) is the classification of on- and
off-budget aid, which is important for fungibility studies since failure to do so could over-
estimate the extent of fungibility, as evident by the difference in the fungibility estimates
with and without this distinction. Aid flows are flagged to be on-budget, off-budget, given
for investment purposes or classified as any other aid flows that do not fall into these
three categories. Two types of aid modalities are of importance: on-budget aid that is
given for specific programmes and is recorded in the government’s budget and off-budget
aid that is not recorded since it is given as technical cooperation. It is expected that the
different aid modalities will have different effects on public spending. Since on-budget
aid is considered in the government’s budget choices, it is expected to affect government
spending, whereas off-budget aid is not expected to impact spending. Off-budget aid in-
volves aid activities and the transfer of resources that are intended for development but
are not directly recorded in the recipient government’s accounts and budget choices. It is
important to distinguish between the two as they have different expected outcomes; both
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in terms of their effectiveness and in their extent of fungibility (Van de Sijpe, 2013, 2012,
Mavrotas and Ouattara, 2006).
On the other hand, Lu et al. (2010) and Dieleman et al. (2013) find evidence of fungibility
in the health sector. Both papers use a dynamic framework and a similar dataset, sample
and empirical model. Lu et al. (2010) focus on a sample of developing countries over the
period of 1996 - 2006 and estimate a dynamic model for public health expenditure. They
control for foreign aid given to the government and foreign aid given to NGOs, debt relief,
income per capita, HIV prevalence and total government expenditure. Dieleman et al.
(2013) extend the dataset used by Lu et al. (2010) and control for the same variables.
The two papers agree in the results and find evidence for fungibility in the health sector,
although problems may arise when foreign aid is not treated as endogenous by Lu et al.
(2010). Foreign aid can be thought to be endogenous in the foreign aid literature since it
is primarily given to developing countries that have low levels of income and possibly low
levels of government expenditure to begin with.
Additionally, Liang and Mirelman (2014) focus on the sector of health and find evidence
for fungibility. The authors also consider the endogeneity of foreign aid by using lagged
values of aid in a Fixed Effects (FE) framework in a panel dataset for a number of both
developed and developing countries. This paper also considers the heterogeneous effect of
aid based on the socio-political risk of countries, where socio-political risk includes vari-
ables capturing several political dimensions, such as democratic accountability, corruption,
ethnic tensions and government stability. The interaction terms between aid for health
and the variables capturing socio-political risk suggest that aid is fungible but less fungible
in situations of low corruption and less ethnic tension, despite the fact that the conditional
effects of aid have been estimated at the means.
2.2.2 Governance and institutional quality
Theoretically, aid aims to improve any capacity problems, strengthen institutions and
transfer knowledge and expertise in developing countries (Ku¨hl, 2009). However, the
effect of foreign aid on government expenditure could depend to a great extent on the
quality of governance. Although we would expect foreign aid to impact governance and
the performance of institutions in developing countries in a positive way, as shown by
Tavares (2003), this may not always be the case. It could be argued that an environment
with large influxes of foreign aid may foster corrupt and illegal activities regarding the
appropriation of aid, thus deteriorating the quality of governance and institutions due to
the large potential benefits of engaging in such activities (Bra¨utigam and Knack, 2004,
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Knack, 2001). Nevertheless, as De Mesquita and Smith (2009) point out, there are types
of foreign aid that are more susceptible to misuse than others so these different types of aid
would affect institutional quality in a different way. Therefore, the relationship of foreign
aid and governance or the quality of institutions may run in either of the two directions.
Institutions can be referred to as ‘organisations that construct budgets, manage economic
policy and make decisions’ (Bra¨utigam and Botchwey, 1999). This notion is important in
the context of foreign aid as institutions are responsible for the construction of the budget
that aid contributes to, its regulation and implementation.
Corruption is thought of as a ‘persistent feature of human societies’ (Aidt, 2009), may
arise under different circumstances and due to its nature it can be defined in various ways
(Svensson, 2005, Aidt, 2003). Theobald (1990) defines corruption as ‘the illegal use of
public office for private gain’. Corruption occurs at two main levels: ‘grand’ or ‘political’
corruption occurs at the preparation phase of a governmental project; and ‘petty’ or
‘bureaucratic’ corruption occurs in the every-day running of governmental transaction
and most likely involves bribing low-ranked officials to overcome any bureaucratic controls
(Acemoglu and Verdier, 2000, Tanzi, 1994, Krueger, 1974).
Corruption may take several forms. An example is when the government gives out con-
tracts for the production of public projects. The government may decide to offer the
contract to a specific firm for its own private reasons; for example the chosen firm may
belong to a family member of a politician, or the firm may have bribed the government
to get the contract. This type of rent-seeking activity occurs at the expense of the public.
The chosen firm may not be offering the lowest cost or it may produce a public good of
low quality. The phenomenon of corruption is common in the construction sector and
corrupt activities can occur at every phase of a project in the construction sector; for ex-
ample when assigning contracts to specific firms, when inspecting a project’s performance,
or when planning and designing an infrastructural project (Sohail and Cavill, 2006). In
general, rent-seeking activities involve resources being transferred with the purpose of ex-
torting rents or private benefits (Aidt, 2009). Not only is the whole process costly in terms
of effectiveness, since the firm could have used the transferred resources more efficiently,
but it is also illegal (Gravelle and Rees, 2004, Bhagwati, 1982).
The theoretical literature combined with the empirical evidence demonstrate that cor-
ruption has important effects and policy implications for the economic performance of a
country as well as large welfare costs. Corruption acts as a tax on private investment,
distorts the allocation of talent, fosters an environment of social unrest and civil conflict
and is associated with reduced growth via public and private investment (Tanzi, 1998,
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Mauro, 1995, Tanzi, 1994, Murphy et al., 1991). On the other hand, there are some who
argue that corruption ‘greases the wheels’ of the economy and overcomes bureaucratic and
‘red-tape’ barriers, thus contributing to growth (Nye, 1967, Leff, 1964). In general, im-
provements in institutional quality have been associated with improvements in economic
growth, but reverse causality could be an issue here since economic growth could lead to
improvements in institutional quality through the development of rules and regulations
(Glaeser et al., 2004, La Porta et al., 1999).
Corruption is also shown to affect public finances. There is evidence that corruption alters
government behaviour by reducing tax revenues or distorting the composition of public
expenditure (Hillman, 2004, Tanzi and Davoodi, 2000, 1997, Tanzi, 1994). Corruption is
found to alter public spending away from social sectors and towards areas where higher
rents may be extorted, such as military or defence spending, rather than health or educa-
tion (Grigoli and Mills, 2014, Keefer and Knack, 2007, Delavallade, 2006, Mauro, 1998).
Reverse causality may occur between expenditure and corruption since a specific compo-
sition of government expenditure may encourage an environment of corruption. Mauro
(1998) examines the distortion of government expenditure as a result of corruption in a
sample of developed and developing countries using instrumental variables estimation to
correct for the issues of reverse causality between expenditure and corruption and any
measurement error underlying the corruption indices. It is expected that the more cor-
rupt a government is, the more it will allocate public funds in areas where it is easier to
extort bribes, such as on military expenditure and away from education and health and
the findings support this hypothesis. Tanzi and Davoodi (2000) estimate that corruption
has a positive ‘quantity’ effect on public investment. They base their hypothesis on the
idea that governments are likely to engage in capital spending to increase growth, or else
on ‘white-elephant’ projects, whilst aiming to benefit themselves. For example, corrupt
politicians may decide on which capital projects to undertake based on bribes or private
links with a specific firm. Delavallade (2006) supports the findings of Mauro (1998) and
Tanzi and Davoodi (2000) by using a FE model for a panel of developing countries. The is-
sue of the endogeneity of corruption is corrected using three-stage least squares. Evidence
for the ‘quantity’ effect of corruption on total government expenditure is found as well as
for the ‘allocation’ effect of corruption on the composition of government expenditure; a
negative allocation effect is found for the sectors of health, education and social protection
and a positive allocation effect on the sectors of defence, culture and fuel and energy.
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2.2.3 Contribution
It is evident from the aid literature that there is mixed results for fungibility (Liang and
Mirelman, 2014, Dieleman et al., 2013, Van de Sijpe, 2012, Lu et al., 2010). The corruption
literature shows that corruption has both a ‘quantity’ and an ‘allocation’ effect on public
expenditure. Total public expenditure is found to increase with corruption due to available
rents (quantity efect) and its composition is found to be altered towards sectors with more
rent-seeking opportunities (allocation effect) (Delavallade, 2006, Tanzi and Davoodi, 2000,
Mauro, 1998).
This study aims to investigate the extent of aid fungibility and whether or not institutional
quality plays a role in an attempt to explain whether fungibility is caused by malicious
intent in aid-recipient countries. In light of the studies summarised in Table 2.1, the
focus of this study is to examine the effect of both foreign aid and institutional quality
on total public expenditure and its allocation by using an interaction term between aid
and institutional quality. The hypothesis of this study is that low institutional quality
makes aid fungible or more fungible based on the assessment of Killick (1991) that the
absorptive capacity of the state, or ‘the ability of the economic system to put additional
aid to productive use’ is limited by lower institutional quality.
Table 2.1: Summary of key studies in the literature
Study Sample Estimation Results Sectors Aid variable
Lu et al.
(2010)
Panel (developing
countries, 1996 -
2006)
GMM Evidence of
fungibility
Health Aid to govern-
ment
Van de Sijpe
(2012)
Panel (developing
countries, 1996 -
2006)
FE and
GMM
Zero or
near zero
fungibility
Educa-
tion and
Health
On- and off-
budget aid to
government
Dieleman et
al. (2013)
Lu et al. (2010)
extended dataset
GMM Evidence of
fungibility
Health Aid to govern-
ment
Liang and
Mirelman
(2014)
Panel (aid-
recipient coun-
tries, 1995 -
2010)
FE Evidence of
fungibility
Health Aid to govern-
ment
To our knowledge, other researchers have not incorporated both variables in their model,
with the exceptions of Liang and Mirelman (2014) who consider both foreign aid and
socio-political risk in the model for public health spending as well as Van de Sijpe (2012)
who controls for corruption as a robustness check. Including institutional quality in the
empirical model introduces a number of problems; such as measurement error and endo-
geneity. Corruption and institutional quality may be endogenous in the model for public
expenditure since a specific allocation of public expenditure may foster an environment
of corruption and rent seeking. Also, indices that measure the quality of institutions are
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based on perceived levels, thereby being subject to the problem of measurement error. As
robustness checks, alternative measures of institutional quality are considered to correct
for these issues.
Moreover, the studies mentioned earlier focus on education and health expenditure, whereas
this study investigates other types of expenditure in addition to health and education, such
as transport and communications to proxy for infrastructure expenditure and total expen-
diture. Looking at several types of expenditure should make the picture of corruption and
institutions clearer and it will allow us to see how aid is allocated between different sectors
that constitute a great part of the total budget.
The studies mentioned use datasets from different sources and their samples differ in
terms of the time periods and country coverage. Furthermore, the choice of estimation
method affects the estimated aid fungibility, indicating the lack of robustness in the results
(Roodman, 2007). Overall, different estimation techniques, samples and controls, affect
the estimated aid coefficient. The selected sample for this study consists of a large number
of developing countries from all regions for the period of 1990 - 2013 and alternative
estimation methods and samples are used to ensure the robustness of the results, for
example system GMM and static FE.
This study also extends the methodology of Van de Sijpe (2012), where the fungibility of
on- and off-budget aid flows is investigated. Interaction terms between each aid modality
and the measure of institutional quality are included in the estimated models for public
expenditure to investigate the extent of fungibility of the different types of aid.
2.3 Methodology
2.3.1 Empirical models
The purpose of this study is to investigate the extent of aid fungibility conditional on
institutional quality. Dynamic models for government spending are estimated to account
for the persistence in spending and to account for the serial correlation of the errors.
Specifically, the following panel data model is estimated as follows:
Yk,it = β1Yk,it−1 + β2Ak,it + β3IQit + β4(Ak,it.IQit) + γ‘Xit + ηi + κt + it (2.1)
where the variables correspond to:
• Yk,it: Government expenditure for sector k in recipient country i at year t
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• Ak,it: Disbursements of foreign aid, disaggregated according to sector k in recipient
country i at year t
• IQit: The institutional quality index, which in this case is the average of the rule of
law, bureaucratic quality and corruption indices of the International Country Risk
Guide (ICRG) in recipient country i at year t
• Ait.IQit: The interaction term between foreign aid and institutional quality for
sector k in recipient country i at year t
• Xit: A vector of controls in recipient country i at year t (e.g. income, debt relief,
NGO aid, openness, agriculture value-added, civil conflict)
• ηi: The fixed effect component/unobserved heterogeneity
• κt: Time fixed effects/common shocks
• it: The error component
for k = T, E, H, I; indicating total public expenditure, public education expenditure,
public health expenditure and public infrastructure expenditure
Table 2.2 shows the dependent variables and aid variables used for each estimated model.
Table 2.2: Estimated models
Model Expenditure (dependent variable) Aid
T Total public expenditure Total aid disbursements
E Public education expenditure Education aid disbursements
H Public health expenditure Health aid disbursements
I Transport and communication spend-
ing, to proxy for infrastructure expen-
diture
Transport and communication aid
disbursements
In addition to using total or sectoral aid disbursements in the model (Ak,it), aid dis-
bursements are broken down according to their modality and more specifically: Sector
Programme (SP) aid or on-budget aid, Technical Cooperation (TC) or off-budget aid,
Investment Projects (IP) aid and other (ONF) aid that does not fall into these categories.
The procedure used to construct these aid modalities is explained in Section 2.4. When
these aid measures are used instead of total aid disbursements, they are also interacted
with the measure of institutional quality (IQit) to investigate the extent of aid fungibility
for each sector further.
More precisely, the following model that considers the different aid modalities is estimated
as follows:
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Yk,it = δ1Yk,it−1 + δ2SPaidk,it + δ3TCaidk,it + δ4IPaidk,it + δ5ONFaidk,it
+δ6IQit + δ7(SPaidk,it.IQit) + δ8(TCaidk,it.IQit) + ξ‘Xit + ηi + κt + it
(2.2)
where the aid variables correspond to:
• SPaidk,it: On-budget aid, disaggregated according to sector k in recipient country
i at year t
• TCaidk,it: Off-budget aid, disaggregated according to sector k in recipient country
i at year t
• IPaidk,it: Aid for investment projects, disaggregated according to sector k in recip-
ient country i at year t
• ONFaidk,it: Other non-flagged aid, disaggregated according to sector k in recipient
country i at year t
for k = T, E, H, I
Table 2.3 shows the definitions of the key variables in the estimated models.
Table 2.3: Key Variables
Variable Definition
Government expen-
diture for sector k
Yk,it Public spending consists of recurrent and cap-
ital government spending, grants and external
borrowings.
Total aid for sector
k
Ak,it Aid disbursements show the actual payments
to recipients every year for all purposes.
On-budget aid for
sector k
SPaidk,it Aid for specific programmes that are recorded
in the recipient’s budget.
Off-budget aid for
sector k
TCaidk,it Aid for technical activities that are not
recorded in the recipient’s budget.
Investment aid for
sector k
IPaidk,it Aid for activities targeted to increase physical
capital.
Other aid for sector
k ONFaidk,it
Other flows not flagged to be SP, TC or IP.
Institutional quality IQit The average of the corruption, law and order
and bureaucratic quality indices of the ICRG.
The models include a number of other control variables in addition to aid, institutional
quality and the interaction terms; namely income, debt relief and NGO aid. Variables
that are found to be significant in other relevant studies are also included, such as the
urbanisation rate, trade openness and civil conflict.
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Econometric theory
Generally, panel data models include an unobserved heterogeneity component. This term
can be modelled and estimated, using the FE model for panel data, or it can be considered
as a component of the error term, using the random effects model. Dealing with this FE
component usually involves taking First Differences (FD) and estimating the model or
demeaning the variables and estimating a Within-Group (WG) estimator. When using
the FE or WG estimators, terms that have no variation over time are removed together
with the unobservable component. These estimators may prove to be a problem in a
dynamic model since the Lagged Dependent Variable (LDV) will be correlated with the
error term of the model, thus causing a bias in the estimated coefficients (Nickell, 1981).
Several models have been developed to correct for this bias. Anderson and Hsiao (1982)
introduced the notion of taking FD to remove the unobserved heterogeneity component
and instrumenting these FD either with a lag of the variable or with a lagged difference.
Arellano and Bond (1991) developed this idea further and introduced the difference GMM
estimation method in this context in which all the moments conditions are exploited. A
potential limitation of the Arellano and Bond estimation method is that lagged levels may
prove to be weak instruments for variables that are in FD in cases when the LDV follows a
random walk and is highly persistent. Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond
(2000) suggested a method to correct for this problem, by estimating the model in both
FD and in levels and instrumenting the endogenous LDV using both lagged values and
lagged differences. This estimator is called the system GMM estimator.
An appropriate lag has to be selected under the assumption that the further lags chosen
for instrumentation are uncorrelated with the errors in a dynamic model. Arellano and
Bond (1991) developed an autocorrelation test that is available in Stata’s xtabond2 com-
mand developed by Roodman (2009a), which employs the difference and system GMM
estimators. In this dynamic model, it is expected that the Arellano and Bond’s test would
detect autocorrelation for the first lag because of how the model is constructed. If second-
order serial correlation does not exist, then the second lag of the dependent variable can
be used as an instrument since the second lag would be uncorrelated with the errors.
Identification strategy
For the purposes of this chapter, the system GMM method is used to instrument for the
endogenous LDV in each model with lagged levels and lagged differences of the dependent
variable. The Windmeijer correction for standard errors is used because of the bias that
the standard errors suffer in small samples (Windmeijer, 2005). In the model for total
government spending, the endogenous LDV is instrumented by going back one period
and using its second and third lags, since these lags are uncorrelated with the errors in
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the model (it − it−1) and as instruments they are valid following the Hansen tests for
instrument validity. The Hansen test is used instead of the Sargan test because it is more
robust in the presence of heteroscedasticity. The choice of lags depends on the Hansen test
for instrument validity. Apart from restricting the number of lags used for instrumentation,
all the instruments are collapsed to avoid the over-fitting of the endogenous variable that
would in turn weaken the Hansen test for instrument validity (Roodman, 2009b)2.1.
The system GMM method allows us to relax the assumption of exogeneity of aid to
public spending. The aid measures are thought to be endogenous in this model, following
the theoretical and empirical literature. Foreign aid is directed towards poorer countries
that could perhaps have low government spending levels to begin with. Causality could
run in either way, thus making aid flows endogenous in the models since both the level
of government expenditure as well as the composition of government expenditure could
affect aid flows. To identify the causal effect of aid, some of the popular instruments of
foreign aid found the empirical literature are measures of recipient need, such as income
or infant mortality and the population of aid-receiving countries since smaller countries
are found to receive larger aid flows. These are not applicable for our analysis since the
regressions have several variables of different types of aid flows that are considered to be
endogenous (on-, off-budget aid, investment project aid and other aid flows) 2.2.
In this study, different types of aid are considered (total aid disbursements and the different
modalities) and they are all considered endogenous as well as their interaction terms. In
this framework, aid flows are instrumented in a similar manner as the LDV: using lagged
levels and lagged differences.
Corruption is thought to be endogenous in the studies investigating its effect on expen-
diture (Delavallade, 2006, Mauro, 1998). As explained earlier, reverse causality between
government spending and corruption may be an issue since a specific allocation of the
government budget across the different sectors may encourage an environment of corrup-
tion. For example, in a country with high military spending opportunities for corruption
are higher. A way to deal with this suggested endogeneity of corruption and therefore
institutional quality is instrumental variables. Popular instruments for corruption used in
the literature include ethnolinguistic fractionalisation and colonial dummies.
Such instruments are not helpful for the purposes of this chapter, since they are time-
invariant and disappear in a dynamic panel data framework. For the purposes of this
analysis, the institutional quality variable is treated as exogenous and instrumented by
2.1Several lag structures have been considered and the results using system GMM will be described in
Section 2.5.
2.2Some initial results suggest that such instruments are weak.
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itself. As a robustness check, the assumption of exogeneity of institutional quality is
relaxed and the quality of institutions is treated as endogenous and instrumented using
its past levels.
The remainder control variables (NGO aid, debt relief, income, urbanisation, trade open-
ness, civil conflict) and the time dummies are instrumented with themselves. The inter-
action terms between aid and institutional quality are also treated as being endogenous
and instrumented using its lagged levels and lagged differences.
Due to the presence of the interaction term between institutional quality and foreign aid,
the conditional effects of foreign aid are calculated since the regression coefficients need
to be adjusted in the presence of an interaction term. The conditional effects are then
plotted against institutional quality (Brambor et al., 2006, Blalock, 2005, Friedrich, 1982)
and the standard errors of the conditional effects of aid are computed using the Delta
method (Oehlert, 1992).
As an alternative measure of institutional quality, institutional quality is ranked and cat-
egorised and different dummies are included in the regression instead of the continuous
variable. For this reason, the ICRG measure for institutional quality is ranked into three
categories: low, medium and high. This measure is constructed in such a way that coun-
tries are classified in the same way across the different samples and models. When using
the categorical measure, the interaction term allows us to estimate the marginal effects of
aid on government expenditure at the three levels of institutional quality (low, medium
and high).2.3
The interaction term between foreign aid and institutional quality is included in the models
to investigate the extent of fungibility and whether it depends on the level of institutional
quality. It is expected that low institutional quality would make aid fungible or more
fungible. Based on the definition of government expenditure, on-budget aid is expected
to have a one-to-one effect on spending if aid is non-fungible. Any coefficients of less than
1 are indications for fungibility. Off-budget aid, however, by definition is not expected to
affect government spending. Therefore, any coefficients of less than 0 are indications for
fungibility. The effects of aid for investment and any other aid flows are unclear based on
the theory, although we do not expect them to have a negative coefficient (Van de Sijpe,
2012). Nevertheless, aid for investment purposes is expected to be positively associated
with infrastructure or investment spending (Van de Walle and Mu, 2007, Mavrotas and
Ouattara, 2006).
Evidence concerning fungibility is mixed and a reason behind it might be corruption and
2.3Very few countries have variations in institutional quality (See Figure A.1.3 of Appendix A.1).
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the quality of institutions, which are not controlled for in most of the studies examined.
Institutional quality2.4 is expected to enter negatively in the model for infrastructure
spending and positively in the social sectors of health and education, based on the results
of the empirical literature described earlier (Delavallade, 2006, Tanzi and Davoodi, 2000,
Mauro, 1998). A negative coefficient of institutional quality for the sectors of education and
health expenditure could indicate that the construction component of the specific sector
receives a large share of the specific sectoral expenditure. This is based on the findings
of other authors, who find that corruption reduces spending in the health and education
sectors (Delavallade, 2006, Tanzi and Davoodi, 2000, Mauro, 1998) and also based on
the assumption that the construction sector provides the most available rents (De Jong
et al., 2009, Mackinnon, 2003). The assumption of corruption being most prevalent in the
construction sector is backed up by the findings of Transparency International. In their
report for the national Bribe Payers Index (TI, 2008) they showed that the construction
sector is the most corrupt sector in the world. Nevertheless, this assumption cannot be
tested with existing data since data on construction and sub-components of government
expenditure are limited.
According to the literature, debt relief would be positively associated with government
expenditure. This is because reducing the amount of debt would free up public resources
since debt repayments would also fall. Therefore, the resources that would have been
used for debt repayments can now be diverted towards government spending (Van de
Sijpe, 2012, Nguyen et al., 2003, Gupta et al., 2002, Sachs, 1988). Nevertheless, there are
some empirical results that do not support this idea (Depetris Chauvin and Kraay, 2005).
Donors could be targeting aid to NGOs as a means of avoiding corruption and cumbersome
bureaucracies (Wallace, 2009, Bra¨utigam and Knack, 2004, Bra¨utigam, 2000) and this is
expected to have a positive effect on total public expenditure (Lu et al., 2010).
Robustness checks
Alternative estimation techniques are employed, namely using static panel data models
with FE. Such models require the assumption of exogeneity of aid, suggesting that the
allocation of foreign aid to countries does not depend on the pattern of public expenditure.
2.3.2 Fungibility tests
After estimating the regression coefficients and conditional effects for each level of insti-
tutional quality, the conditional effects of on-budget aid and off-budget aid are tested
2.4Higher values of institutional quality correspond to low corruption, strong law and order and a small
bureacracy.
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against two one-sided fungibility tests to determine firstly whether or not aid is fungible
and secondly the extent of fungibility. These tests follow the methodology of Van de Sijpe
(2012) and Pettersson (2007).
The conditional effect of total aid disbursements is estimated to be:
ζT = (β2 + β4.IQit) (2.3)
The conditional effect of on-budget aid disbursements is:
ζSP = (δ2 + δ7.IQit) (2.4)
The conditional effect of off-budget aid disbursements is:
ζTC = (δ3 + δ8.IQit) (2.5)
These conditional effects are tested at each level of institutional quality since the condi-
tional effect of aid depends on the continuous institutional quality measure.
By definition, government expenditure would increase with total on-budget aid disburse-
ments since on-budget aid flows are included in the government expenditure variable as
external resources. This allows us to test whether aid fungibility exists by testing whether
the conditional effect of on-budget aid is equal to or larger than 1 (1 being the anticipated
conditional effect of aid flows in the case of no leakages). If the conditional effect takes
any value less than 1, it is an indication that some fungibility exists since on-budget aid
is not completely transferred into government expenditure. A conditional effect between
0 and 1 is an indication of partial fungibility. To determine the extent of fungibility we
test whether the conditional effect of on-budget aid is negative, indicating full fungibility.
The hypothesis of no fungibility of on-budget aid disbursements translates into:
H0 : ζSP ≥ 1 (2.6)
Ha : ζSP < 1 (2.7)
The hypothesis of full fungibility of on-budget aid disbursements translates into:
H0 : ζSP ≤ 0 (2.8)
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Ha : ζSP > 0 (2.9)
Off-budget aid, as opposed to on-budget aid, is not recorded in the recipient government’s
accounts, therefore, different fungibility tests need to be constructed. Off-budget aid is
not expected to raise government spending so to determine whether or not off-budget aid
is fungible we test the sign of the conditional effect of off-budget aid. If the conditional
effect of off-budget aid on spending is statistically insignificant it indicates that off-budget
aid is not fungible and has no effect on spending. If it is positive it shows that off-budget
aid crowds-in resources and raises government expenditure, but if the conditional effect
is negative it is an indication of fungibility. Following Van de Sijpe (2012), to test the
extent of fungibility of off-budget aid, we test whether the conditional effect is less than
the marginal effect of public resources net of aid flows minus 1.
Public resources net of aid refer to resources raised domestically through taxes or resources
raised by external borrowing and exclude aid flows. Devarajan et al. (2007) estimate
the marginal effect of unconditional resources on government spending to be 0.12 for
education and 0.04 for health, whereas Feyzioglu et al. (1998) estimate this to be even
lower: 0.08 for education and 0.02 for health. These estimations suggest that the marginal
effect of unconditional resources should be close to 0, therefore, Van de Sijpe (2012)
assumes that this marginal effect is 0. Making this assumption would not affect the
estimated coefficients, but could increase the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis
of full fungibility of off-budget aid (Van de Sijpe, 2012)2.5.
The hypothesis of no fungibility of off-budget aid disbursements then translates into:
H0 : ζTC ≥ 0 (2.10)
Ha : ζTC < 0 (2.11)
The hypothesis of full fungibility of off-budget aid disbursements then translates into:
H0 : ζTC ≤ −1 (2.12)
Ha : ζTC > −1 (2.13)
It is expected that in low levels of institutional quality, characterised by high corruption,
a weak law and order system and a large bureaucracy, aid would be fungible and definitely
2.5The marginal effect of the unconditional resources could be calculated using a two-step procedure as
in Devarajan et al. (2007) if reliable data on tax revenues and borrowing were available.
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to a larger extent than in high levels of institutional quality.
2.4 Data
2.4.1 Sources
The sample used consists of developing countries from the regions of Eastern Europe, the
Caribbean, Latin America, North Africa and the Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa, South
Asia, South East Asia, East Asia and the Pacific, over the period of 1990 - 2013. The
sample used for model T consists of 59 countries over the 24-year time period. The sample
used for model E consists of 51 countries, for model H of 70 countries and for model I of
51 countries. See Appendix A.6 for the full list of countries in each specification
Data for general public expenditure as a percentage to GDP are obtained from three sep-
arate sources. Total public spending data and transport and communications spending to
proxy for infrastructure spending data are obtained from the Statistics for Public Expen-
diture for Economic Development (SPEED) database provided by the International Food
Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) (IFPRI, 2013) that offers government expenditure by
sector. Public education data are obtained from the dataset constructed by Clements et al.
(2013) that collect government expenditure data using consolidated national accounts and
country reports to correct for any missing values in the areas of education and health.
Public health data are obtained from the World Developments Indicators (WDI) of the
WB (World Bank, 2015). Different data sources for the dependent variables are used for
the various models and are chosen based on the larger data availability.
The measure of institutional quality used for this study is the ICRG measure obtained
from the Quality of Governance (QoG) dataset published by the University of Gothenburg
(Dahlberg et al., 2015). The PRS Group publishes the ICRG index, which consists of
economic, financial and political risk factors. The institutional quality index used for
the purposes of this study includes three components of the political risk factors averaged
together: the extent of corruption, bureaucratic control and law and order. This measure of
corruption focuses mostly on political corruption in the form of patronage, favours, secret
funding of parties in power, nepotism and ties between politicians and businesses (Howell,
2011). The component of bureaucratic quality focuses on interruptions in government
services due to bureaucratic reasons. High-risk countries are those where the bureaucracy
is embedded in the political system and government services. The component on law and
order focuses on the strength of the legal system. High-risk countries suffer from a high
crime rate with weak sanctions. The index has been rescaled and normalised and ranges
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between 0 and 1, so that higher values indicate higher quality of governance.
The ICRG index of corruption is one of the most widespread measures for corruption and
has been available since 1985 for a large number of countries. Nevertheless, it is based
on the opinion of country experts on how political corruption is expected to affect in-
ternational investment and businesses. According to its methodology, political data are
collected and then transferred into risk points on the basis of the analysis of pre-set ques-
tions for each sub-component of the political risk component (i.e. corruption, law and
order, bureaucratic quality). These pre-set questions are not made public and, therefore,
cannot be challenged. Measuring corruption and the quality of institutions, is usually
based on individuals’ perceptions of corruption in any given country. Measuring percep-
tions introduces some measurement error since what certain people perceive as corruption
is not uniform across the population or between countries. Nevertheless, individuals make
decisions and behave accordingly based on such perceptions, thus the perception of cor-
ruption could be equally important (Razafindrakoto and Roubaud, 2010). Another issue
is the fact that perceptions may be easily affected by either the current situation of a
country and its economic performance, by the respondent’s experiences or by the cultural
and societal values of each country (Rothstein and Torsello, 2013). For example, business
experts and local people do not experience corruption at the same level and their responses
are expected to differ.
Data for foreign aid disbursements are obtained from the Creditor Reporting System
(CRS) of Development Assistance Committee of the OECD (OECD-DAC) that offers
disaggregated aid data according to donors, types of foreign aid and sectors (OECD, 2013).
Data for total disbursements for all sectors are available to be used in model T. Data for
disbursements for the purposes of the sectors of education, health and infrastructure are
available to be used in models E, H and I, respectively. The CRS database offers data
for disbursements and commitments and the differences between the two variables from
year to year are attributed to the fact that commitments may actually be disbursed in a
later year. For this reason, disbursements were chosen to best reflect foreign aid from the
point of view of recipient countries. Aid disbursements are defined as the actual payments
in each year and show the realisation of donors’ intentions and previous commitments.
Data for aid disbursements are available since 1990 from the CRS database although the
availability of aid disbursements is low in the years prior to 2002. Data for debt relief are
obtained from the DAC2a Table of the CRS for net debt relief. All of the aid variables
have been rescaled to reflect percentages of GDP.
The CRS database classifies flows according to their type and their purpose and this
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feature was used to construct the measure for aid disbursements. For each sector, data ac-
cording to channels of delivery and aid modalities were obtained. The channel of delivery
is the ‘first implementing partner’, who is responsible for the subsequent allocation of the
ODA resources. We focused on concessional flows of resources according to the definition
for ODA that have the public sector as the first implementing partner and more precisely
ODA grants (flow code 11), ODA loans (flow code 13) and private concessional loans (flow
code 30) that include flows from both bilateral and multilateral donors. The aid dis-
bursements for certain sectors were also constructed using the purpose codes and purpose
sectors assigned to each flow and more precisely for the sectors of education (sector code
110) and health (sector code 120. Aid disbursements for infrastructure are proxied by aid
disbursements for transport and storage (sector code 210) and disbursements for commu-
nications (sector code 220). Data for flows that have NGOs as their first implementing
partner were used to construct the ‘NGO aid’ variable for each sector k that is included
in the regressions and measures total or sectoral aid disbursements that are directed to
NGOs.
Data for different aid modalities were constructed to account for the idea that different
aid modalities would have different effects on the composition of public expenditure. This
methodology follows the procedure followed by Van de Sijpe (2012) as far as possible. The
CRS database flags each aid flow according to its aid modality: Programme-Based Ap-
proaches (PBAs), Free-standing Technical-Cooperation (FTC), IP and other non-flagged
aid (ONF). PBAs or SP aid includes aid flows that target a specific programme and aim
for development. SP aid or PBAs is the aid modality that best resembles flows with a di-
rect purpose for development on specific projects in specific sectors and that are recorded
in the budgets of recipient countries. FTC or TC includes activities that are financed
by donors but do not enter the national accounts directly. Some examples of TC include
funding training activities for the people of the developing country or the transfer of cer-
tain supplies related to human capital. IP aid includes any flows whose aim is to increase
the physical capital of a recipient country. Some flows are flagged twice so those flows are
equally divided between the two modalities which they were flagged for. Some flows are
not flagged at all and are recorded as ONF.
The WDI (2015) are also used to obtain data for a number of other variables used in
the models, namely GDP per capita, HIV prevalence, trade openness, agricultural value-
added, urbanisation, population variables, and GPD in current terms for the rescaling of
the aid measures. The index of civil conflict is obtained from the Centre of Systemic Peace
(Center of Systemic Peace, 2013). Detailed definitions of each variable and their sources
can be found in Appendix A.7.
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2.4.2 Descriptive statistics
Table 2.5 shows the descriptive statistics of the key variables. The sample of each model
changes because of data availability; the sample used is based on developing countries
that have available information for institutional quality (ICRG) and on public spending.
Such data for developing countries are not always available and there is a large number of
missing values in these samples. Most of the countries included in this sample come from
the region of Sub-Saharan Africa.
It can be seen that a large portion of public spending is diverted to education and health,
despite the differences in the samples for each model: around 15% of total spending is
diverted to education and around 12% to health. The sector of health receives the largest
share of NGO aid. It can be seen that a large amount of total aid is in the form of
investment and on-budget aid, but aid flows are mostly not flagged for specific purposes.
Aid for the purposes of education is mostly in the form of off-budget aid and aid for the
purposes of infrastructure is mostly in the form of aid for investment purposes. Negative
values for debt relief refer to the accumulation of more debt offsetting debt forgiveness.
The mean of public spending is higher in upper-middle income countries than low income
countries, explaining the need for foreign aid resources. This correlation is also true for
institutional quality and income, as expected from the empirical literature.
2.5 Empirical Results
2.5.1 Empirical models
This Section discusses the results for the dynamic models of government expenditure
(models T, E, H and I) using the system GMM estimation method because of its better
properties outlined in the Section 2.3. The conditional effects of aid flows and the p-values
for the two one-sided hypothesis tests are shown.
Total government spending - Model T
Table 2.6 shows the regressions for total public spending as a dependent variable. The
relevant p-values for the tests of first and second order autocorrelation are passed, show-
ing that only first degree autocorrelation exists, making the choice of the second lag for
instrumentation a valid one. The relevant p-values for the Hansen test for instrument
validity are also shown and it can be seen that the Hansen test is passed in all cases.
There is also no issue of over-fitting as the number of instruments for each regression is
less than the number of countries in each regression. The coefficients of the LDV using
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GMM lie between the coefficient obtained using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and FE,
as expected. It can be seen from the Table that the coefficient of the LDV using GMM is
lower than the one obtained using FE.
Based on the definition of government spending, it is expected that aid would have some
effect on it. Total government spending includes external resources or else aid flows.
Aid is statistically insignificant without the interaction term between aid and institutional
quality, providing some evidence of fungibility and that it does not depend on institutional
quality (column (3) of Table 2.6). The first column shows the results for the static model
and a significantly negative coefficient for total aid disbursements is estimated. For the
model with the aid modalities, the coefficient of on-budget aid is statistically insignificant
(Column (7) of Table 2.6). Based on the definition of on-budget aid, in cases of no
fungibility when no fund are leaked, a one-to-one effect with public spending is expected.
This insignificant coefficient gives evidence of fungibility. Nevertheless, it is argued in the
literature that the lack of a one-to-one relationship between aid and spending is not always
a cause for concern since aid funds could be saved as reserves (Harper, 2012). Off-budget
aid has a significantly negative coefficient in the model without the interaction (column
(7) of Table 2.6), giving evidence for fungibility irrespective of institutional quality. More
specifically, an increase of total off-budget aid of 1% of GDP is associated with a decrease of
0.95% of GDP, significant at 10 percent. This significantly negative coefficient is found in
the static model as well. The other types of aid have statistically insignificant coefficients
in column (7) of Table 2.6 using GMM. Positive coefficients would be expected if no
funds were leaked and this could be an indication of fungibility of those aid flows. Aid
for investment purposes has a significantly positive coefficient in the models estimated
using FE showing evidence against fungibility. Nevertheless, the extent of fungibility of
investment aid is unknown as a theoretical model does not exist to examine the coefficient
against certain hypotheses.
The coefficient of the ICRG variable is insignificant for all models, contradicting the results
of Tanzi and Davoodi (2000) that identify a ‘quantity’ effect of corruption on total public
spending. This could occur because the ICRG variable measures bureaucratic quality and
the rule of law in addition to corruption. NGO aid has, surprisingly, a negative coefficient
only in the model with the aid modalities using GMM. NGO aid is expected to have a
positive coefficient (Lu et al., 2010) but in this analysis it is associated with reductions in
public spending, suggesting that NGO aid is fungible (Yontcheva and Masud, 2005). Debt
relief is insignificant for the model of total public spending agreeing with Depetris Chauvin
and Kraay (2005) that find debt relief to have no association with spending.
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The other variables that are controlled for, apart from openness, HIV prevalence and
the share of agriculture value-added in the economy are insignificant. A positive effect
of trade is an indication that any gains from trade are fed back in the economy and re-
distributed in the form of public spending as a safety net against exposure to the terms of
trade risk (Rodrik, 1998). HIV prevalence is associated with increases in public spending
possibly via the health sector or education sector for prevention and monitoring (Mishra
and Newhouse, 2009, Gupta et al., 2002, Schwartla¨nder et al., 2001). A higher share of
agriculture in the economy is generally associated with reductions in tax revenues, as such
an informal sector with high levels of subsistence farming is difficult to be taxed. This
could have an effect on spending as lower tax revenues for the economy would mean less
funding for public expenditure (Teera and Hudson, 2004, Slemrod, 2002, Ghura, 1998).
Figure 2.1 shows the conditional effects of aid disbursements at the range of the ICRG
variable using system GMM (columns (4) and (8) of table 2.6). Figure 2.1(a) shows the
conditional effect of total aid disbursements, Figure 2.1(b) shows the effect of on-budget
aid disbursements and Figure 2.1(c) of off-budget aid disbursements. It can be seen that
the conditional effect of total aid disbursements is not statistically significantly different
from 0 at any value of the ICRG suggesting that some fungibility exists and is independent
of the quality of institutions.2.6 Total on-budget aid is generally found to be insignificant,
although when the ICRG takes the value 0.3 this conditional effect is significantly negative
and takes the value of -0.12. The conditional effect of total off-budget aid is found to be
dependent on institutional quality. The conditional effect is significantly negative when
institutions are weak and as institutional quality improves the conditional effect becomes
statistically insignificant. An insignificant effect for off-budget aid is no indication for
fungibility since off-budget aid is not expected to impact spending. When the ICRG
ranges between 0 and 0.3, the conditional effect of off-budget aid is between -2.22 and
-0.66.2.7
Table 2.7 shows the p-values for the two one-sided fungibility tests for on- and off-budget
aid. The first row of this Table shows the p-values for the two fungibility tests on the
regression coefficients obtained using system GMM when the interaction terms are not
included. Based on these p-values the hypothesis of no fungibility of on-budget is rejected
at all values of the ICRG (column (1) of Table 2.7), whereas the hypothesis of full fun-
gibility is not rejected at all values of the ICRG (column (2) of Table 2.7). This further
supports the finding of fungibility of on-budget aid and more precisely full fungibility and
disagrees with the initial hypothesis of the paper that the extent of fungibility depends on
2.6As institutional quality improves, the conditional effect increases and becomes positive.
2.719 countries of the sample take values between 0 and 0.3 for the ICRG and examples are Cote d’Ivoire,
Nigeria and Togo.
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institutional quality.
When institutional quality is considered, the p-values for the fungibility tests of total
off-budget aid show that the hypothesis of no fungibility is rejected (column (3)) when
institutions are weak (ICRG values of 0 - 0.3) and not rejected elsewhere. The hypothesis
of full fungibility is not rejected (column (4)) when institutions are weak (ICRG values
of 0 - 0.3) and rejected when institutions are strong (ICRG values of 0.4 - one).2.8 These
tests show that the extent of fungibility for total off-budget aid depends on institutional
quality and that lower institutional quality makes off-budget aid fungible. The hypothesis
of full fungibility of off-budget aid is not rejected when institutions are weak (ICRG values
of 0 - 0.3) and rejected when institutions are stronger (ICRG values of 0.4 - one).
Overall, the results agree with the finding that aid fungibility tends to be over-estimated
if the different aid modalities are not accounted for. The conditional effect of total aid dis-
bursements is found to be statistically insignificant for spending and therefore fungible, but
these results break down when on- and off-budget aid disbursements are considered, high-
lighting the importance of examining the different aid modalities. Additionally, including
the interaction term proves important for total off-budget aid. Without the interaction
term total on-budget aid is insignificant (column (3) of Table 2.6) and according to the
p-values for the fungibility tests it is also fully fungible (first row of Table 2.7). These
results remain with the inclusion of the interaction term at all values of the ICRG. On
the other hand, total off-budget aid is significantly negative without the interaction term
(column (3) of Table 2.6) and based on the fungibility tests it is fully fungible at the 10%
level (first row of Table 2.7).
Comparing these results with the results including the interaction terms, the results for
off-budget aid change. More precisely, the effect of total off-budget aid is significantly neg-
ative only when institutions are weak and insignificant when institutions become stronger.
The fungibility tests show that when institutions are strong, off-budget aid is non-fungible.
This shows the importance of examining the heterogeneous effect of aid based on insti-
tutional quality, as the extent of fungibility would be over-estimated in countries with
environments of strong institutions if the institutional quality is not considered.
Donors make a case for on-budget aid as it allows a more transparent management of aid
resources, especially in countries that are highly aid-dependent. Nevertheless, on-budget
aid is found to be fully fungible and the extent of fungibility is not found to depend on
institutional quality. This agrees with the findings of CABRI (2008) that finds no evidence
of a correlation between on-budget aid and public finance management, concluding that
2.8Some examples of countries that take values between 0.4 and 1 for the ICRG are Burkina Faso, Malawi
and Sri Lanka.
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on-budget aid is more easily captured.
Composition of government spending - Models E, H and I
Regarding the results on fungibility of aid for different purposes, the detailed results are
available in Appendix A.3.
The fungibility tests (Table A.3.3) suggest that on-budget aid for education is fully fungible
at low levels of institutional quality (ICRG values of 0 - 0.3) and non-fungible at the
higher values. On-budget aid for health is found to be fully fungible at the low to middle
values of the ICRG (0.2 - 0.7) and non-fungible at the higher values. On-budget aid for
infrastructure is found to be non-fungible at all values. Off-budget aid for education,
health and infrastructure is found to be non-fungible at all values of the ICRG. These
results provide some support for the initial hypothesis of this study that institutional
quality matters for the degree of fungibility.
Long-run effects
Dynamic models are estimated for public spending and because of the presence of the
LDV the long-run effects of aid need to be estimated (See Figures A.4.1, A.4.2, A.4.3 in
Appendix A.5). The long-run effects follow the same pattern with the short-run effects.
2.5.2 Discussion
The initial hypothesis of this study is not supported by the findings of aggregate aid dis-
bursements: institutional quality does not seem to play a role for the extent of fungibility
of aggregate aid. Nevertheless, the suggested fungibility of total aid disbursements is
found to be over-estimated as shown by the empirical literature. By disaggregating aid
flows according to their modality we find that the extent of fungibility depends on the aid
modality and on institutional quality. This could be an indication that corruption, the
general mis-management of aid flows by bureaucrats and participation in illegal activities
with low chance of getting caught or punished are likely causes of aid fungibility. Environ-
ments with low institutional quality are likely to foster illegal activities and the malicious
actions of the governments. On the other hand, the degree of aid illusion could also be
larger in such environments due to the large bureaucracy.
The fungibility results of on- and off-budget aid for the different estimated models are
summarised in Table 2.4.
Including the interaction term proves important especially for total off-budget aid and
off-budget aid for the purposes of health. For example, without the interaction term, total
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Table 2.4: Summary of results
On-budget aid (SP) Off-budget aid (TC)
Model T Insignificant & fully fungible at all
values of ICRG.
Negative & fully fungible at low values
of ICRG. Positive & non-fungible at
high values of ICRG.
Model E Insignificant & fully fungible at low
values of ICRG. Insignificant & non-
fungible at high values of ICRG.
Insignificant & non-fungible at all val-
ues of ICRG.
Model H Insignificant & fully fungible at low-
middle values of ICRG. Insignificant &
non-fungible at high values of ICRG.
Positive & non-fungible at ICRG=0.3
onwards.
Model I Insignificant & non-fungible at all val-
ues of ICRG.
Insignificant & non-fungible at all val-
ues of ICRG..
Higher values of the ICRG indicate higher quality of institutions.
off-budget aid is found to be partially fungible at the 10% level (first row of Table 2.7).
When institutional quality is considered, the hypothesis tests suggest that off-budget aid is
fully fungible when institutions are weak and non-fungible when they are strong. Similar
results hold for aid for the purposes of health: inferences change when we consider the
fungibility tests of the coefficient of on- or off-budget aid and the corresponding tests
conditional on the value of the ICRG. More precisely, without the interaction term total
off-budget aid is found to be partially fungible, whilst considering the interaction term
changes this result: total off-budget aid is found to be fully fungible when institutions are
weak and non-fungible when institutions are strong. These models show the importance
of examining the heterogeneous effect of aid based on institutional quality, as we would
wrongly estimate the extent of fungibility for environments with strong institutions if
institutional quality is not considered.
Examining the three components of spending, namely education, health and infrastructure,
does not shed light on the origin of the fungibility result with regard to total public
spending and total off-budget aid. The conditional effects of total, on- and off-budget
aid flows for the purposes of education, health and infrastructure are in almost all cases
statistically insignificant (with the exception of on-budget aid for health). These results
could be explained by two possible reasons. Firstly, aid is given for other purposes apart
from education, health and infrastructure and the fungibility result of total off-budget aid
could originate from other purposes. Some examples of other aid purposes not examined
by this study are aid for the purposes of population policies, aid for the purposes of water
and sanitation or aid for the purposes of conflict resolution. Also, the variability of aid
flows for different purposes is low compared to total aid. This could explain the lack of
significant results. The dataset for aid of different purposes contains a large number of
zeros and aid flows close to 0 (See Table 2.5).
Furthermore, there is no evidence to support the ‘quantity’ effect of corruption identified
37
in the empirical literature (Tanzi and Davoodi, 2000). There is some evidence of the allo-
cation effect for the model of public education spending, but overall institutional quality
is not found to be statistically significant for public spending. Regarding NGO aid, our
analysis shows that it may be fungible as it is found to be negatively associated with total
public spending. Nevertheless, this negative association does not originate from spending
on education, health and infrastructure as NGO aid is found to be insignificant for those
types of spending. As mentioned earlier, NGO aid is expected to have a positive coef-
ficient on spending since this type of aid is used by international donors as a means of
avoiding cumbersome governments and rent-seeking activities (Wallace, 2009, Bra¨utigam
and Knack, 2004, Bra¨utigam, 2000). An insignificant or negative effect could be an in-
dication for the fungibility of such aid (Yontcheva and Masud, 2005). Furthermore, aid
in the form of debt relief is not found to be associated with changes in public spending
based on the results of this study. A theoretical model is not available to characterise the
extent of fungibility of aid in the form of debt relief, but an insignificant coefficient could
be indication of fungibility since resources that would have been spent on debt repayments
could now be diverted towards public spending (Van de Sijpe, 2012, Nguyen et al., 2003,
Gupta et al., 2002, Sachs, 1988). Moreover, aid targeted to the three different components
of spending studies in this study is always found to be insignificant suggesting that there
are no spillover effects of aid from other sectors. This means that in the cases where aid is
found to be fungible for specific sectors, the fungible aid flows are not transferred into the
sectors studied in this study: education, health or infrastructure. The fact that different
forms of aid are found to be fungible based on the results of this study is not necessarily a
cause for concern. Fungibility could arise for any number of reasons, as mentioned earlier,
one of them being the optimal choice of recipient governments. Aid flows might affect tax
revenue or the external debt and aid flows might, therefore, be allocated elsewhere within
the government’s budget.
2.5.3 Robustness checks
To ensure that the results are robust and are not sensitive to the estimation method used,
alternative estimation methods and samples are used.
Static models with FE and standard errors clustered at the country level are estimated.
Furthermore, an alternative measure for total government spending is considered by using
the WB measure for expense as a percentage of GDP that measures all payments for the
operating activities of the government (World Bank, 2015).2.9 (See Appendix A.2).
2.9Static models are estimated as the number of observations falls to 571 from 979.
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Furthermore, to further extend the FE analysis, lagged values for the aid variables are
considered as well as contemporaneous ones. Lagged values are used to correct for the
potential endogeneity of aid and public spending since countries that receive foreign aid
might be countries with low government spending that require external funds to fill in the
gaps. The first and second lags are considered so as to ensure that past values of aid do
not impact the results. In the static model, as a robustness check, lagged values of the
ICRG variable are also used to correct for the potential endogeneity between institutional
quality or corruption and public spending. Also, institutional quality is measured using
the average of the Worldwide Governance Indicators developed by Kaufmann and Zoido-
Lobato´n (1999) (World Bank, 2014). The FE models are also estimated using a categorical
measure for institutional quality, rather than a continuous one. Countries are classified to
have low, medium or high institutional quality. Countries whose mean institutional quality
throughout the time period examined is higher than the mean institutional quality of all
countries in the sample are classified as having high institutional quality and countries
whose mean is lower are classified as having low institutional quality. To complement
this categorisation, countries are also classified to have low or high institutional quality
based on their median institutional quality value rather than the mean. If there are any
discrepancies between the two categorisations, then these cases are classified as having
medium level institutional quality. Moreover, a common sample is generated where the
same observations for all four models of public spending are used.2.10 These results are
shown in Appendix A.4)
The results for model T remain mostly robust with these alternative methods of estimation.
More precisely, when the original model is estimated with FE and when the alternative
dependent variable is used, the results with regard to aggregate aid and off-budget aid
remain robust. Initially, on-budget aid was found to be statistically insignificant and fully
fungible for all values of the ICRG. With static FE models and the alternative dependent
variable, the results become stronger and the fungibility of on-budget aid is also found to
be dependent on institutional quality in the direction expected (See Appendix A.2).
2.6 Conclusion
The aim of this study was to examine aid fungibility for total aid disbursements and for
some of its components, by looking at the sectors of education, health and infrastructure.
These sectors were considered because of their importance for development and the impor-
tance donors place on them, especially since they aim in improving related development
2.10The number of observations of the common sample is 510.
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indicators (MDGs/post-2015 agenda). The hypothesis of this study was that institutional
quality plays a role for fungibility and more specifically that aid disbursements are more
fungible when institutional quality is low, described as situations of a large bureaucracy,
a weak legal system and a high degree of corruption. Investigating whether the effect
of aid on government expenditure depends on institutional quality can shed light on the
cause behind fungibility. Fungibility can arise for a number of reasons: due to the opti-
mal choice of recipient governments that consider their total revenue - including domestic
and external sources - when allocating funds across their budget, malicious intent or aid
illusion.
Following the work of Lu et al. (2010), Van de Sijpe (2012) and Dieleman et al. (2013), dy-
namic models were estimated using the system GMM method to capture the persistence
of public expenditure and different aid modalities were considered (on- and off-budget
aid). As a robustness check, static models with FE were also estimated. Looking at aid
disbursements as a whole, over-estimates the degree of fungibility, as suggested by Van de
Sijpe (2012) and this is supported by the findings of this study. The hypothesis that insti-
tutional quality plays a role for fungibility is not supported when total aid disbursements
are considered. Total aid disbursements as a whole and total aid disbursements for the
sectors considered (education, health, infrastructure) are found to have an insignificant ef-
fect on expenditure. The results become interesting when we distinguish between on- and
off-budget aid and consider if the two types of aid have different effects on expenditure.
Total on-budget aid disbursements are found to be insignificant and fully fungible, whereas
off-budget aid is found to be non-fungible when institutions are strong and fully fungible
when institutions are weak, suggesting that the quality of institutions does play a role
for the fungibility of off-budget aid. In other words, total aid disbursements received are
substituting domestic resources instead of complementing them and government spending
does not increase (in some cases it even decreases - if the conditional effect is negative).
This result could be explained as the optimal choice of the governments to consider aid
disbursements as part of total revenue as a whole when allocating resources across their
budget, but it could also be explained by malicious intent of government officials at the
receiving end of aid disbursements, especially for the cases of off-budget aid where the
extent of fungibility depends on institutional quality. This could be an indication that the
reason behind the fungibility of off-budget aid is not a optimal choice, but malicious intent.
On the other hand, weak institutions could also exacerbate the issue of aid illusion when
uninformed government officials misperceive the budget and available revenues. Neverthe-
less, in some cases where aid is found to be fungible, the fungibility result does not depend
on institutional quality and this could indicate that malicious intent or aid illusion are
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not the causes behind fungibility, for example for total on-budget aid flows. The fact that
the fungibility of total on-budget aid is found to be independent of institutional quality is
surprising as on-budget aid disbursements correspond to the flows received and handled
by the recipient governments. Nevertheless, with alternative econometric specifications,
the fungibility of on-budget aid is indeed found to depend on institutional quality.
Off-budget aid refers to activities that are financed by donors and are intended for devel-
opment, such as the provision of know-how in the form of training activities or education
programmes to augment the human capital of developing countries. Total off-budget aid
is found to be fungible when institutions are weak and this suggests that the activities
aimed for development, for example training activities aimed to raise human capital, are
not utilised to raise spending.
Debt relief is also found to be insignificant for spending. Although we expect the resources
targeted for debt repayments to be spent elsewhere and raise government spending, an
insignificant effect might indicate that governments are behaving optimally and those re-
sources are used somewhere else within the budget and not on spending. For the different
components of spending, non-sector specific aid was also included and the results sug-
gest that there are no spillover effects of aid between sectors, therefore, any fungible aid
resources for education, health or infrastructure are spent outside of these sectors.
The same models of public spending were estimated with and without the interaction
terms and the effects of aid were tested against the fungibility tests in both cases. The
importance of considering institutional quality for fungibility is highlighted particularly
for total public spending. The degree of fungibility based on the fungibility tests changes
with institutional quality for off-budget aid and if the heterogeneous effect of institutional
quality on off-budget aid is not considered, we would have inferred that off-budget aid
is fully fungible, thus over-estimating the degree of fungibility in environments of high
institutional quality.
These results have their limitations, particularly with regard to the data used. The avail-
able data for public expenditure lack information on the sub-components of sectoral ex-
penditure and this could have been helpful with estimating the extent of aid fungibility.
Furthermore, these results are largely based on the ICRG measure of institutional quality.
As discussed previously, measures of institutional quality are highly subjective as they
involve perceptions and the assessment of country experts, who can easily be affected by
a number of factors. The conditional effect of aid as well as the fungibility tests, were
estimated over the range of this institutional quality measure and this could be problem-
atic for the values estimated at the extremes, although looking at the descriptive statistics
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indicates that extreme values of the ICRG are not present in these samples. Furthermore,
the measure capturing institutional quality is an average of three political components:
bureaucratic quality, the extent of corruption and law and order and it is unclear which
component drives these results. Another limitation of this study is the quality of data used.
Data for developing countries suffer from the problem of a large number of missing values,
especially in Africa (Devarajan, 2013), and this can prove to be a problem when GMM
estimation is used, where using past levels and past differences as instruments reduces the
number of available observations even further.
Furthermore, looking at the revenue side of the budget and how taxation changes with
foreign aid could help in identifying the effect of aid on public finances as a whole and
would make the picture of fungibility and institutional quality clearer. Since foreign aid
is found to substitute domestic resources for spending, the domestic resources are either
spent elsewhere, diverted into private accounts, or used to finance tax reductions or debt
reductions. Tax revenue constitutes a large part of the government’s revenue used to
finance expenditure and repay any public debt. How foreign aid and institutional quality
together affect tax collection efforts and the various types of tax revenues is important
in developing countries, where institutions are weak and corruption is more prevalent.
Bureaucratic corruption is likely to affect the collection of tax revenues by bribing tax
collectors for tax exemptions (Gupta, 2007). Foreign aid and bureaucratic corruption
could have contradicting effects on government revenues. Therefore, examining the two
variables together and considering an interaction term between the two could prove to be
helpful in understanding the extent of fungibility in terms of public finances at different
levels of institutional quality. The following study (Chapter 3) investigates the extent of
fungibility with regard to tax revenues. This is done to understand whether the absence
of an effect of aid on spending is explained by the government behaving optimally and
adjusting other components of the budget, such as tax revenues.
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2.7 Figures and Tables
Table 2.5: Descriptive statistics, 1990 - 2013
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Total: 979 observations (59 countries for 1990 - 2013, unbalanced)
Total public spending 22.377 8.749 0.250 61.720
Total aid disbursements 4.744 10.774 0 184.863
Total on-budget aid 0.767 4.538 0 90.576
Total off-budget aid 0.367 0.731 0 10.735
Total investment aid 0.800 1.170 0 7.935
Total other non-flagged aid 2.810 9.089 0 175.739
Total NGO aid 0.220 0.928 0 12.595
Debt relief 0.484 2.725 -0.907 63.899
ICRG 0.447 0.125 0.097 0.898
Education: 772 observations (51 countries for 1990 - 2013, unbalanced)
Total education spending 3.420 2.174 0 12.860
Education aid disbursements 0.252 0.445 0 3.828
Education on-budget aid 0.022 0.101 0 1.189
Education off-budget aid 0.077 0.141 0 1.303
Education investment aid 0.061 0.148 0 1.981
Education other non-flagged aid 0.092 0.219 0 2.428
Education NGO aid 0.015 0.087 0 1.211
Debt relief 0.417 2.839 -0.346 63.899
ICRG 0.462 0.109 0.097 0.805
Health: 1044 observations (70 countries for 1990 - 2013, unbalanced)
Total health spending 2.688 1.429 0.113 11.247
Health aid disbursements 0.297 0.537 0 4.732
Health on-budget aid 0.022 0.083 0 1.214
Health off-budget aid 0.037 0.081 0 1.043
Health investment aid 0.068 0.132 0 1.356
Health other non-flagged aid 0.170 0.364 0 3.900
Health NGO aid 0.034 0.128 0 1.905
Debt relief 0.604 3.273 -0.907 63.899
ICRG 0.428 0.113 0.111 0.875
Infrastructure: 746 observations (51 countries for 1990 - 2013, unbalanced)
Total infrastructure spending 1.218 1.034 0 7.690
Infrastructure aid disburse-
ments
0.292 0.511 0 5.267
Infrastructure on-budget aid 0.009 0.053 0 0.779
Infrastructure off-budget aid 0.014 0.083 0 1.955
Infrastructure investment aid 0.202 0.391 0 4.993
Infrastructure other non-flagged
aid
0.067 0.202 0 3.339
Infrastructure NGO aid 0 0.002 0 0.037
Debt relief 0.399 2.760 -0.346 63.899
ICRG 0.468 0.110 0.097 0.806
The variables are expressed in percentages of GDP, with the exception of the ICRG variable. The sample
of each model changes due to data limitations, leaving an unbalanced panel dataset from 1990 - 2013.
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Table 2.6: Total public expenditure model - Model T
Total aid disbursements Total aid modalities
FE FE GMM GMM FE FE GMM GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Total public spending, lagged 0.635*** 0.554*** 0.608*** 0.625*** 0.517** 0.530***
(0.097) (0.170) (0.140) (0.102) (0.220) (0.096)
Total aid disbursements -0.263* 0.071 -0.031 -0.311
(0.141) (0.085) (0.268) (0.571)
Total on-budget aid -0.380 0.084 -0.117 -0.025
(0.473) (0.274) (0.075) (0.333)
Total off-budget aid -2.521*** -0.180 -0.953* -2.217***
(0.767) (0.530) (0.538) (0.790)
Total investment aid 0.802* 0.566** -0.290 -0.352
(0.407) (0.216) (0.475) (0.284)
Other non-flagged aid 0.050 -0.005 0.059 0.047
(0.048) (0.037) (0.158) (0.069)
ICRG 0.666 -0.247 2.934 1.650 1.306 -0.597 3.993 2.613
(5.152) (2.435) (4.665) (4.969) (5.267) (2.569) (3.551) (3.418)
Interaction (ICRG*Total aid) 0.775* -0.124 0.909
(0.399) (0.250) (1.543)
Interaction (ICRG*On-budget aid) 0.986 -0.113 -0.327
(1.570) (0.870) (1.102)
Interaction (ICRG*Off-budget aid) 3.991 -0.494 5.175
(3.154) (2.000) (3.122)
Total NGO aid -0.033 -0.008 -0.098 -0.084 -0.013 -0.004 -0.137*** -0.123***
(0.090) (0.045) (0.063) (0.078) (0.090) (0.043) (0.044) (0.044)
Debt relief 0.026 -0.021 0.036 0.074 -0.138 -0.041 0.022 0.050
(0.173) (0.087) (0.622) (0.361) (0.139) (0.099) (0.244) (0.116)
GDP per capita -7.663* -2.480 -1.909 -1.523 -8.090* -2.880 -2.126 -1.792
(4.013) (1.928) (1.748) (1.336) (4.080) (1.956) (1.513) (1.250)
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Urbanisation -0.183 -0.104 0.015 0.011 -0.169 -0.079 -0.002 -0.001
(0.242) (0.099) (0.041) (0.036) (0.252) (0.105) (0.033) (0.029)
Openness -0.006 0.003 0.036** 0.030* -0.004 0.002 0.042* 0.041***
(0.023) (0.010) (0.015) (0.016) (0.021) (0.010) (0.024) (0.014)
Civil conflict 0.266 0.039 0.165 0.090 0.238 0.035 0.050 0.071
(0.229) (0.092) (0.257) (0.295) (0.229) (0.092) (0.294) (0.256)
HIV prevalence -0.135 -0.051 0.158 0.129 -0.139 -0.053 0.182** 0.178***
(0.138) (0.055) (0.101) (0.104) (0.144) (0.057) (0.088) (0.059)
Population ages 0-14 -0.703** -0.264** 0.000 -0.015 -0.742** -0.306** -0.023 -0.010
(0.295) (0.129) (0.083) (0.085) (0.280) (0.124) (0.081) (0.064)
Agriculture value added -0.294*** -0.175*** -0.137** -0.112 -0.276*** -0.176*** -0.128* -0.118**
(0.086) (0.044) (0.065) (0.071) (0.080) (0.041) (0.068) (0.056)
AR(1) test 0.006 0.003 0.009 0.003
AR(2) test 0.990 0.825 0.997 0.956
Hansen test 0.576 0.348 0.592 0.917
Diff-in Hansen test 0.712 0.870 0.744 0.839
No. of instruments 37 40 46 52
No. of countries 59 59 59 59 59 59 59 59
N 979 979 979 979 979 979 979 979
All specifications control for a full set of country and year fixed effects. The endogenous variables are instrumented by using the second up to third lags.
p-values for the autocorrelation tests for the first and second lags are provided. p-values for the Hansen test of instrument validity and the difference-in
Hansen test showing the validity of the additional lags used by System GMM are also provided. The fiscal variables, aid, debt relief, openness and agri-
culture-valued added are expressed as percentages of GDP. Urbanisation and HIV prevalence are expressed in as percentages of total. Standard errors in
parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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(a) Total aid disbursements
(b) Total on-budget aid disbursements
(c) Total off-budget aid disbursements
Figure 2.1: The conditional effects of total aid
The effects are calculated from Table 2.6. Standard errors
are calculated using the Delta method. Confidence inter-
vals at the 95% level are shown for the two-sided test of
significance. The conditional effect is estimated over the
range of the ICRG variable, where higher values indicate
higher institutional quality.
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Table 2.7: Model T - Fungibility tests for on- and off-budget aid disbursements
ICRG H0 : δSP≥1 H0 : δSP≤0 H0 : δTC≥0 H0 : δTC≤−1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
No interaction 0.000 0.124 0.082 0.930
0 0.001 0.530 0.003 0.938
0.1 0.000 0.601 0.000 0.918
0.2 0.000 0.780 0.000 0.253
0.3 0.000 1.000 0.024 0.154
0.4 0.000 0.910 0.395 0.061
0.5 0.000 0.800 0.670 0.052
0.6 0.000 0.747 0.781 0.050
0.7 0.002 0.717 0.833 0.049
0.8 0.010 0.698 0.862 0.049
0.9 0.023 0.685 0.881 0.048
1 0.040 0.675 0.893 0.048
p-values for the one-sided fungibility tests are shown over the range of the ICRG variable. Columns (1)
and (3) correspond to the test of no fungibility for on- and off-budget aid, respectively. Columns (2) and
(4) correspond to the test of full fungibility for on- and off-budget aid,respectively. These tests are based
on the conditional effects of Table 2.6.
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Appendix A:
A.1 Descriptive statistics
Appendix A.1 contains information on the variables used for the analysis.
Figure A.1.1 shows the normal distribution of the ICRG variable used.
Figure A.1.1: ICRG distribution
Figure A.1.2 shows aggregate aid flows for total aid and for the different sectors over time
in the common sample of 510 observations.
Figure A.1.2: Aggregate aid flows over time
48
Figure A.1.3 shows ICRG over time by country in the sample.
Figure A.1.3: ICRG over time by country
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A.2 FE results
Appendix A.2 shows the conditional effects of model T with static FE and standard
errors clustered at the country level. The results with FE support the original findings
that the degree of fungibility of off-budget aid depends on institutional quality in the
anticipated direction. Additionally, this econometric specification shows that the degree
of fungibility of on-budget aid also depends on institutional quality in the anticipated
direction. Furthermore, the one-sided fungibility tests in the specifications without the
interaction terms (first row of Tables A.2.1 and A.2.2) show that fungibility would be
over-estimated in environments of high institutional quality if the interaction term is not
considered.
Table A.2.1 shows the p-values for the two one-sided fungibility tests. The results with FE
suggest that on-budget aid is fully fungible when institutional quality is low to medium
(values 0 - 0.6) and non-fungible when institutional quality is high (values 0.7 - one). Off-
budget aid is found to be fully fungible when institutional quality is low (values 0 - 0.4)
and non-fungible as institutional quality improves (values 0.5 - one).
Table A.2.1: Model T (Static FE) - Fungibility tests for on- and off-budget aid dis-
bursements
ICRG H0 : δSP≥1 H0 : δSP≤0 H0 : δTC≥0 H0 : δTC≤−1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
No interaction 0.000 0.159 0.001 0.226
0 0.001 0.797 0.000 0.980
0.1 0.000 0.819 0.000 0.990
0.2 0.000 0.866 0.000 0.990
0.3 0.000 0.873 0.000 0.801
0.4 0.000 0.467 0.068 0.451
0.5 0.003 0.361 0.280 0.299
0.6 0.045 0.325 0.458 0.232
0.7 0.132 0.308 0.573 0.196
0.8 0.221 0.297 0.646 0.175
0.9 0.295 0.291 0.696 0.161
1 0.357 0.286 0.730 0.302
p-values for the one-sided fungibility tests are shown over the range of the ICRG variable. Columns (1)
and (3) correspond to the test of no fungibility for on- and off-budget aid, respectively. Columns (2) and
(4) correspond to the test of full fungibility for on- and off-budget aid,respectively. These tests are based
on the conditional effects obtained using FE portrayed in Figure A.2.1.
Figure A.2.1 shows the conditional effects of total aid flows on total general public spend-
ing.
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(a) Total aid disbursements
(b) Total on-budget aid disbursements
(c) Total off-budget aid disbursements
Figure A.2.1: The conditional effects of total aid on government spending (Static FE)
Standard errors are calculated using the Delta method. Confidence intervals at the 95% level are shown
for the two-sided test of significance. The conditional effect is estimated over the range of the ICRG
variable, where higher values indicate higher institutional quality.
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Table A.2.2 shows the p-values for the two one-sided fungibility tests in the models with
the alternative measure of government spending (government expenses) as a dependent
variable.
The results suggest that on-budget aid is fully fungible when institutional quality is low to
medium (values 0 - 0.5) and non-fungible when institutional quality is high (values 0.6 -
one). Off-budget aid is found to be fully fungible when institutional quality is low (values
0 - 0.3) and non-fungible as institutional quality improves (values 0.4 - one).
Table A.2.2: Model T (Static FE) - Fungibility tests for on- and off-budget aid disburse-
ments with alternative dependent variable
ICRG H0 : δSP≥1 H0 : δSP≤0 H0 : δTC≥0 H0 : δTC≤−1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
No interaction 0.000 0.164 0.903 0.989
0 0.000 0.976 0.002 0.985
0.1 0.000 0.978 0.002 0.972
0.2 0.000 0.980 0.003 0.800
0.3 0.000 0.919 0.011 0.562
0.4 0.000 0.178 0.397 0.003
0.5 0.013 0.074 0.973 0.000
0.6 0.200 0.055 0.994 0.000
0.7 0.439 0.047 0.997 0.000
0.8 0.601 0.044 0.997 0.000
0.9 0.701 0.041 0.998 0.000
1 0.764 0.040 0.998 0.000
p-values for the one-sided fungibility tests are shown over the range of the ICRG variable. Columns (1)
and (3) correspond to the test of no fungibility for on- and off-budget aid, respectively. Columns (2) and
(4) correspond to the test of full fungibility for on- and off-budget aid,respectively. These tests are based
on the conditional effects obtained using FE portrayed in Figure A.2.1.
Figure A.2.2 shows the conditional effects of aid on the alternative dependent variable
used (government expenses).
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(a) Total aid disbursements
(b) Total on-budget aid disbursements
(c) Total off-budget aid disbursements
Figure A.2.2: The conditional effects of total aid on government expenses (Static FE)
Static models with FE are estimated with government expense as the dependent variable. Standard
errors are calculated using the Delta method. Confidence intervals at the 95% level are shown for the
two-sided test of significance. The conditional effect is estimated over the range of the ICRG variable,
where higher values indicate higher institutional quality.
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A.3 Sectoral results
Appendix A.3 shows the detailed results on the models of sectoral expenditure: education,
health and infrastructure.
Table A.3.1 shows the regression coefficients for the models of the different components
of public spending: education, health and infrastructure, when considering the aggregate
effect of aid disbursements. Aid corresponds to the sector-specific aid for each model, i.e.
for education spending aid indicates education aid disbursements, for health spending aid
indicates health aid disbursements and so on. The NGO variable indicates the sector-
specific aid that is diverted to NGOs. Non-sector specific aid corresponds to aid given for
other purposes apart from the sector in question, i.e. for the education model, non-sector
specific aid corresponds to aid given for other purposes apart from education such as health,
infrastructure and so on. Table A.3.2 shows the regression coefficients for the different
models of public spending: education, health and infrastructure, when considering the
different aid modalities, i.e. on-budget aid, off-budget aid, investsment aid and any other
aid flows that do not fall into these categories. For the case of education the second and
third lags are just used for instrumentation, while for the case of infrastructure more lags
are used (second up to fifth). The lags for instrumentation are chosen based on the Hansen
test for instrument validity (the requirement was that the test should not reject the null of
validity) and this choice resulted in more lags than the number of countries. Different lag
structures are also used with fewer instruments and the empirical results do not change.
The coefficients of the LDV using GMM lie between the coefficient obtained using OLS
and FE, as expected (not shown).
Total aid for the purposes of education is statistically insignificant (column (1) of Ta-
ble A.3.1). These results suggest that there is some fungibility of aid for the purposes
of education that is independent of institutional quality. On- and off-budget aid dis-
bursements for the purposes of education have insignificant coefficients (column (1) of
Table A.3.2). This is a cause for concern regarding on-budget aid since on-budget aid
flows do not contribute in spending at all, whereas a positive one-to-one effect is expected.
Off-budget aid, however, is not expected to affect spending based on its definition, thus an
insignificant coefficient is not a cause for concern. The negative coefficient of investment
aid is also an indication of fungibility for this aid modality since according to the literature
a positive effect is expected (Van de Sijpe, 2012, Gomanee et al., 2005, Heller, 1975).
Total aid for the purposes of health is statistically insignificant in the models of public
health spending (column (3) of Table A.3.1), showing some evidence of fungibility. On-
budget aid is insignificant showing evidence for fungibility, whereas off-budget aid has
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a positive coefficient without the interaction term (column (3) of Table A.3.2). More
precisely, an increase in off-budget health aid of 1% of GDP is associated with an increase
in public health spending of 1.17% of GDP, significant at 1%. This positive coefficient
gives evidence against the fungibility of off-budget aid and also evidence of a flypaper
effect since the coefficient of aid is higher than 1 and therefore, the associated increase in
spending is higher than the aid increase (Bailey and Connolly, 1998).
For the model of public infrastructure spending it can be seen that aggregate aid as well as
on- and off-budget aid flows are statistically insignificant (column (5) of Table A.3.1 and
Table A.3.2), giving evidence of fungibility. These insignificant coefficients give evidence
for fungibility for the case of on-budget aid. Nevertheless, the finding of fungibility is
found to be independent of the level of the quality of institutions. Positive coefficients are
expected for investment and other aid flows and insignificant ones could indicate fungibility
(Van de Sijpe, 2012, Gomanee et al., 2005).
The ICRG variable is significant only in the model for education spending with aggregate
aid disbursement (Table A.3.1), agreeing to some extent with the literature with regard
to the ‘allocation’ effect of corruption: lower corruption (higher institutional quality) is
associated with increases in spending in social sectors such as education (Delavallade,
2006, Mauro, 1998, Tanzi and Davoodi, 2000). The ICRG variable is statistically insignifi-
cant for the model of infrastructure spending, contradicting the findings of the corruption
literature. The effect of corruption on total spending is likely to originate from the con-
struction sector, which plays a significant role in this type of expenditure; however, this
suggested idea is not supported by these findings (Sohail and Cavill, 2006).
Non-sector specific aid (any other aid flows apart from aid for the purposes of education
does not affect public education spending, showing that there are no spillover effects of
aid in the education sector. The same is found to be true for non-health aid and non-
infrastructure aid. Debt relief is expected to increase spending as resources that were to
be spent on repayments can now be diverted towards public spending, nevertheless, as
with the case of total public spending, debt relief is not associated with public spending
for the purposes of education, health or infrastructure. Aid given to NGOs is statistically
insignificant for the models of spending.
Civil conflict is found to be significantly associated with reductions in public education
spending, possibly due to the uncertainty such situations create and also due to the diver-
sion of public finance towards military spending (Grigoli and Mills, 2014, Blattman and
Miguel, 2010, Hendrix, 2010). As expected, HIV prevalence is found to be significantly
positive for the model of health spending. This finding could possibly be driven by strate-
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gies for prevention and monitoring of the virus (Lu et al., 2010, Mishra and Newhouse,
2009, Gupta et al., 2002, Schwartla¨nder et al., 2001). Urbanisation has a significantly
positive coefficient for the model of public health spending and this is to be expected since
the delivery of public health services is easier to deliver in urban areas and urbanisation is
likely to create economies of scale in health provision (Baqir, 1998, Kau and Rubin, 1981).
Furthermore, trade has a positive and significant coefficient for infrastructure spending
and the share of agriculture value-added has a significantly negative coefficient. These
coefficients can be explained by the reasons explained earlier for the case of total public
spending. The gains from trade could be re-distributed in the form of public spending and
more precisely public infrastructure spending, thus raising the delivery of infrastructure
services (Rodrik, 1998). Additionally, output from the agriculture sector is difficult to
be taxed and this deprives tax revenue from being raised that could in turn be financing
spending (Teera and Hudson, 2004, Slemrod, 2002, Ghura, 1998). The other variables that
are included in the models are statistically insignificant.
Table A.3.3 shows the p-values for the two one-sided fungibility tests for on- and off-budget
aid for the different dependent variables. The first row of the Table shows the p-values
for the two fungibility tests on the coefficients of aid when the interaction terms are not
included initially.
Figure A.3.1 shows the conditional effects of education aid disbursements at the range of
the ICRG variable. Figure A.3.1(a) shows the effect of aggregate education aid disburse-
ments, Figure A.3.1(b) the effect of on-budget aid for education and Figure A.3.1(c) the
effect of off-budget aid for education. The conditional effect of education aid disburse-
ments is statistically insignificant at all levels of institutional quality, giving evidence for
fungibility of aid for education purposes. As institutional quality improves, the conditional
effect rises. On-budget aid for the purposes of education is also found to be statistically
insignificant at all values of the ICRG. Although the conditional effect of on-budget aid
is statistically insignificant, as institutional quality increases, the conditional effect also
increases, thus supporting the initial hypothesis of the study. The p-values for the two
one-sided fungibility tests show that the hypothesis of no fungibility is rejected for the
values 0 to 0.3 when institutional quality is low and not rejected as institutional quality
improves (column (1)).A.1 The hypothesis of full fungibility is rejected for the values 0.5
to 1 of the ICRG when institutional quality is higher (column (2)).A.2 These tests suggest
that full fungibility of on-budget aid for the purposes of education exists between 0 and
A.1Some examples of countries that take values for the ICRG between 0 and 0.3 are Bangladesh, Nigeria
and Liberia. Out of the 51 countries that are included in the sample for public education spending, 11
countries take values between 0 and 0.3 for the ICRG variable.
A.232 out of the 51 countries of the education sample take values between 0.3 and 1 and some examples
are Botswana, Sri Lanka, Thailand and Uganda.
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0.3, whereas no fungibility exists between 0.5 and one. Although the conditional effects
are insignificant, the fungibility tests show that the degree of fungibility depends on insti-
tutional quality in the anticipated direction: lower institutional quality makes on-budget
aid for the purposes of education fungible. The conditional effect of off-budget aid for the
purposes of education is statistically insignificant for all values of the ICRG and based on
the p-values for the two fungibility tests both hypotheses are not rejected, suggesting that
off-budget aid for education is non-fungible.
Figure A.3.2 shows the conditional effects of health aid disbursements at the range of the
ICRG variable. Figure A.3.2(a) shows the effect of aggregate health aid disbursements,
Figure A.3.2(b) the effect of on-budget aid for health and Figure A.3.2(c) the effect of
off-budget aid for health. There is evidence of fungibility for aid flows for the purposes of
health due to the insignificant marginal effect of health aid. As institutions get stronger,
the conditional effect of aggregate aid for the purposes of health increases, although it
remains statistically insignificant. On-budget aid for the purposes of health is insignificant
at all values of the ICRG. According to the p-values for the two one-sided fungibility tests
the hypothesis of no fungibility is rejected for the values between 0.2 - 0.5 and not rejected
elsewhere (column (3)).A.3 The hypothesis of full fungibility is not rejected at any value
(column (4)). This indicates that on-budget aid for health is fully fungibility for the values
between 0.2 and 0.5 and supports the hypothesis of this study that institutional quality
matters for the fungibility of on-budget health aid, since at higher values of the ICRG
(values of 0.6 onwards), the hypothesis of no fungibility is not rejected (column (3)).A.4
Off-budget aid for the purposes of health is found to be insignificant when institutions are
weak (ICRG values of 0 - 0.2) and as the quality of institutions improves the conditional
effect becomes significantly positive.A.5 The hypothesis of no fungibility is not rejected
at any value of the ICRG and improvements in institutional quality make the effect of
off-budget aid for health on public health spending significantly positive, showing that the
effect of off-budget aid for health depends on institutional quality.
Figure A.3.3 shows the conditional effects of infrastructure aid disbursements at the range
of the ICRG variable. Figure A.3.2(a) shows the effect of aggregate infrastructure aid
disbursements, Figure A.3.3(b) the effect of on-budget aid for infrastructure and Fig-
ure A.3.3(c) the effect of off-budget aid for infrastructure. For infrastructure, the con-
ditional effect is generally insignificant, although for some values (0.2 - 0.3) it takes sig-
A.3The countries that take values between 0.3 and 0.5 for the ICRG are the Democratic Republic of
Congo and Niger.
A.4The ICRG takes values 0.6 onwards in countries such as Morocco, India, Malaysia and others.
A.5Out of the 70 countries in the sample, 15 countries take values between 0 and 0.2 for the ICRG and
some examples are Cote d’Ivoire, Mali, Niger and the Democratic Republic of Congo.
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nificantly positive values (between 0.16 and 0.12).A.6 On-budget aid for the purposes of
infrastructure is statistically insignificant at all values of the ICRG. The hypothesis of no
fungibility is not rejected (column (5)). Off-budget aid for the purposes of infrastructure
is found to be statistically insignificant at all values of the ICRG and based on the p-values
the hypothesis of no fungibility is not rejected at any value of the ICRG.
Table A.3.1: Government spending models - Models E, H, I - Total aid disbursements
Education Health Infrastructure
GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Public spending, lagged 0.829*** 0.784*** 0.834*** 0.837*** 0.741*** 0.719***
(0.159) (0.195) (0.078) (0.074) (0.120) (0.106)
Aid -0.496 -0.632 0.046 -0.050 0.027 0.195
(0.351) (1.692) (0.157) (0.200) (0.157) (0.168)
ICRG 1.331* 1.286 0.245 0.145 0.259 0.350
(0.738) (0.795) (0.215) (0.255) (0.362) (0.316)
Interaction (ICRG*Aid) 0.694 0.383 -0.276
(3.538) (0.482) (0.516)
Non-sector specific aid 0.009 0.009 0.005 0.004 -0.000 -0.001
(0.008) (0.010) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
NGO aid -0.006 -0.006 0.003 0.003 0.011 0.011*
(0.008) (0.007) (0.002) (0.002) (0.007) (0.006)
Debt relief -0.013 -0.017 -0.002 0.001 -0.003 -0.006
(0.023) (0.020) (0.010) (0.008) (0.013) (0.009)
GDP per capita -0.140 -0.039 -0.059 -0.055 -0.008 -0.010
(0.169) (0.256) (0.057) (0.052) (0.140) (0.107)
Urbanisation 0.007 0.007 0.004* 0.004* -0.005 -0.004
(0.004) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003)
Openness 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Civil conflict -0.051** -0.053** -0.014 -0.011 -0.010 -0.009
(0.024) (0.026) (0.012) (0.012) (0.018) (0.015)
HIV prevalence 0.014 0.017 0.008 0.007* 0.005 0.006
(0.015) (0.019) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005)
Population ages 0-14 0.008 0.010 -0.008* -0.008* 0.000 0.002
(0.011) (0.014) (0.005) (0.005) (0.009) (0.007)
Agriculture value added -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.007 -0.007*
(0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004)
AR(1) test 0.001 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.003
AR(2) test 0.687 0.752 0.189 0.201 0.722 0.699
Hansen test 0.022 0.066 0.009 0.218 0.028 0.123
Diff-in Hansen test 0.027 0.104 0.674 0.474 0.066 0.133
No. of instruments 39 42 38 43 42 47
No. of countries 51 51 70 70 51 51
N 772 772 1044 1044 746 746
All specifications control for a full set of country and year fixed effects. The endogenous variables are
instrumented by using the second up to third lags. p-values for the autocorrelation tests for the first
and second lags are provided. p-values for the Hansen test of instrument validity and the difference-in
Hansen test showing the validity of the additional lags used by System GMM are also provided. The fiscal
variables, aid, debt relief, openness and agriculture-valued added are expressed as percentages of GDP.
Urbanisation and HIV prevalence are expressed in as percentages of total. Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
A.6Countries that take these values for the ICRG are Bangladesh and Liberia.
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Table A.3.2: Government spending models - Models E, H, I - Aid modalities
Education Health Infrastructure
GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Public spending, lagged 0.769*** 0.865*** 0.832*** 0.826*** 0.749*** 0.787***
(0.242) (0.232) (0.084) (0.089) (0.156) (0.147)
On-budget aid 1.745 -7.088 0.471 -0.056 0.821 2.329
(1.104) (5.816) (0.530) (1.292) (0.903) (1.896)
Off-budget aid -0.261 1.023 1.174*** -3.169 1.184 -4.310
(0.593) (4.525) (0.421) (2.856) (0.906) (6.213)
Investment aid -0.641 -0.906* -0.419 -0.484 0.048 0.022
(0.661) (0.541) (0.397) (0.403) (0.094) (0.103)
Other non-flagged aid 0.478 0.419 0.057 0.132 0.065 -0.275
(0.634) (0.514) (0.250) (0.154) (0.284) (0.478)
ICRG 1.297 1.037 0.265 0.097 0.201 0.313
(1.145) (1.399) (0.301) (0.440) (0.313) (0.316)
Interaction (ICRG*On-budget aid) 19.416 0.203 -7.010
(13.644) (3.482) (7.539)
Interaction (ICRG*Off-budget aid) -4.026 12.628 14.052
(10.631) (8.244) (16.804)
Non-sector specific aid 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
NGO aid -0.005 -0.004 0.003 0.002 0.008 0.008
(0.012) (0.013) (0.002) (0.002) (0.009) (0.008)
Debt relief -0.017 -0.016 0.006 0.013 -0.034 0.018
(0.027) (0.025) (0.009) (0.010) (0.028) (0.067)
GDP per capita 0.135 -0.049 -0.044 -0.101 -0.022 -0.059
(0.288) (0.242) (0.062) (0.112) (0.105) (0.100)
Urbanisation 0.006 0.006 0.005* 0.006* -0.004 -0.004
(0.007) (0.007) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Openness 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002
(0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Civil conflict -0.050 -0.046 -0.006 -0.007 -0.015 -0.017
(0.033) (0.032) (0.017) (0.020) (0.017) (0.018)
HIV prevalence 0.018 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.007 0.004
(0.032) (0.026) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
Population ages 0-14 0.008 0.000 -0.010* -0.011 0.001 -0.001
(0.020) (0.018) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Agriculture value added 0.000 -0.003 -0.000 -0.002 -0.007* -0.006
(0.007) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
AR(1) test 0.004 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.002
AR(2) test 0.714 0.738 0.246 0.181 0.788 0.777
Hansen test 0.091 0.321 0.159 0.224 0.459 0.920
Diff-in Hansen test 0.054 0.133 0.383 0.699 0.678 0.776
No. of instruments 48 54 53 63 57 67
No. of countries 51 51 70 70 51 51
N 772 772 1044 1044 746 746
All specifications control for a full set of country and year fixed effects. The endogenous variables are
instrumented by using the second up to third lags. p-values for the autocorrelation tests for the first
and second lags are provided. p-values for the Hansen test of instrument validity and the difference-in
Hansen test showing the validity of the additional lags used by System GMM are also provided. The fiscal
variables, aid, debt relief, openness and agriculture-valued added are expressed as percentages of GDP.
Urbanisation and HIV prevalence are expressed in as percentages of total. Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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(a) Education aid disbursements
(b) Education on-budget aid disbursements
(c) Education off-budget aid disbursements
Figure A.3.1: The conditional effects of education aid
The effects are calculated from Table A.3.1 and Table A.3.2. Stan-
dard errors are calculated using the Delta method. Confidence
intervals at the 95% level are shown for the two-sided test of sig-
nificance. The conditional effect is estimated over the range of the
ICRG variable, where higher values indicate higher institutional
quality.
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(a) Health aid disbursements
(b) Health on-budget aid disbursements
(c) Health off-budget aid disbursements
Figure A.3.2: The conditional effects of health aid
The effects are calculated from Table A.3.1 and Table A.3.2.
Standard errors are calculated using the Delta method. Con-
fidence intervals at the 95% level are shown for the two-sided
test of significance. The conditional effect is estimated over
the range of the ICRG variable, where higher values indicate
higher institutional quality.
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(a) Infrastructure aid disbursements
(b) Infrastructure on-budget aid disbursements
(c) Infrastructure off-budget aid disbursements
Figure A.3.3: The conditional effects of infrastructure aid
The effects are calculated from Table A.3.1 and Table A.3.2. Standard
errors are calculated using the Delta method. Confidence intervals at
the 95% level are shown for the two-sided test of significance. The
conditional effect is estimated over the range of the ICRG variable,
where higher values indicate higher institutional quality.
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Table A.3.3: Models E, H, I - Fungibility tests for on- and off-budget aid disbursements
Model E Model H Model I
ICRG H0 : δSP≥1 H0 : δSP≤0 H0 : δSP≥1 H0 : δSP≤0 H0 : δSP≥1 H0 : δSP≤0
Table A.3.2 0.503 0.120 0.322 0.377 0.844 0.369
0 0.081 0.889 0.207 0.517 0.758 0.110
0.1 0.084 0.876 0.140 0.515 0.686 0.104
0.2 0.089 0.848 0.057 0.510 0.469 0.162
0.3 0.106 0.757 0.005 0.495 0.243 0.419
0.4 0.332 0.179 0.003 0.472 0.186 0.613
0.5 0.904 0.017 0.052 0.469 0.174 0.694
0.6 0.923 0.034 0.149 0.471 0.171 0.733
0.7 0.925 0.045 0.229 0.472 0.170 0.754
0.8 0.925 0.052 0.284 0.473 0.170 0.768
0.9 0.925 0.056 0.324 0.474 0.170 0.777
1 0.924 0.059 0.353 0.474 0.171 0.783
ICRG H0 : δTC≥0 H0 : δTC≤−1 H0 : δTC≥0 H0 : δTC≤−1 H0 : δTC≥0 H0 : δTC≤−1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Table A.3.2 0.661 0.219 0.007 0.000 0.198 0.020
0 0.589 0.327 0.134 0.776 0.244 0.702
0.1 0.571 0.320 0.175 0.672 0.272 0.654
0.2 0.536 0.693 0.301 0.614 0.330 0.442
0.3 0.447 0.277 0.899 0.000 0.483 0.337
0.4 0.112 0.196 1.000 0.000 0.819 0.054
0.5 0.138 0.495 0.991 0.001 0.916 0.030
0.6 0.234 0.581 0.981 0.006 0.902 0.054
0.7 0.272 0.606 0.973 0.012 0.887 0.076
0.8 0.292 0.617 0.967 0.018 0.877 0.092
0.9 0.304 0.624 0.963 0.023 0.869 0.105
1 0.312 0.628 0.960 0.027 0.863 0.114
p-values for the one-sided fungibility tests are shown over the range of the ICRG variable. Columns (1)
and (3) correspond to the test of no fungibility for on- and off-budget aid, respectively. Columns (2) and
(4) correspond to the test of full fungibility for on- and off-budget aid,respectively. These tests are based
on the results of Table A.3.2.
A.4 Common sample results
Appendix A.4 shows the conditional effects of models T, E, H over a common sample of
observations for all models. This common sample consists of 510 observations, therefore,
the models are estimated using static FE, where the standard errors are clustered at the
country level.
Table A.3.4 shows the regression coefficients for the models of public expenditure with
the aggregate measure of aid disbursements (columns (1) and (2)) and with the different
aid modalities (columns (3) and (4)). Included but not shown are the control variables
mentioned earlier, namely NGO aid, debt relief, GDP per capita, urbanisation, trade
openness, civil conflict, HIV prevalence, population ages 0-14 and agriculture value-added.
Table A.3.5 shows the p-values for the two one-sided fungibility tests for on- and off-budget
aid. The first row shows the p-values for the two fungibility tests on the coefficients of aid
when the interaction terms are not included initially (columns (1) and (3)). Figure A.3.4
shows the conditional effects of total aid flows on total general public spending.
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Table A.3.4: Total public expenditure model (common sample)- Model T
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Aid -0.033 -0.362**
(0.030) (0.176)
On-budget aid -0.134** -0.397
(0.058) (0.438)
Off-budget aid aid -1.687*** -3.066**
(0.561) (1.242)
Investment aid 0.939** 0.840**
(0.353) (0.417)
Other non-flagged aid -0.025 -0.026
(0.042) (0.045)
ICRG 18.762 16.849 17.869 16.703
(11.347) (11.569) (11.409) (12.145)
Interaction (ICRG*Aid) 0.798*
(0.408)
Interaction (ICRG*On-budget aid) 0.793
(1.494)
Interaction (ICRG*Off-budget aid) 4.008
(4.665)
R2 0.314 0.321 0.346 0.349
No. of countries 47 47 47 47
N 510 510 510 510
All specifications control for a full set of country and year fixed effect and variables capturing NGO aid, debt
relief, GDP per capita, urbanisation, trade openness, civil conflict, HIV prevalence, population ages 0-14
and agriculture value-added. The fiscal variables, aid, debt relief, openness and agriculture-valued added
are expressed as percentages of GDP. Urbanisation and HIV prevalence are expressed in as percentages of
total. Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Table A.3.5: Model T (common sample) - Fungibility tests for on- and off-budget aid
disbursements
ICRG H0 : δSP≥1 H0 : δSP≤0 H0 : δTC≥0 H0 : δTC≤−1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
No interaction 0.000 0.024 0.004 0.227
0 0.001 0.818 0.007 0.952
0.1 0.000 0.864 0.000 0.981
0.2 0.000 0.953 0.000 0.998
0.3 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.986
0.4 0.000 0.686 0.026 0.731
0.5 0.001 0.500 0.185 0.521
0.6 0.023 0.432 0.343 0.418
0.7 0.084 0.398 0.451 0.362
0.8 0.158 0.377 0.522 0.328
0.9 0.226 0.364 0.571 0.305
1 0.284 0.354 0.606 0.289
p-values for the one-sided fungibility tests are shown over the range of the ICRG variable. Columns (1)
and (3) correspond to the test of no fungibility for on- and off-budget aid, respectively. Columns (2) and
(4) correspond to the test of full fungibility for on- and off-budget aid,respectively. These tests are based
on the conditional effects obtained using FE portrayed in Figure A.3.4.
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(a) Total aid disbursements
(b) Total on-budget aid disbursements
(c) Total off-budget aid disbursements
Figure A.3.4: The conditional effects of total aid on government spending (common
sample)
Standard errors are calculated using the Delta method. Confidence intervals at the 95% level are shown
for the two-sided test of significance. The conditional effect is estimated over the range of the ICRG
variable, where higher values indicate higher institutional quality.
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The results of Model T on this common sample of observations agree with the FE results
over the original larger sample of observations, as well as with the results obtained using
system GMM. Firstly, the coefficients of the aid variables without the interaction term
give evidence for fungibility, as total aid is insignificant and on- and off-budget aid are
significantly negative. The conditional effects suggests that the degree of fungibility de-
pends on institutional quality. The conditional effect of total aid is significantly negative
when institutions are weak and increases as institutions improve. Furthermore, on-budget
aid is found to be insignificant at all values of the ICRG, with the exception of when the
ICRG takes the value of 0.3, and off-budget aid is found to have a significantly negative
coefficient only when institutions are weak. The fungibility tests strengthen the findings
inferred by examining the conditional effects. On-budget aid is found to be fully fungible
when institutions are weak (ICRG values 0 - 0.7) and non-fungible when institutions are
strong (ICRG values 0.8 - 1). Off-budget aid is found to be fully fungible when institu-
tions are weak (ICRG values 0 - 0.4) and non-fungible when institutions are strong (ICRG
values 0.5 - 1). Including an interaction term proves to be important for both on- and
off-budget aid as without the interaction term the conclusion based on the fungibility tests
would be that on-budget aid is partially fungible and off-budget aid is fully fungible.
Table A.3.6 shows the regression coefficients for the models of public education expenditure
with the aggregate measure of aid disbursements (columns (1) and (2)) and with the
different aid modalities (columns (3) and (4)). Included but not shown are the control
variables mentioned earlier, namely NGO aid, debt relief, GDP per capita, urbanisation,
trade openness, civil conflict, HIV prevalence, population ages 0-14 and agriculture value-
added. Table A.3.7 shows the p-values for the two one-sided fungibility tests for on-
and off-budget aid. The first row shows the p-values for the two fungibility tests on the
coefficients of aid when the interaction terms are not included initially (columns (1) and
(3)). Figure A.3.5 shows the conditional effects of education aid flows on total public
education spending.
The results of Model E on this common sample of observations agree to some extent with
the results obtained over the original larger sample of observations using system GMM.
The conditional effects of all three aid measures remain insignificant. Nonetheless, the
fungibility tests suggest that on-budget aid is non-fungible at all values of the ICRGA.7
and off-budget aid is partially fungible at lower values of the ICRG (0 - 0.4) and non-
fungible at higher values of the ICRG (0.5 - 1)A.8. These results albeit being different than
what was obtained using system GMM, agree with the general direction of the results of
A.7The results using GMM suggested that on-budget aid is fully fungible at low values of the ICRG and
non-fungible at higher values of the ICRG.
A.8The results using GMM suggested that off-budget aid is non-fungible at all values of the ICRG.
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total public spending. The importance of the interaction term is highlighted for the case
of off-budget aid for education since the fungibility tests suggest that aid is non-fungible
(first row of Table A.3.7).
Table A.3.6: Public education expenditure model (common sample)- Model E
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Aid 0.106 -0.774
(0.191) (1.343)
On-budget aid 0.880*** 8.640
(0.318) (8.825)
Off-budget aid -0.640 -6.656
(0.645) (4.157)
Investment aid 0.278 0.109
(0.231) (0.258)
Other non-flagged aid 0.014 -0.177
(0.363) (0.394)
ICRG 0.257 -0.118 0.065 -0.399
(1.872) (1.875) (1.825) (1.835)
Interaction (ICRG*Aid) 1.883
(2.702)
Interaction (ICRG*On-budget aid) -16.093
(17.664)
Interaction (ICRG*Off-budget aid) 13.866
(8.734)
R2 0.173 0.177 0.182 0.203
No. of countries 47 47 47 47
N 510 510 510 510
All specifications control for a full set of country and year fixed effect and variables capturing NGO aid, debt
relief, GDP per capita, urbanisation, trade openness, civil conflict, HIV prevalence, population ages 0-14
and agriculture value-added. The fiscal variables, aid, debt relief, openness and agriculture-valued added
are expressed as percentages of GDP. Urbanisation and HIV prevalence are expressed in as percentages of
total. Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table A.3.7: Model E (common sample) - Fungibility tests for on- and off-budget aid
disbursements
ICRG H0 : δSP≥1 H0 : δSP≤0 H0 : δTC≥0 H0 : δTC≤−1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
No interaction 0.708 0.008 0.326 0.594
0 0.807 0.164 0.055 0.913
0.1 0.803 0.160 0.055 0.903
0.2 0.798 0.153 0.055 0.118
0.3 0.787 0.140 0.057 0.828
0.4 0.750 0.109 0.079 0.555
0.5 0.129 0.044 0.704 0.007
0.6 0.133 0.712 0.917 0.013
0.7 0.155 0.769 0.933 0.023
0.8 0.163 0.787 0.937 0.030
0.9 0.167 0.795 0.939 0.035
1 0.170 0.800 0.940 0.038
p-values for the one-sided fungibility tests are shown over the range of the ICRG variable. Columns (1)
and (3) correspond to the test of no fungibility for on- and off-budget aid, respectively. Columns (2) and
(4) correspond to the test of full fungibility for on- and off-budget aid,respectively. These tests are based
on the conditional effects obtained using FE portrayed in Figure A.3.5.
Table A.3.8 shows the regression coefficients for the models of public health expenditure
with the aggregate measure of aid disbursements (columns (1) and (2)) and with the
different aid modalities (columns (3) and (4)). Included but not shown are the control
variables mentioned earlier, namely NGO aid, debt relief, GDP per capita, urbanisation,
trade openness, civil conflict, HIV prevalence, population ages 0-14 and agriculture value-
added. Table A.3.9 shows the p-values for the two one-sided fungibility tests for on-
and off-budget aid. The first row shows the p-values for the two fungibility tests on
the coefficients of aid when the interaction terms are not included initially (columns (1)
and (3)). Figure A.3.6 shows the conditional effects of health aid flows on total public
education spending.
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(a) Total aid disbursements
(b) Total on-budget aid disbursements
(c) Total off-budget aid disbursements
Figure A.3.5: The conditional effects of education aid on government spending (common
sample)
Standard errors are calculated using the Delta method. Confidence intervals at the 95% level are shown
for the two-sided test of significance. The conditional effect is estimated over the range of the ICRG
variable, where higher values indicate higher institutional quality.
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Table A.3.8: Public health expenditure model (common sample)- Model H
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Aid 0.792*** 0.415
(0.162) (0.823)
On-budget aid -0.190 3.747*
(0.693) (2.224)
Off-budget aid 0.480 -4.204***
(0.475) (1.325)
Investment aid 0.840** 0.815*
(0.346) (0.433)
Other non-flagged aid 0.948*** 0.944***
(0.233) (0.248)
ICRG -0.120 -0.259 -0.125 -0.337
(0.534) (0.520) (0.511) (0.511)
Interaction (ICRG*Aid) 0.918
(1.869)
Interaction (ICRG*On-budget aid) -8.436
(5.171)
Interaction (ICRG*Off-budget aid) 13.337***
(4.172)
R2 0.449 0.450 0.458 0.478
No. of countries 47 47 47 47
N 510 510 510 510
All specifications control for a full set of country and year fixed effect and variables capturing NGO aid, debt
relief, GDP per capita, urbanisation, trade openness, civil conflict, HIV prevalence, population ages 0-14
and agriculture value-added. The fiscal variables, aid, debt relief, openness and agriculture-valued added
are expressed as percentages of GDP. Urbanisation and HIV prevalence are expressed in as percentages of
total. Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Table A.3.9: Model H (common sample) - Fungibility tests for on- and off-budget aid
disbursements
ICRG H0 : δSP≥1 H0 : δSP≤0 H0 : δTC≥0 H0 : δTC≤−1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
No interaction 0.093 0.785 0.317 0.003
0 0.892 0.046 0.001 0.992
0.1 0.866 0.046 0.001 0.980
0.2 0.805 0.047 0.001 0.147
0.3 0.610 0.059 0.145 0.000
0.4 0.093 0.216 0.998 0.000
0.5 0.009 0.777 0.999 0.000
0.6 0.013 0.898 0.999 0.000
0.7 0.019 0.923 0.999 0.000
0.8 0.024 0.932 0.999 0.000
0.9 0.027 0.936 0.999 0.000
1 0.030 0.939 0.999 0.000
p-values for the one-sided fungibility tests are shown over the range of the ICRG variable. Columns (1)
and (3) correspond to the test of no fungibility for on- and off-budget aid, respectively. Columns (2) and
(4) correspond to the test of full fungibility for on- and off-budget aid,respectively. These tests are based
on the conditional effects obtained using FE portrayed in Figure A.3.6.
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(a) Total aid disbursements
(b) Total on-budget aid disbursements
(c) Total off-budget aid disbursements
Figure A.3.6: The conditional effects of health aid on government spending (common
sample)
Standard errors are calculated using the Delta method. Confidence intervals at the 95% level are shown
for the two-sided test of significance. The conditional effect is estimated over the range of the ICRG
variable, where higher values indicate higher institutional quality.
71
The results of Model H on this common sample of observations agree to some extent with
the results obtained over the original larger sample of observations using system GMM.
The conditional effect of aid for the purposes of health is significantly positive in the
middle values of the ICRG, the effect of on-budget aid is insignificant at all values of the
ICRG and off-budget aid has a significantly negative effect when institutions are weak and
a positive one when institutions are strong suggesting that institutional quality plays a
role for the fungibility of off-budget aidA.9. With regard to the fungibility tests, on-budget
aid is found to be non-fungible when institutions are weak and fungible when institutions
are strongA.10. With regard to off-budget aid, the fungibility tests suggest that off-budget
aid is fully fungible when institutions are weak and non-fungible when institutions are
strongA.11. The results of off-budget aid for health are in line with the results obtained
for total off-budget aid as a whole.
Table A.3.10: Public infrastructure expenditure model (common sample)- Model I
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Aid -0.080 -0.099
(0.105) (0.240)
On-budget aid -0.200 1.644
(0.674) (2.806)
Off-budget aid 0.241 1.653
(0.972) (3.228)
Investment aid -0.015 -0.022
(0.119) (0.124)
Other non-flagged aid -0.367 -0.348
(0.231) (0.289)
ICRG 0.022 0.009 -0.026 0.080
(1.114) (1.093) (1.100) (1.092)
Interaction (ICRG*Aid) 0.040
(0.520)
Interaction (ICRG*On-budget aid) -4.444
(7.717)
Interaction (ICRG*Off-budget aid) -3.328
(8.138)
R2 0.251 0.251 0.255 0.256
No. of countries 47 47 47 47
N 510 510 510 510
All specifications control for a full set of country and year fixed effect and variables capturing NGO aid, debt
relief, GDP per capita, urbanisation, trade openness, civil conflict, HIV prevalence, population ages 0-14
and agriculture value-added. The fiscal variables, aid, debt relief, openness and agriculture-valued added
are expressed as percentages of GDP. Urbanisation and HIV prevalence are expressed in as percentages of
total. Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
A.9The conditional effect of off-budget aid for health is found to be insignificant using system GMM.
A.10This finding of fungibility for on-budget aid agrees with the previous findings obtained using system
GMM.
A.11The finding of no fungibility of off-budget aid is also obtained using system GMM.
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Table A.3.11: Model I (common sample) - Fungibility tests for on- and off-budget aid
disbursements
ICRG H0 : δSP≥1 H0 : δSP≤0 H0 : δTC≥0 H0 : δTC≤−1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
No interaction 0.082 0.768 0.805 0.208
0 0.591 0.279 0.695 0.206
0.1 0.539 0.280 0.705 0.172
0.2 0.428 0.287 0.717 0.876
0.3 0.176 0.338 0.723 0.068
0.4 0.053 0.576 0.639 0.071
0.5 0.108 0.675 0.497 0.226
0.6 0.154 0.697 0.431 0.371
0.7 0.183 0.704 0.403 0.453
0.8 0.202 0.708 0.387 0.501
0.9 0.215 0.710 0.378 0.532
1 0.224 0.712 0.372 0.553
p-values for the one-sided fungibility tests are shown over the range of the ICRG variable. Columns (1)
and (3) correspond to the test of no fungibility for on- and off-budget aid, respectively. Columns (2) and
(4) correspond to the test of full fungibility for on- and off-budget aid,respectively. These tests are based
on the conditional effects obtained using FE portrayed in Figure A.3.7.
Table A.3.10 shows the regression coefficients for the models of public infrastructure ex-
penditure with the aggregate measure of aid disbursements (columns (1) and (2)) and
with the different aid modalities (columns (3) and (4)). Included but not shown are the
control variables mentioned earlier, namely NGO aid, debt relief, GDP per capita, urbani-
sation, trade openness, civil conflict, HIV prevalence, population ages 0-14 and agriculture
value-added. Table A.3.11 shows the p-values for the two one-sided fungibility tests for
on- and off-budget aid. The first row shows the p-values for the two fungibility tests on
the coefficients of aid when the interaction terms are not included initially (columns (1)
and (3)). Figure A.3.7 shows the conditional effects of infrastructure aid flows on total
public education spending.
The results of Model I on this common sample of observations agree with the results ob-
tained over the original larger sample of observations using system GMM. The conditional
effects of infrastructure aid are statistically insignificant and the fungibility tests suggest
that on- and off-budget aid are non-fungible at all values of the ICRG.
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(a) Total aid disbursements
(b) Total on-budget aid disbursements
(c) Total off-budget aid disbursements
Figure A.3.7: The conditional effects of infrastructure aid on government spending
(common sample)
Standard errors are calculated using the Delta method. Confidence intervals at the 95% level are shown
for the two-sided test of significance. The conditional effect is estimated over the range of the ICRG
variable, where higher values indicate higher institutional quality.
All in all, the results over this common sample obtained using static FE support the
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original findings that the degree of fungibility of off-budget aid depends on institutional
quality in the anticipated direction. This result seems to be driven from the sectors
of education and health. Additionally, the fungibility tests shows that the degree of
fungibility of total on-budget aid also depends on institutional quality in the anticipated
direction, however, this finding does not seem to originate from the sectoral spending
examined. Furthermore, the one-sided fungibility tests in the specifications without the
interaction terms show that fungibility would be over-estimated in environments of high
institutional quality if the interaction term is not considered, highlighting the importance
of examining fungibility by considering institutional quality.
A.5 Long-run effects
Appendix A.5 shows the long-run effects of aid disbursements on government spending.
(a) Total aid (b) Education aid
(c) Health aid (d) Infrastructure aid
Figure A.4.1: The long-run effects of aggregate aid disbursements
The effects are calculated based on the dynamic models of Table 2.6 and Ta-
ble A.3.1. Standard errors are calculated using the Delta method. Confidence
intervals at the 95% level are shown for the two-sided test of significance. The
conditional effect is estimated over the range of the ICRG variable, where higher
values indicate higher institutional quality.
75
(a) Total aid (b) Education aid
(c) Health aid (d) Infrastructure aid
Figure A.4.2: The long-run effects of on-budget aid disbursements
The effects are calculated based on the dynamic models of Table 2.6 and Ta-
ble A.3.2. Standard errors are calculated using the Delta method. Confidence
intervals at the 95% level are shown for the two-sided test of significance. The
conditional effect is estimated over the range of the ICRG variable, where higher
values indicate higher institutional quality.
(a) Total aid (b) Education aid
(c) Health aid (d) Infrastructure aid
Figure A.4.3: The long-run effects of off-budget aid disbursements
The effects are calculated based on the dynamic models of Table 2.6 and Ta-
ble A.3.2. Standard errors are calculated using the Delta method. Confidence
intervals at the 95% level are shown for the two-sided test of significance. The
conditional effect is estimated over the range of the ICRG variable, where higher
values indicate higher institutional quality.
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A.6 Sample
Appendix A.6 displays the countries included in the sample of each model (total public
spending, public education spending, public health spending and public infrastructure
spending).
Country Model T Model E Model H Model I
Albania D D D D
Algeria D D D D
Angola D D D D
Armenia D
Azerbaijan D D D D
Bangladesh D D D D
Belarus D D D D
Bolivia D D D D
Botswana D D D D
Burkina Faso D D
Cameroon D D D D
Colombia D D D D
Congo, Dem. Rep. D D
Congo Rep. D D D D
Costa Rica D D D D
Cote d’Ivoire D D
Cuba D
Dominican Republic D D D D
Ecuador D D D D
Egypt, Arab Rep. D D
El Salvador D D D D
Ethiopia D D D D
Ghana D D D D
Guatemala D D D D
Guinea D
Guinea-Bissau D D
Guyana D
Honduras D
India D D D D
Indonesia D D D D
Iran, Islamic Rep. D D
Jamaica D D D D
Kenya D D D D
Liberia D D D D
Madagascar D D D D
Malawi D D D D
Malaysia D D D D
Mali D D
Mexico D D D D
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Country Model T Model E Model H Model I
Moldova D D D D
Mongolia D D D D
Morocco D D D D
Namibia D D D D
Nicaragua D
Niger D D
Nigeria D D D D
Pakistan D D D D
Panama D D D D
Papua New Guinea D D D D
Paraguay D D D D
Peru D D D D
Senegal D D
Serbia D D D D
Sierra Leone D D
South Africa D D D D
Sri Lanka D D D D
Sudan D D D
Suriname D
Tanzania D D D D
Thailand D D D D
Togo D D
Tunisia D D D D
Uganda D D D D
Ukraine D D D D
Venezuela, RB D D D D
Vietnam D D D D
Yemen, Rep. D D D D
Zambia D D D D
Total 59 51 70 51
A.7 Definitions and sources of variables
Appendix A.7 shows the detailed definitions and sources of the main variables of interest
(expenditure, foreign aid and institutional quality) as well as the control variables used in
the empirical models.
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Variables Definitions Sources
Total public expenditure,
(percentages of GDP)
Total general public expenditure consists of recurrent and capital spending
from government budgets, external borrowings and grants and social health
insurance funds.
SPEED Dataset (2013) of IF-
PRI (Original source: In-
ternational Monetary Fund
(IMF) Government Finance
Statistics (GFS).
Expense, (percentages of
GDP)
Expense is cash payments for operating activities of the government in
providing goods and services. It includes compensation of employees (such
as wages and salaries), interest and subsidies, grants, social benefits, and
other expenses such as rent and dividends.
WDI (2015) of WB (Original
source:IMF GFS and OECD
GDP estimates.)
Health expenditure, public
(percentages of GDP)
Public health expenditure consists of recurrent and capital spending from
government budgets, external borrowings and grants and social health in-
surance funds.
WDI (2015) of the WB (Orig-
inal source: World Health Or-
ganisation (WHO) national
accounts).
Education expenditure (per-
centages of GDP)
Public education expenditure consists of recurrent and capital spending
from government budgets, external borrowings and grants and social health
insurance funds.
Clements et al. (2011)
dataset for their IMF paper.
Transport & Communica-
tions expenditure (percent-
ages of GDP)
Transport and communication expenditure consists of recurrent and capital
spending from government budgets, external borrowings and grants and
social health insurance funds.
SPEED Dataset (2013) of IF-
PRI (Original source: IMF
GFS).
Total aid disbursements and
aid disbursements disaggre-
gated by sector, such as edu-
cation, health and infrastruc-
ture, (percentages of GDP)
Disbursements show actual payments in each year. They show the realisa-
tion of donors’ intentions and the implementation of their policies. They
are required to examine the contribution of donors’ actions in development
achievements and they better describe aid flows from a recipient’s point of
view. These values are computed using aid disbursements in current USD
calculated over GDP in current USD.
Author’s calculations using
WDI (2015) and CRS data of
the OECD-DAC.
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Variables Definitions Sources
PBAs or else SP aid (percent-
ages of GDP)
Aid flows from different donors are flagged according to their modality.
PBAs are defined as a way of engaging in development cooperation based
on the principles of co-ordinated support for a locally-owned programme of
development, such as a national development strategy, a sector programme,
a thematic programme or a programme of a specific organisation. Aid flows
flagged as PBAs are then added together for each recipient country and
rescaled to reflect percentage of GDP.
Author’s calculations using
WDI (2015) and CRS data of
the OECD-DAC.
FTC or else TC aid (percent-
ages of GDP)
Aid flows from different donors are flagged according to their modality.
FTC comprises activities financed by a donor country whose primary pur-
pose is to augment the level of knowledge, skills, technical know-how or
productive aptitudes of the population of developing countries, i.e. in-
creasing their stock of human intellectual capital, or their capacity for
more effective use of their existing factor endowment. This relates es-
sentially to activities that either enhance or supply human resources. It
includes financing of students and trainees who are nationals of developing
countries; experts, teachers, and volunteers; equipment and materials for
training; research; development-oriented social and cultural programmes,
etc. Associated supplies are also classified as technical cooperation. Aid
flows flagged as FTC are then added together for each recipient country
and rescaled to reflect percentages of GDP.
Author’s calculations using
WDI (2015) and CRS data of
the OECD-DAC.
IP aid (percentages of GDP) Aid flows from different donors are flagged according to their modality. IP
aid comprises activities primarily designed to augment the physical capital
of recipient countries. It includes contributions for local and recurrent
costs and investment-related technical cooperation. Aid flows flagged as IP
are then added together for each recipient country and rescaled to reflect
percentages of GDP.
Author’s calculations using
WDI (2015) and CRS data of
the OECD-DAC.
ONF aid (percentages of
GDP)
The remainder flows of aid that are not flagged to be PBA, FTC or IP
are summed together and rescaled for each recipient country to reflect
percentages of GDP.
Author’s calculations using
WDI (2015) and CRS data of
the OECD-DAC.
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Variables Definitions Sources
Non-sector specific aid (per-
centages of GDP)
Aid disbursements that are targeted for the other sectors and not the one
in question. (i.e. for the model of education spending non-education aid
would include aid on health, infrastructure and other sectors.).
Author’s calculations using
WDI (2015) and CRS data of
the OECD-DAC.
ICRG The mean value of the ICRG variables ‘Corruption’, ‘Law and Order’ and
‘Bureaucracy Quality’, ranging between 0 and 1. The index has been
rescaled so that higher values indicate low quality of governance. This
political risk rating assesses various political components and how they are
a ’threat’ to foreign/international investment/business. The component of
corruption assesses corruption within the political system and is mostly
concerned with actual or potential corruption in the form of excessive pa-
tronage, nepotism, job reservations, ‘favor-for-favors’, secret party funding
and suspiciously close ties between politics and business. The components
of law and order are assessed separately. The Law sub-component is an
assessment of the strength and impartiality of the legal system, while the
Order sub-component is an assessment of popular observance of the law.
The bureaucracy quality component measures the institutional strength
and quality of the bureaucracy and high points are given to countries where
the bureaucracy has the strength and expertise to govern without drastic
changes in policy or interruptions in government services.
QoG (2015) dataset published
by the University of Gothen-
burg (Original sources: ICRG
by the Political Risk Services
(PRS) Group).
Debt relief (percentages of
GDP)
The sum of debt forgiveness and rescheduling, other action on debt, and
offsetting entries for debt forgiveness. Groups all actions relating to debt
(forgiveness, conversions, swaps, buybacks, rescheduling, refinancing) and
their offsetting entries.
OECD-DAC, Table DAC2a.
NGO aid (percentages of
GDP )
Aid flows having NGOs as the first implementing agent. These flows cor-
respond to the total aid or for each sector or purpose that are given on
concessional terms.
Author’s calculations using
WDI (2015) and CRS data of
the OECD-DAC.
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Variables Definitions Sources
GDP per capita, PPP inter-
national $
GDP per capita based on Purchasing Power Parity (PPP). GDP at pur-
chaser’s prices is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in
the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included
in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions
for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of
natural resources. Data are in constant 2005 international dollars.
WDI (2015) (Original source:
WB International Compari-
son Program database).
Total Civil Major Episodes of
Political Violence (MEPV)
The total summed magnitudes of all societal MEPV, such as civil violence,
civil war, ethnic violence and ethnic war. The civil violence variable mea-
sures the magnitude score of episodes of civil violence involving the state in
that year. The civil war variable measures the magnitude score of episodes
of civil warfare involving that state in that year. The ethnic violence vari-
able measures the magnitude score of episodes of ethnic violence involving
that state in that year. The ethnic war variable measures the magnitude
score of episodes of ethnic warfare involving that state in that year. The
index is scaled from 1 (lowest) to 10 (highest) and 0 denotes no episodes.
Centre for Systemic Peace
(2013).
Urban population (percent-
ages of total)
Urban population refers to people living in urban areas as defined by na-
tional statistical offices. It is calculated using WB population estimates and
urban ratios from the United Nations (UN) World Urbanization Prospects.
WDI (2015) (Original source:
UN, World Urbanization
Prospects).
Openness (percentages of
GDP)
Trade is the sum of exports and imports of goods and services measured
as a share of gross domestic product.
WDI (2015) (Original source:
WB national accounts data,
and OECD National Ac-
counts data files).
Prevalence of HIV, total (per-
centages of population ages
15-49)
Prevalence of HIV refers to the percentage of people ages 15-49 who are
infected with HIV.
WDI (2015) (Original source:
UNAIDS estimates).
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Variables Definitions Sources
Population ages 0-14 (per-
centages of total)
Population between the ages 0 to 14 as a percentage of the total population.
Population is based on the de facto definition of population.
WDI (2015) (Original source:
The UN Population Divi-
sion’s World Population
Prospects).
Agriculture value-added (per-
centages of GDP)
Agriculture corresponds to ISIC divisions 1-5 and includes forestry, hunt-
ing, and fishing, as well as cultivation of crops and livestock production.
Value added is the net output of a sector after adding up all outputs and
subtracting intermediate inputs. It is calculated without making deduc-
tions for depreciation of fabricated assets or depletion and degradation of
natural resources. The origin of value added is determined by the Interna-
tional Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC), revision 3. Note: For VAB
countries, gross value added at factor cost is used as the denominator.
WDI (2015) (Original source:
WB national accounts data,
and OECD National Ac-
counts data files).
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Chapter 3
The effects of foreign aid and institutions on tax revenues
3.1 Introduction
3.1.1 Background and motivation
Taxes are an important tool for governments for collecting revenue to achieve spending
targets, providing public goods, supporting markets and re-allocating resources for eco-
nomic growth and development (Besley and Persson, 2014, 2009, Teera and Hudson, 2004,
Migdal, 1988). Several international bodies, such as the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), have
looked at strengthening the tax systems in developing countries because of the importance
of tax collection for growth and development (Prichard et al., 2012).
Based on theoretical and empirical evidence, developing countries need tax revenues to
increase the resources available for public infrastructure and human capital that are nec-
essary for growth and developmental targets (Oto-Peral´ıas and Romero-A´vila, 2013, Bose
et al., 2007, Kneller et al., 1999, Barro, 1990). Nevertheless, tax revenues may not be
sufficient in financing spending targets and promoting growth since developing countries,
or ‘weak states’ face fiscal capacity problems, i.e. a limited capacity in enforcement and
compliance structures throughout the entire economy to raise tax revenues (Besley and
Persson, 2014, 2013, 2011, Besley, 2010, Besley and Persson, 2009, Acemoglu, 2005). Low
fiscal capacity of ‘weak states’ is likely to be complemented by high reliance on natural
resources and foreign aid flows (Azam et al., 1999). This is because aid dependency could
hinder the collection of tax revenues since aid can be seen as a substitute for tax revenues.
Recipient governments are no longer accountable to their people but are accountable to
their donors (Knack, 2009, Moore, 2007, Collier, 1999). This phenomenon could also be
exacerbated in environments of low institutional quality and a low absorptive capacity
with regard to aid loans, which require state flows for repayments (Azam et al., 1999,
Killick, 1991).
On the other hand, foreign aid is thought of as a complement to tax revenues since the
theoretical literature considers it as a tool to fill the fiscal gap of developing countries
(Collier, 1999, Bacha, 1990). It should be emphasised that there is no consensus in the
empirical literature as to what is the effect of foreign aid on economic growth. The
primary recipients of aid flows are governments. Therefore, how governments behave in
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terms of their tax policy and budget allocation will in turn determine aid effectiveness
(Morrissey, 2015a, McGillivray and Morrissey, 2000, Devarajan et al., 1999). Aid may
not be used as intended and receiving aid flows might give opportunities for corruption
and illegal activities (Bra¨utigam and Knack, 2004, Knack, 2001). This raises the issue of
‘fungibility’, which is defined as aid not being used as intended by the donors.
Fungibility can arise for a number of reasons: a difference in information and preferences
between donors and recipients, aid illusion, malicious intent of recipient governments or
the optimal choice of recipient governments to adjust their budgets and relieve themselves
of the burden of taxation based on the external resources received (Chatterjee et al., 2012,
Prichard et al., 2012, Carter, 2010, Gupta et al., 2003, McGillivray and Morrissey, 2001).
The empirical literature on fungibility yields mixed results for the effect of aid on tax
revenues. On the one hand, some studies find a negative effect on tax revenues indicating
that aid is fungible and pays for tax reductions rather than development (Benedek et al.,
2012, Gupta et al., 2003). On the other hand, there are other studies that find either an
insignificant or positive effect on taxes, providing evidence against fungibility in terms of
tax revenues (Morrissey et al., 2014, Clist and Morrissey, 2011). Foreign aid can negatively
affect tax revenues directly for the reasons explained earlier, but it can also affect revenues
indirectly in a positive way. Examples are when aid is used for current public spending
or budget support to pay for the salaries of government officials that are then taxed, or
when foreign aid flows are fed into the economy’s formal sector and can then also be taxed
(Carter, 2010). Another example is the fact that foreign aid provides recipient economies
with foreign exchange that in turn increases imports and trade taxes (Morrissey, 2015a,
Bacha, 1990).
Institutions and their quality are important for aid effectiveness and aid fungibility. Coun-
tries with low quality institutions and high levels of corruption are more likely to misuse
aid flows through, for example, the diversion of aid flows into private pockets by gov-
ernment officials (Prichard et al., 2012, Hillman, 2004). According to Kaufmann and
Zoido-Lobato´n (1999), governance has several dimensions and is defined as ‘traditions and
institutions by which authority in a country is exercised’. Generally, corruption is a signif-
icant problem in both developed and developing countries and it is viewed as a constraint
to both foreign aid and growth-enhancing policies. Theobald (1990) defines corruption as
‘the illegal use of public office for private gain’. The theoretical and empirical literature
suggests that corruption has several economic effects; one of which is how it affects public
finances. There is evidence that corruption reduces tax revenues since tax collectors can
be bribed (Asongu and Jellal, 2014, Hillman, 2004, Tanzi and Davoodi, 2000). There is
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also evidence that corruption distorts public spending towards areas where higher rents
may be extorted, such as on military spending or infrastructure projects, and away from
social sectors, such as health or education (Delavallade, 2006, Hillman, 2004, Tanzi and
Davoodi, 2000, Mauro, 1998).
3.1.2 Research question
In light of the studies mentioned above, the purpose of this study is to explore the re-
lationship between institutional quality, foreign aid and tax revenues. More precisely, to
examine the effect that aid has on tax revenues under different levels of institutional qual-
ity. This relationship has important policy implications for donor countries since this will
help shed light on whether aid pays for development or for tax reductions. Chapter 2 of
this thesis examines the extent of fungibility with regard to government spending. This
study examines the other side of the budget constraint of recipient governments, focus-
ing on revenues raised through taxes. Based on the theoretical and empirical literature,
it is expected that low institutional quality would be associated with lower tax revenues
because of the administrative constrains for tax collection in weak states (Besley and Pers-
son, 2014, Acemoglu, 2005). Aid, which is also found to be associated with a deterioration
in the quality of institutions (Bra¨utigam and Knack, 2004, Knack, 2001), could have a
negative effect on tax revenues, at least in countries with low institutional quality.
Several papers have estimated the effect of aid on tax revenues controlling for either
corruption or institutional quality (Yohou et al., 2016, Benedek et al., 2012, Alonso and
Garcimart´ın, 2011, Brun et al., 2011, Carter, 2010, Mahdavi, 2008, Gupta et al., 2003,
Tanzi and Davoodi, 2000, Ghura, 1998). However, these studies did not consider that
the effect of aid on tax revenues could depend on corruption or institutional quality.
Exceptions are the papers of Gupta et al. (2003) and Benedek et al. (2012), who divide
their samples into sub-samples of different levels of corruption. Also, the paper of Alonso
and Garcimart´ın (2011) considers the interaction between the two variables of interest but
does not estimate any conditional effects. Nevertheless, the analysis in all three papers
focuses on total tax revenues. The aim of this study is to look at both total taxes, as well
as the different types of taxes.
Taxes are examined to explain whether fungibility, if it exists, is caused by malicious
intent in situations of low institutional quality; or if the reason behind fungibility is the
optimal choice of recipient governments that consider external and internal resources for
their budget allocation. Along these lines, the phenomenon of aid illusion may also be
exacerbated in environments of low institutional quality, where government officials in a
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large bureaucracy misperceive the government’s resources and budget. This study also
distinguishes between the two main types of finance for foreign aid: aid given in the form
of grants and in the form of loans. The empirical literature has found that grants have a
different effect than loans on tax revenues since grants are given as a gift and loans are
expected to be repaid (Odedokun, 2004).
A newly constructed dataset on tax revenues is used which is published by the International
Centre for Tax and Development (ICTD) (Prichard et al., 2014) that provides information
on general government data for disaggregated tax data. Total tax revenue is used as a
dependent variable, as are taxes on income/capital gains/profits, taxes on international
trade and taxes on goods and services. Static models with Fixed Effects (FE) are estimated
to control for serial correlation and heteroscedasticity. A panel sample of developing
countries is used, defined by the World Bank (WB) as countries with low or middle income
per capita from the regions of Eastern Europe, the Caribbean, Latin America, Sub-Saharan
Africa, North Africa and the Middle East, East Asia, South Asia, South-East Asia and
the Pacific, over the period of 1990 - 2013.
3.1.3 Research findings
The empirical results firstly suggest that institutional quality does not play a role for the
effect of aid on tax revenues. Moreover, total aid and aid decomposed into grants and
loans, is not found to have a negative effect on total tax revenue and this result holds with
various alternative methods; either an insignificant effect or a positive effect is found for
aid. These findings contradict the results obtained by Gupta et al. (2003) and Benedek
et al. (2012) and but agree with the findings of Clist and Morrissey (2011) and Morrissey
et al. (2014). Overall, foreign aid is not found to finance tax reductions and is therefore
non-fungible in the context of tax revenues.
3.1.4 Structure
The next Section describes the main results of the literature. Section 3.3 shows the
empirical methodology for the different models that are estimated. Section 3.4 presents
the data used and Section 3.5 discusses the results obtained along with various robustness
checks. Section 3.6 concludes this Chapter. The results are displayed in Section 3.7.
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3.2 Literature Review
3.2.1 State capacities
The performance of tax revenues is a big concern for developing countries and the inter-
national community. Tax revenues are used to finance spending targets and the delivery
of public goods that are key for economic growth, poverty reduction and financial devel-
opment, as well as for redistribution policies (Besley and Persson, 2014, Prichard et al.,
2012, Besley and Persson, 2009, Bird et al., 2008, Teera and Hudson, 2004).
Tax revenues are explained using economic structures or tax bases in an economy, such
as the share of agriculture in an economy, the share of the manufacturing industry or
how open a country is to international trade. These are the traditional determinants of
tax revenue but macroeconomic factors, such as institutional quality, as well as structural
reforms can not be neglected (Morrissey, 2015a, Clist and Morrissey, 2011, Ghura, 1998).
Developing countries are likely to have large informal sectors that are highly dependent
on natural resources, which cannot be easily taxed (Tanzi and Zee, 2000, Chelliah, 1971,
Lotz and Morss, 1967). Furthermore, low incomes and, in turn, low consumption patterns
could help explain the low levels of income taxes or taxes on goods and services, and the
over-reliance on certain types of taxation such as trade taxes (Bird et al., 2008, Teera and
Hudson, 2004, Tanzi and Zee, 2000, Ghura, 1998). These phenomena together with the
low compliance in paying taxes, political factors embedded that are historical in origin and
the presence of civil wars and conflicts contribute further to the low revenue mobilisation
(Besley and Persson, 2014, 2013, 2009).
The above characteristics are common in developing countries or ‘weak states’ according
to Acemoglu (2005). Such countries face ‘state capacity’ problems, where state capacities
consists of ‘legal’ and ‘fiscal’ capacities and is defined as the ‘institutional capacity of the
state to carry out various policies that deliver benefits and services to households and
firms’ (Besley and Persson, 2011). ‘Legal capacities’ provide rules and regulations and an
example is the provision of property rights, whereas ‘fiscal capacities’ include the necessary
infrastructure to administrate, monitor and enforce taxation policies to support its citizens
(Besley and Persson, 2011). To promote economic growth, investment in both legal and
fiscal capacities is required as the two complement each other; a sound legal system is
required to attract firms to legally operate, which in turn generate income that can be
taxed depending on the level of fiscal capacity (Besley and Persson, 2014, 2011)
Improvements in the state’s accountability to its citizens, as well as improvements in the
law and order of the state are associated with increased institutional quality (Asongu and
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Jellal, 2014, Besley and Persson, 2014). Issues of transparency, monitoring and the rule
of law, are particularly common in developing countries (Rauch and Evans, 2000), where
corruption is a ‘persistent feature’ in the society (Aidt, 2009) and may be described by sev-
eral scenarios, such as bribery, extortion, fraud, a weak legal system, lack of accountability
and transparency (Ghura, 1998)3.12.
The theoretical and empirical literature show that corruption has important effects on
the economic performance of a country, as well as welfare costs. These are also discussed
in Chapter 2 (Section 2.2.2). Corruption is found to be associated with reduced growth
via public and private investment (Tanzi, 1994). There is also evidence that corruption
affects public finances and alters government behaviour by reducing tax revenues since
tax collectors can be bribed or distorts public expenditure towards sector where higher
rents can be extorted, such as infrastructure or the military (Delavallade, 2006, Tanzi and
Davoodi, 2000, Mauro, 1998). Any improvements in institutional quality, measured by the
state’s accountability to its citizens or the rule of law are generally associated with higher
tax receipts. Weaker checks and balances within a developing country, tax policies that are
not binding and courts that do not reinforce such policies could lead to higher corruption
and in turn to leakage of tax funds (Besley and Persson, 2014). High institutional quality
improves state capacity problems and it is found to be positively associated with tax
receipts (Brun et al., 2011). Furthermore, lower institutional quality and state capacity
problems could indicate that the ‘absorptive capacity’ of a country is low. The absorptive
capacity according to Killick (1991) refers to the ability of a developing country to serve
a loan and ‘the ability of the economic system to put additional aid to productive use’.
3.2.2 Foreign aid
See Section 1.1.1 for a discussion on aid fungibility.
Tax receipts and policies are constrained by the lack of these capacities in developing
countries, which are seen as an obstacle to economic development (Besley, 2010). Foreign
aid may be given by international donors to fill in these gaps and promote growth and
development (Bird et al., 2008, Teera and Hudson, 2004, Bacha, 1990). Aid flows aim to
provide the necessary infrastructure for development and improve revenue mobilisation as
well as the management of public finances (Fjeldstad, 2014, Moore, 2007). Nevertheless,
the over-dependence on aid flows can in turn lead to a ‘resource curse’ and as Kaldor (1963)
puts it, there is a need by developing countries to learn to tax. Receiving large volumes
of aid could make an economy dependent on aid, thus giving no incentive to recipient
3.12See Section 2.2.2 for a discussion on corruption.
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governments for improvements in accountability to its citizens or improvements in the
general handling and management of aid funds (Knack, 2009, Moore, 2007). Receiving
aid may alter public finance decisions (Tanzi and Davoodi, 2000), however the decision of
the government with regard to their budget largely depends on the quality of institutions.
Countries with high quality institutions and an accountable government are found to view
aid as a complement to their domestic revenue, rather than as a substitute (Prichard et al.,
2012).
Overall, the aid fungibility literature yields mixed results for the effect of aid on tax revenue
(Yohou et al., 2016, Morrissey et al., 2014, Thornton, 2014, Benedek et al., 2012, Alonso
and Garcimart´ın, 2011, Brun et al., 2011, Clist and Morrissey, 2011, Carter, 2010, Gupta,
2007, Mahdavi, 2008, Teera and Hudson, 2004, Gupta et al., 2003, Franco-Rodriguez et al.,
1998, Khan and Hoshino, 1992). Foreign aid could affect tax revenues directly in a negative
way, but it could also increase tax revenues indirectly when it feeds into the formal sector
that can be taxed. A strand of the literature identifies a negative effect of aid on tax
revenues, leading to the conclusion that aid is fungible since it finances tax reductions;
nevertheless, this fungibility result may be driven by the optimal choice of governments
and be welfare-optimal.
Heller (1975) developed a model of fiscal response to aid using the assumption that the
public sector aims to maximise its utility by considering its spending on public investment
for development, maintenance and socioeconomic expenditures, as well as revenue from
taxation, borrowing and aid in the form of grants and loans. When the model is estimated
using a simultaneous equation system, the results support the idea of no fungibility. Using
this methodology, Khan and Hoshino (1992), Franco-Rodriguez et al. (1998) and Mahdavi
(2008) find evidence of fungibility in a sample of South and South-East Asian countries, in
Pakistan and in a sample of 43 developing countries, respectively. Different samples and
econometric techniques are used by these papers, despite the similar theoretical frame-
work. Nevertheless, the underlying conclusion is that fungibility exists with regard to aid:
aid flows finance tax reductions. Mahdavi (2008) also looks at different tax revenue com-
ponents, such as taxes on income/capital gains/profits taxes, social security/payroll taxes,
property taxes, sales taxes, excise/value-added taxes and taxes on international trade. He
finds that a negative coefficient of aid is only observed for total tax revenues and taxes on
income, capital gains and profits, whereas for the other types of taxes aid is insignificant.
Furthermore, Gupta et al. (2003) use a sample of 107 developing countries over the period
1970 - 2000 and distinguish between grants and loans since they expect the two types
of aid to have different effects on tax revenue. Grants are given as gifts, whereas loans
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need to be repaid, even on concessional terms, therefore, revenue mobilisation is impor-
tant for repayment. They control for the traditional variables mentioned earlier: tax
bases, macroeconomic variables, income, structural reform dummies and debt. They use
panel methods and panel time-series methods, such as Feasible Generalised Least Squares
(FGLS) and regressions with Panel Corrected Standard Errors (PCSEs), and conclude
that grants reduce revenues, whereas loans improve revenue mobilisation. Furthermore,
this analysis uses sub-samples that have different levels of corruption according to the In-
ternational Country Risk Guide (ICRG) variable and concludes that for countries that are
more corrupt the reduction of revenues because of grants is higher than when the complete
sample is considered. Benedek et al. (2012) extend this analysis to 117 countries over the
period 1980 - 2009 using a dynamic model and appropriate General Method of Moments
(GMM) methods. Their findings support the findings of Gupta et al. (2003) with regard
to grants but not with regard to loans. Grants are associated with reduced revenues but
loans are statistically insignificant for tax revenues. Additionally, they also disaggregate
total tax into sub-components (VAT, excise taxes, income tax and trade taxes). They find
that grants are negatively associated with VAT, excise and income taxes but positively
associated with trade taxes.
On the other hand, a strand of the literature finds evidence against fungibility with regard
to tax revenues by either estimating a positive effect of aid on tax receipts or an insignif-
icant one. A positive or an insignificant coefficient of aid is not a cause for concern with
regard to fungibility. A positive coefficient could indicate that foreign aid helps in improv-
ing tax collection efforts by strengthening institutions and administrative capacities. An
insignificant coefficient shows that aid is not fungible with regard to taxes and that tax
collection efforts are not undermined in the presence of aid flows.
Although Mahdavi (2008) estimates a negative coefficient of aid on total tax revenues and
income taxes, the author estimates an insignificant effect for social security/payroll taxes,
sales taxes, excise/value-added taxes and taxes on international trade and a positive one
for property taxes. This finding shows that different tax policies are affected in a different
way by foreign aid flows, although the author gives little explanation of the results with
regard to the aid variable. Gupta (2007) finds a positive coefficient of aid for revenue
using panel data methods and panel time-series data methods for a sample of developing
countries.
Additionally, Carter (2010) challenges the reliability of the results in the aid-tax literature
that identify a negative effect of aid on tax revenues. Carter (2010) firstly argues against
using GMM techniques because of the volatility of results and he also argues that the
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endogeneity of foreign aid should be considered, because any negative coefficient found
could just reflect the negative correlation between aid and tax since aid is given to countries
with low tax mobilisation. The author also suggests that the Pesaran and Smith (1995)
estimation method would be a better-suited method to treat heterogeneous dynamics and
estimating with PCSEs would better address serial correlation. Clist and Morrissey (2011)
estimate the effects of grants and loans on total tax revenue for a sample of 82 developing
countries over the period 1970 - 2005. The authors use static panel data methods but use
lagged aid values instead of contemporaneous ones to firstly control for the endogeneity of
foreign aid and secondly to address the issue of aid not having an effect on tax revenues
immediately. They include controls for the tax bases of agriculture, industry and trade
and income and conclude that aid has no significant effect on taxes. Although they find a
negative coefficient for contemporaneous grants, this effect disappears when using lagged
grants so they attribute this finding to endogeneity. Additionally, Morrissey et al. (2014)
use the newly constructed dataset for taxes by the ICTD over a sample of 121 developing
countries using 4-year averaged data from 1980 - 2009. They use static panel methods
and panel time-series methods and find that aid, aid grants and aid loans are insignificant
for tax revenues. They control for similar control variables as the previous studies.
Furthermore, Clist (2014) attempts to replicate the results of Gupta et al. (2003) and
Benedek et al. (2012) using their sample and concludes that since their results cannot
be replicated they can not be considered as robust. The negative association between
aid grants and revenues could be driven because of the endogeneity of aid since donors
might direct aid grants towards the countries that are heavily indebted to avoid adding
to the existing debt (Morrissey, 2015a, Carter, 2010). Moreover, Clist (2014) not only
challenges the robustness of the results of Gupta (2007) and Benedek et al. (2012), but
also the construction of their dataset since in trying to construct the dependent variables
the authors use a number of sources and treat missing values as inter-changeable. There is
no guarantee that the different sources are measured in the same way or that the definitions
used in the different sources are comparable, thus raising the measurement error in the
model. Clist (2014) attempts to estimate the aid-tax model using various data sources and
although he finds that the results are not consistent, he does not find a negative coefficient
for aid.
Alonso and Garcimart´ın (2011) and Yohou et al. (2016) are two of the few papers that con-
sider the effect of institutional quality as a tax determinant.3.13 Alonso and Garcimart´ın
(2011) use an unbalanced panel of both developed and developing aid-recipient countries
3.13Gupta et al. (2003) and Benedek et al. (2012) divide their samples according to the corruption level
for the model of total taxes.
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from 1990 - 2007 and consider an interaction term between foreign aid and institutional
quality. They use alternative econometric techniques, such as static and dynamic panel
data techniques and control for the different tax bases of agriculture, industry, trade, in-
come, as well as income inequality captured by the Gini index. They also treat income,
foreign aid and income inequality as endogenous. They find that the coefficient of aid
is insignificant and that aid does not have an impact on tax revenues with and without
considering institutional quality, measured by the ICRG index. Nevertheless, the interac-
tion term included in their model is a product of two continuous variables and conditional
effects are not estimated. Yohou et al. (2016) use panel time-series techniques in a sample
of six African countries over the period 1986 - 2010. They treat aid as endogenous by
using lagged values and control for the different tax bases mentioned above (agriculture,
industry, trade, income) as well as structural reforms variables. The authors also con-
sider the interaction term of aid and a measure of government stability, captured by the
ICRG index and find evidence that the impact of aid on total tax revenues depends on
government stability by plotting the conditional effects of aid for each of the six countries
examined (West African Economic and Monetary Union countries). They conclude that
improvements in government stability are associated with increases in tax revenues and
find that government stability, or the measure of ICRG, matters for the extent of aid
fungibility with regard to total tax revenues.
3.2.3 Contribution
Overall, the results described above show that there is no consensus in the literature
on the effect of foreign aid on tax revenues. An established result in the literature is
that weak institutions or higher corruption are associated with reductions in tax revenues
(Asongu and Jellal, 2014, Thornton, 2014, Brun et al., 2011, Knack, 2009). Nevertheless,
this finding might not hold when total tax is disaggregated into different types of taxes as
these are collected in different ways and are subject to different bureaucratic controls, as
shown by Mahdavi (2008).
In light of the studies summarised in Table 3.1, the focus of this study is to examine the
effect of both foreign aid and institutional quality on total tax revenues as well as the
composition of total tax revenues by looking at taxes from income/capital gains/profits,
taxes from international trade and taxes on goods and services.
By using an interaction term between the aid measure and institutional quality, the ef-
fects of foreign aid and the effects of the different types of financing (grants or loans),
can be estimated to examine the extent of fungibility at different levels of institutional
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Table 3.1: Summary of key studies in the literature
Study Sample Estimation Results
Gupta et al. (2003) Panel (developing
countries, 1970 -
2000)
FE, FGLS and
PCSE
Evidence of fungibility
Alonso & Garci-
martin (2011)
Panel (developed
and developing
countries, 1990 -
2007)
FE and GMM No evidence for fungibility
Benedek et al.
(2012)
Panel (developing
countries, 1980 -
2009)
FE and GMM Evidence of fungibility
Morrissey et al.
(2014)
Panel (developing
countries, 1980 -
2009)
FE and PCSE No evidence of fungibility
Yohou et al. (2016) Panel (6
WAEMU coun-
tries, 1986 -
2010)
FGLS Government stability
makes aid less fungible
quality. Although other researchers have controlled for either the quality of institutions
or a measure of corruption in their models as a robustness check, very few studies have
considered that foreign aid might have a heterogeneous effect on tax revenues conditional
on the quality of institutions. For example, Gupta et al. (2003) and Benedek et al. (2012)
divide their sample based on the level of corruption in each country and estimate the
effect of aid on total tax revenues in countries with weak institutions or high corruption.
Alonso and Garcimart´ın (2011) and Yohou et al. (2016) also consider the interaction term
between foreign aid and a continuous measure capturing institutional quality but they
do not estimate any conditional effects. Looking at the main components of taxes would
show a complete picture of how tax revenues are affected by institutions and foreign aid
inflows.
For the purposes of this study, the newly constructed dataset offered by the ICTD is used
and the models are estimated over a panel of developing countries for the period 1990 -
2013. Studies in the literature have mostly focused on central government data. We take
advantage of this new source for disaggregated tax data that considers both central and
general government data on tax revenues. Considering general government data instead
of central, allows us to avoid under-estimating tax revenue collection in federal states.
Following the work of Morrissey et al. (2014), who also use the ICTD dataset, static
panel data models and panel time-series techniques are estimated. Alternative estimation
methods and samples are used to ensure the robustness of the results and to cover the
limitations of each of the different estimation technique.
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3.3 Methodology
The purpose of this study is to investigate the extent of aid fungibility regarding tax
revenues conditional on institutional quality.
Specifically, the following static panel data model is estimated as follows:
Yit = β1Ait + β2IQit + β3(Ait.IQit) + γ
′Xit + κt + ηi + it (3.1)
where the variables correspond to:
• Yit: Tax revenues (total, income/capital gains/profits taxes, taxes on goods and
services, taxes on international trade) in recipient country i at year t
• Ait: Disbursements of foreign aid in recipient country i at year t
• IQit: The institutional quality index, which in this case is the average of the rule of
law, bureaucratic quality and corruption indices of the ICRG in recipient country i
at year t
• Ait.IQit: The interaction term between foreign aid and institutional quality in re-
cipient country i at year t
• Xit: A vector of controls in recipient country i at year t (e.g. agriculture value-added,
industry value-added, trade openness, income)
• ηi: The fixed effect component/unobserved heterogeneity
• κt: Time fixed effects/common shocks
• it: The error component
In addition to using total aid disbursements in the model (Ait), aid disbursements are
broken down according to their type of finance: grants and loans. The procedure used
to construct the different variables of aid is explained in Section 2.4. When grants and
loans are used instead of total aid they are interacted with the measure of the quality of
institutions (IQit) to explore any possible heterogeneous effects of aid on tax revenue.
More precisely, the model that disaggregates aid into grants and loans is estimated as
follows:
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Yit = δ1Grantsit + δ2Loansit + δ3IQit+
δ4(Grantsit.IQit) + δ5(Loansit.IQit) + γ
′Xit + κt + ηi + it
(3.2)
where the aid variables correspond to:
• Grantsit: Disbursements of foreign aid that are given as grants in recipient country
i at year t
• Loansit: Disbursements of foreign aid that are given as loans in recipient country i
at year t
Table 3.2 lists the different dependent variables of the estimated models and Table 3.3
shows the definitions of the key variables in the estimated models.
Table 3.2: Estimated models
Model Dependent variable
TOT Total taxes
IPC Income, capital gains and profits taxes
GS Taxes on goods and services
TR Taxes on international trade
Table 3.3: Key Variables
Variable Definition
Total tax revenue Yit Total tax revenue consists of revenue
obtained from direct and indirect
taxes.
Total aid Ait Aid disbursements show the actual
payments to recipients every year for
all purposes.
Aid grants Grantsit Aid disbursements that are given as
grants are transfers that the recipient
does not need to repay.
Aid loans Loansit Aid disbursements that are given as
loans are transfers for which the re-
cipient incurs legal debt.
Institutional quality IQit The average of the corruption, law
and order and bureaucratic quality
indices of the ICRG.
Econometric theory
Generally, panel data models include an unobserved heterogeneity component in their error
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term. This unobserved component can be modelled and estimated using the FE model
for panel data, or can be considered as a component of the error term using the random
effects model. Dealing with this FE component usually involves taking first differences
and estimating the model or demeaning the variables and estimating a Within-Group
(WG) estimator. When using the FE or WG estimators, terms that have no variation
over time are removed together with the unobservable component. To account for the
heteroscedasticity and the serial correlation that makes Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)
inconsistent, static models with country and time FE are estimated, where standard errors
are clustered by country. This method guarantees that our estimates are not contaminated
by aggregate shocks and trends common to all countries or by time invariant country-
specific characteristics.
Identification strategy
The issue of aid endogeneity discussed in the previous study is a concern for this study
as well. Reverse causality may be an issue since countries with low revenue mobilisation
are likely to receive more aid to cover for their inadequate domestic resources. Therefore,
to mitigate concerns of endogeneity of foreign aid and be able to identify a causal effect,
lagged values of aid are used instead of contemporaneous values, following the empirical
literature (Morrissey et al., 2014, Gupta et al., 2003). With regard to institutional quality,
the variable is assumed to be exogenous, although this is a limiting assumption. This
assumption is relaxed in a robustness check where lagged institutional quality is considered
instead of contemporaneous ones.
In the presence of an interaction term between the foreign aid variable and a continuous
measure of institutional quality, the conditional effects of foreign aid need to be calcu-
lated and then plotted against institutional quality (Brambor et al., 2006, Blalock, 2005,
Friedrich, 1982). The standard errors of the conditional effects of aid are then computed
by using the Delta method (Oehlert, 1992).
The interaction term between foreign aid and institutional quality is included in the models
to investigate whether the effects of aid on tax revenues or on the components of the
budget constraint depend on the level of institutional quality. It is expected that low
institutional quality would make aid fungible or more fungible. What fungibility means
in terms of tax revenues is a reduction in tax collected meaning that aid resources finance
tax reductions and are treated as a substitute to tax revenues. An insignificant marginal
effect of aid indicating that receiving aid has no effect on tax collection effort, and a
significantly positive marginal effect would give evidence against fungibility. The empirical
literature suggests that corruption is associated with reductions in tax revenues directly
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and indirectly (Tanzi and Davoodi, 2000, Ghura, 1998) and looking at the coefficient
of institutional quality could shed light on how bureaucratic quality, the rule of law and
corruption affect tax collection. Nevertheless, fungibility in the context of tax revenues due
to the optimal choice of recipient government could be optimal from a welfare perspective
(Carter, 2010).
Regarding the additional control variables, debt relief, which is a form of aid itself, is used
to reduce the level of a country’s indebtedness. Having a large external debt would require
more government revenue to be collected for the purpose of debt repayments and it can,
therefore, be expected that debt relief and a lower level of external debt would reduce tax
collection efforts for the purposes of repayments. Aid diverted towards Non-Governmental
Organisations (NGOs) is not expected to impact tax collection decisions made by the
recipient government. Income or GDP per capita is expected to enter the model positively
since the expected revenue that would be obtained is higher in a richer economy (Besley
and Persson, 2014, Lotz and Morss, 1967). Agriculture and industry value-added measure
the share of agriculture and industry in an economy. Since agriculture or subsistence
farming falls under the informal sector of an economy, it is expected that it will enter
the tax revenue model negatively (Teera and Hudson, 2004, Slemrod, 2002, Ghura, 1998,
Chelliah, 1971). The opposite holds for the share of industry since tax collection would be
easier. Trade openness is used to capture the contribution of trade taxes for economies, as
well as the level of protectionism in recipient countries. Trade openness is expected to have
a positive coefficient, especially for taxes on international trade since lower protectionism
measure would facilitate trade and raise trade taxes (Lotz and Morss, 1967, Rodrik, 1998).
Robustness checks
Dynamic models are also considered for this analysis, however, the relevant tests for instru-
ment validity are not passed. Furthermore, as Carter (2010) points out, dynamic models
estimated using appropriate GMM techniques are extremely sensitive to the choice of
parameters.3.14 Following the literature (Morrissey et al., 2014), the models for tax rev-
enues (models TOT, IPC, GS, TR) are estimated using panel time-series techniques as
a robustness check. To account for serial correlation first order autocorrelation (AR(1))
or panel specific first order autocorrelation (PSAR(1)) can be specified for the estimated
model. When using FGLS the full variance-covariance matrix is estimated and the model
estimates rely on the parameter estimates of the variance-covariance matrix. PCSE pro-
duces identical results to OLS if no autocorrelation structure is specified but if AR(1) or
PSAR(1) are specified Prais-Winstren regressions are used. Both methods are consistent
and should yield similar point estimates but the FGLS method is found to under-estimate
3.14GMM models are estimated for the first study of this thesis and the results proved to be sensitive.
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standard errors (Beck and Katz, 2011, 1996, 1995). For the purposes of this study, the
method of PCSE using Prais-Winsten regressions is used with a correlation of AR(1) is
specified for the models, following Beck and Katz (1995).
Alternatively, as Carter (2010) points out, the Pesaran and Smith (1995) Mean Group
Estimator can be used to identify the slopes for each country i and then averaging the
coefficients for each group. Such an estimator can prove to be useful using the panel
dataset used for the purposes of this chapter. This estimation techniques provides unbiased
coefficients in the presence of heterogeneity and consistent coefficients in the presence of
autocorrelation, as opposed to other panel data techniques. Nevertheless, the assumption
of strict exogeneity of foreign aid and institutional quality would still have to be made
using the Mean Group Estimator.
3.4 Data
3.4.1 Sources
The sample used consists of developing countries from the regions of Eastern Europe, the
Caribbean, Latin America, North Africa and the Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa, South
Asia, South East Asia, East Asia and the Pacific, over the period of 1990 - 2013. The
sample used for the model of total tax revenues (model TOT) consists of 926 observations
for 59 countries. The sample for the model of income, capital gains and profits taxes (model
IPC) consists of 1045 observations and 69 countries. For the model of taxes on goods and
services (model GS) the sample consists of 1093 observations over 70 countries. The sample
for model of taxes on international trade (model TR) consists of 1107 observations for 69
countries. See Appendix B.3 for the full list of countries in each specification
Data for total tax revenue are obtained from the ICTD that collects tax revenue data from
various sources, such as various international databases and country reports (Prichard
et al., 2014). This dataset offers data for various other types of tax revenues, as well as
non-tax revenues and resource revenues. Comparing data from various sources reduces
errors and increases the availability of taxation data that suffer from low coverage.
The measure of institutional quality used for this study is the ICRG measure obtained
from the Quality of Governance (QoG) dataset published by the University of Gothenburg
(Dahlberg et al., 2015). The PRS Group publishes the ICRG index, which consists of
economic, financial and political risk factors. The institutional quality index used for
the purposes of this study includes three components of the political risk factors averaged
together: the extent of corruption, bureaucratic control and law and order. This measure of
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corruption focuses mostly on political corruption in the form of patronage, favours, secret
funding of parties in power, nepotism and ties between politicians and businesses (Howell,
2011). The component of bureaucratic quality focuses on interruptions in government
services due to bureaucratic reasons. High-risk countries are those where the bureaucracy
is embedded in the political system and government services. The component on law and
order focuses on the strength of the legal system. High-risk countries suffer from a high
crime rate with weak sanctions. The index has been rescaled and normalised to range
between 0 and 1 so that higher values indicate higher quality of governance.
The ICRG index of corruption is one of the most widespread measures for corruption and
has been available since 1985 for a large number of countries. Nevertheless, it is based
on the opinion of country experts on how political corruption is expected to affect in-
ternational investment and businesses. According to its methodology, political data are
collected and then transferred into risk points on the basis of the analysis of pre-set ques-
tions for each sub-component of the political risk component (i.e. corruption, law and
order, bureaucratic quality). These pre-set questions are not made public and, therefore,
cannot be challenged. Measuring corruption and the quality of institutions in general, is
usually based on individuals’ perceptions of corruption in any given country. Measuring
perceptions introduces some measurement error in the models since what certain people
perceive as corruption is not uniform across the population or between countries. Never-
theless, individuals make decisions and behave accordingly based on such perceptions, so
the perception of corruption could be equally important (Razafindrakoto and Roubaud,
2010). Another issue is the fact that perceptions may be easily affected by either the cur-
rent situation of a country and its economic performance, by the respondent’s experiences
or by the cultural and societal values of each country (Rothstein and Torsello, 2013). For
example, business experts and locals do not experience corruption at the same level and
their responses are expected to differ.
Data for foreign aid disbursements are obtained from the Creditor Reporting System
(CRS) of the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD (OECD-DAC) that offers
disaggregated aid data according to donors, types of foreign aid and sectors (OECD, 2013).
The CRS database offers data for disbursements and commitments and the differences
between the two variables from year to year are attributed to the fact that commitments
may actually be disbursed in a later year. For this reason, disbursements were chosen to
best reflect foreign aid from the point of view of recipient countries. Aid disbursements are
defined as the actual payments in each year and show the realisation of donors’ intentions
and previous commitments. Data for aid disbursements are available since 1990 from the
CRS database although the availability of aid disbursements is low in the years prior to
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2002. Data for debt relief are obtained from the DAC2a Table of the CRS for net debt
relief. All of the aid variables have been rescaled to reflect percentages to GDP.
The CRS database classifies flows according to their type and their purpose and this feature
was used to construct the measure for aid disbursements. The database also classifies
the channel of delivery for each of the flows, which is the ‘first implementing partner’
that is responsible for the subsequent allocation of the ODA resources. We focused on
concessional flows of resources according to the definition for ODA having the public sector
as their channel for delivery and more precisely ODA grants (flow code 11), ODA loans
(flow code 13) and private concessional loans (flow code 30) that include flows from both
bilateral and multilateral donors. The flow codes allowed the construction of the aid grants
and aid loans variables. Flows according to channels of delivery and aid modalities was
obtained. Data for flows that have as their first implementing partner NGOs were used
to construct the ‘NGO aid’ variable that is included in the regressions and measures the
aid disbursements that are directed to NGOs.
The World Development Indicators (2015) (WDI) of the WB are used to obtain data for
a number of other variables used in the models, such as GDP per capita, agricultural and
industry value-added, trade openness and GDP in current terms for the rescaling of the
aid measures (World Bank, 2015).
Detailed definitions of each variable and their sources can be found in Appendix B.4.
3.4.2 Descriptive statistics
Table 3.4 shows the descriptive statistics of the key variables. The sample of each model
changes because of data availability; the sample used is based on developing countries that
have available information for institutional quality (ICRG) and on tax revenues. Such data
for developing countries are not always available and there is a large number of missing
values in these samples. Most of the countries included in this sample come from the
region of Sub-Saharan Africa.
Tax revenue excluding external grants constitute around 74% of total government revenue
and the rest falls under non-tax revenue. Total tax revenue consists of direct and indirect
taxes and direct taxes can be broken down to income, capital and profit taxes and property
taxes. Indirect taxes are broken down into trade taxes, taxes on goods and services and
other taxes. Income/capital/profit taxes constitute around a third of total tax revenue,
trade taxes around a fourth of total tax revenue, taxes on goods and services around
40% of total tax, and the rest are property and other taxes. It can be seen that most
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of the aid disbursed is in the form of grants rather than loans. Negative values for debt
relief refer to the accumulation of more debt offsetting debt forgiveness. The mean of
total tax revenue is higher in upper-middle income countries than low income countries,
explaining the need of foreign aid resources to fill the gaps. This correlation is also true
for institutional quality and income, as expected based on the empirical literature since
improved institutional capacities are correlated with higher collected tax revenues. The
difference between total aid disbursements and the aggregation of aid grants and aid loans
is attributed to aid flows in the form of private concessional loans that are not considered
for the purposes of this study.
3.5 Results
3.5.1 Empirical models
This Section discusses the results for the models of total tax revenues and its components
estimated using static models with FE. Several robustness checks are also shown, such as
the results obtained using PCSEs with an AR(1) component and with dynamic FE.
Table 3.5 shows the results for the different models of tax revenues using aggregate aid
disbursements. The first column of each model shows the results of the model without
including the interaction term. Aid disbursements are found to have a statistically insignif-
icant effect for all models of tax revenues, except for the case of taxes on international trade
where aid has a significantly positive coefficient. Insignificant or positive coefficients give
evidence against fungibility since tax revenues do not fall with aid. Institutional quality
is not found to be significant for tax revenues, although the coefficients are positive.
Table 3.6 shows the regression coefficients for the different models of tax revenues when
total aid disbursements are disaggregated into the two types of finance: aid grants and aid
loans. The first column of each model shows the results of the model without including the
interaction term. Aid grants are statistically insignificant for all models of tax revenues.
Aid loans are significantly positive only for the model GS (column (8)). This positive
coefficient can be explained because of the structure of aid: loans, even on concessional
terms, need to be repaid either after a longer time period or with a lower interest rate,
and tax revenues need to be raised to cover the repayments (Odedokun, 2004).
NGO aid and debt relief are statistically insignificant. An insignificant effect for NGO aid
suggests that aid to NGOs does not contribute to raising taxes. An insignificant effect for
debt relief suggests that this form of aid does not relief recipient economies from the burden
of taxation. Per capita income is statistically insignificant. Trade openness is significantly
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positive, as expected, since the growth of trade and the demand for imports and exports
generates revenue for the economy (Rodrik, 1998). The share of agriculture value-added
for the economy is associated with reductions for tax revenues, agreeing with the empirical
literature (Chelliah, 1971). Agriculture is an informal sector where subsistence farming
is very common, especially in developing countries. Such an informal sector is difficult
to be taxed and this deprives developing countries of potential resources in the form of
tax revenues, thus explaining the negative coefficient. Industry value-added, on the other
hand, is expected to have a positive coefficient since activities in the industrial sector are
easier to be taxed and are likely to generate incomes that are part of the recorded output
of the economy that can be taxed (Ghura, 1998). Nevertheless, a significantly negative
coefficient is found.
Figure 3.1 shows the conditional effects of total aid disbursements for the different mod-
els of tax revenues at the range of the ICRG variable. The conditional effects of total
aid for all types of tax revenues, except for the case of taxes on international trade are
insignificant and this finding holds at all levels of institutional quality. The conditional
effect of aggregate aid on taxes on international trade is generally statistically insignifi-
cant and significantly positive in low to middle levels of institutional quality (ICRG values
0.2 - 0.4). Although an insignificant effect is an indication against fungibility, a positive
marginal effect indicates that aid is definitely not fungible as it is associated with increases
in tax revenue collected from trade, possibly because foreign aid provides resources in for-
eign currency that can be used for buying imported goods (Bacha, 1990). These results
suggest that total aid is not associated with tax reductions and there is no evidence for
fungibility with regard to tax revenues.
Figure 3.2 shows the conditional effect of total aid grants for the different models of tax
revenues at the range of the ICRG variable. The conditional effects of aid grants follow a
similar pattern with aggregate aid: aid grants leave tax revenues unaffected. This finding
holds for all levels of institutional quality and for all types of tax revenues.
Figure 3.3 shows the conditional effect of total aid loans for the different models of tax
revenues at the range of the ICRG variable. The conditional effect of aid loans is insignifi-
cant at all values of the ICRG for all four models, except for taxes on international trade.
The conditional effect of aid loans on taxes on international trade is significantly positive
at low levels of institutional quality (ICRG values of 0 - 0.3).3.15. Loans are generally
expected to have a significantly positive effect on tax revenues since they are expected
to be repaid (Gupta et al., 2003). Nevertheless, this positive effect is present only for
taxes on international trade and at low values of institutional quality, contradicting the
3.15Some examples of countries that take such values are Liberia, Mali and Nigeria.
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initial hypothesis of this study that improvements in institutional quality are expected to
increase the fiscal capacity of countries and raise tax revenues.
Based on the results described above, total aid disbursements, as well as aid decomposed
into types of finance, are not associated with tax reductions. This finding holds for total
taxes as well as for important sub-components of total taxes (income/capital gains/profits
taxes, taxes on goods and services, taxes on international trade). Institutional quality
is generally not found to be important for these results as we observe no evidence for
fungibility for all levels of institutional quality. Surprisingly, at lower values of the ICRG,
aggregate aid disbursements and aid in the form of loans are associated with increases in
taxes on international trade, contradicting the initial hypothesis. Another surprising find-
ing of this study is that institutional quality is not important for taxes in the regressions.
Overall, these findings agree with Clist and Morrissey (2011) and Morrissey et al. (2014),
who find either an insignificant or a positive effect of aid on taxes.
3.5.2 Robustness checks
To ensure that the results are robust, alternative estimation methods and samples are used.
Panel time-series techniques are used and the models are estimated with PCSEs with an
AR(1) component. Appendix B.2 displays the conditional effects of these specifications.
Secondly, dynamic panel data models with FE are estimated. Furthermore, to extend the
FE analysis lagged values for the aid variables are also considered to capture the issue of
endogeneity of aid in revenue models. Also, lagged values of the ICRG variable are used
to correct for the potential endogeneity between institutional quality or corruption and
tax revenue. Additionally, the institutional quality measure is replaced with the average
of the six Worldwide Governance Indicators developed by Kaufmann and Zoido-Lobato´n
(1999) (World Bank, 2014). These results are not shown but are available upon request.
These results results remain mostly robust to these alternative econometric techniques.
Although the significance of the coefficients changes in some instances: for example, aid
grants have a significantly positive effect on total taxes and on taxes on goods services at
high levels of institutional quality, the inference of the results does not chance. Overall, we
find no evidence of fungibility in the context of tax revenues at any level of institutional
quality: aid flows are not found to finance tax reductions.
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3.6 Conclusion
Following the results of Chapter 1, where aid is found to be fungible in the context of
public spending, the aim of this study was to examine aid fungibility with regard to tax
revenues, by looking at total tax revenues and some of its important sub-components,
such as income/capital gains/profits taxes, taxes on goods and services and taxes on
international trade. The hypothesis of this study was that institutional quality plays
a role for fungibility and more precisely, higher institutional quality was expected to be
associated with a higher conditional effect of aid since improvements in institutional quality
are found to increase tax revenues in the empirical literature.
Fungibility can arise for a number of reasons. It could arise due to the optimal choice of
recipient governments that consider their total revenue - including domestic and external
resources - when allocating funds across their budget. According to this explanation, aid
could impact revenue negatively. Aid could finance tax reductions since fungibility could
also arise due to malicious intent, possibly when institutions are weak as characterised by
environments of high corruption, a large and cumbersome bureaucracy and a weak rule of
law, or due to aid illusion.
A new dataset on tax revenues was used that considers both central and general govern-
ment data. Most studies in the literature use central tax revenues and this could under-
estimate tax revenue collection efforts in federal states. Following the empirical literature
(Yohou et al., 2016, Morrissey et al., 2014, Benedek et al., 2012, Alonso and Garcimart´ın,
2011, Gupta et al., 2003) several estimation techniques were employed considering the
serial correlation that exists in such models. Static, dynamic and panel time-series models
were estimated for several dependent variables of tax revenues. Aggregate aid and aid
disaggregated into the two types of finance: aid grants and aid loans. According to the
literature, the various types of aid were expected to impact tax revenues in a different
way.
With regard to tax revenues, the hypothesis that institutional quality plays a role for
fungibility is not supported for either aggregate or disaggregated aid into types of finance.
Total aid disbursements, aid grants and aid loans are found to leave tax revenues unaf-
fected. In some cases a positive conditional effect is found. The fact that the effect of
aid is either statistically insignificant or significantly positive provides evidence against
fungibility with regard to tax revenue since aid is not found to finance tax reductions.
The results are largely based on the ICRG measure of institutional quality. As discussed
previously, measures of institutional quality are highly subjective as they involve percep-
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tions and the assessment of country experts, who can easily be affected by a number of
factors. The conditional effects of aid were estimated over the range of this institutional
quality measure and this could be problematic for the values estimated at the extremes,
although looking at the descriptive statistics indicates that extreme values of the ICRG
are not present in these samples. Furthermore, the measure capturing institutional quality
is an average of three political components: bureaucratic quality, the extent of corruption
and law and order. It is unclear which component drives these results. Furthermore,
alternative estimation techniques can be used, for example the Mean Group Estimator
proposed by Pesaran and Smith (1995) and suggested by Carter (2010).
Moreover, this analysis of tax revenues can be extended by looking at the different aid
modalities as off-budget aid, which is given as technical cooperation and training, would
be expected to affect tax revenues positively by building the necessary state capacities for
tax collection.
Chatterjee et al. (2012) explain that aid fungibility could arise due to the optimal choice of
recipient governments, where they adjust another component of their budget constraint.
For example, the recipient government may react to changes in aid by adjusting spending,
tax revenues, external borrowing or by deciding to run a public surplus. So far this thesis
has examined the effects of aid on government spending and tax revenues. An alternative
method of examining the extent of fungibility would be to consider all components of the
budget constraint over a common sample. This method could explain how recipients be-
have with aid receipts and how they adjust their public finances. Looking at the complete
component of the budget constraint could also shed light on the cause behind fungibility.
The results of Chapter 2 suggest that aid does not have the anticipated effect on expendi-
tures, especially in environments of low institutional quality. Examining the components
of the budget constraint will allow us to understand if governments are behaving optimally
and adjusting borrowing or the fiscal balance upon receiving aid flows, or if aid is leaked
out of the budget.
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3.7 Figures and Tables
Table 3.4: Descriptive statistics, 1990 - 2013
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Total taxes: 926 observations (59 countries for 1990 - 2013, unbalanced)
Total tax revenue 13.057 5.453 2.166 29.627
Total aid disbursements 4.206 10.878 0 184.863
Aid grants 2.460 5.424 0 97.370
Aid loans 0.946 1.803 0 39.829
ICRG 0.446 0.122 0.097 0.900
Debt relief 0.483 2.786 -0.907 63.899
NGO share of aid 0.210 0.909 0 12.595
Income, capital gains and profits taxes: 1045 observations (69 countries for 1990 - 2013, unbalanced)
Income, capital gains and prof-
its taxes
4.885 3.828 0.092 31.469
Total aid disbursements 4.421 10.112 0 184.863
Aid grants 2.718 5.045 0 53.910
Aid loans 1.043 1.970 0 39.829
ICRG 0.442 0.125 0.083 0.898
Debt relief 0.581 3.231 -0.907 63.898
NGO share of aid 0.243 0.845 0 11.280
Taxes on goods and services: 1093 observations (70 countries for 1990 - 2013, unbalanced)
Taxes on goods and services 5.936 3.891 0 29.088
Total aid disbursements 4.420 9.929 0 184.863
Aid grants 2.702 4.968 0 53.910
Aid loans 1.043 1.925 0 39.829
ICRG 0.445 0.121 0.083 0.898
Debt relief 0.613 3.249 -0.907 63.900
NGO share of aid 0.242 0.831 0 11.286
Taxes on international trade: 1107 observations (69 countries for 1990 - 2013, unbalanced)
Taxes on international trade 2.645 2.059 0 13.129
Total aid disbursements 4.364 9.892 0 184.863
Aid grants 2.652 4.922 0 53.910
Aid loans 1.024 1.905 0 39.829
ICRG 0.442 0.123 0.083 0.898
Debt relief 0.616 3.239 -0.907 63.900
NGO share of aid 0.235 0.825 0 11.280
The variables are expressed in percentages of GDP, with the exception of the ICRG variable. The sample
of each model changes due to data limitations, leaving an unbalanced panel dataset from 1990 - 2013.
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Table 3.5: Static FE: Tax revenue models - Total aid disbursements
Model TOT Model IPC Model GS Model TR
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Total aid disbursements 0.005 -0.011 0.007 0.039 -0.004 -0.041 0.020** 0.067**
(0.013) (0.033) (0.015) (0.043) (0.014) (0.047) (0.009) (0.034)
Interaction (ICRG*Total aid) 0.044 -0.090 0.102 -0.132
(0.100) (0.095) (0.104) (0.080)
ICRG 0.847 0.768 1.683 1.842 0.113 -0.068 -0.435 -0.224
(1.619) (1.631) (1.806) (1.800) (1.401) (1.432) (1.075) (1.055)
NGO aid 0.031 0.031 -0.023 -0.023 -0.022 -0.021 0.005 0.004
(0.027) (0.027) (0.040) (0.039) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018)
Debt relief -0.005 0.003 -0.030 -0.048 -0.007 0.011 -0.002 -0.025
(0.031) (0.031) (0.033) (0.039) (0.022) (0.037) (0.017) (0.028)
GDP per capita -0.345 -0.355 0.999 1.050 0.090 0.036 -0.313 -0.224
(1.027) (1.026) (1.282) (1.282) (0.594) (0.594) (0.613) (0.565)
Openness 0.029*** 0.030*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.014* 0.014** 0.006 0.006
(0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005)
Agriculture value-added -0.077*** -0.077*** -0.023 -0.021 -0.059*** -0.061*** -0.019 -0.015
(0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.030) (0.021) (0.021) (0.019) (0.018)
Industry value-added -0.150*** -0.150*** 0.041 0.042 -0.067*** -0.068*** 0.001 0.002
(0.031) (0.031) (0.053) (0.053) (0.022) (0.021) (0.019) (0.019)
R-squared 0.339 0.339 0.116 0.116 0.291 0.293 0.157 0.163
F-test 17.887 16.938 8.791 9.742 4.505 4.420 10.159 11.188
No. of countries 59 59 69 69 70 70 69 69
N 926 926 1045 1045 1093 1093 1107 1107
All specifications control for a full set of country and year fixed effects. Column titles refer to the dependent
variable (TOT: total taxes; IPC: Income, Profits and Capital gains taxes, GS: Goods and Services taxes;
and TR: Trade taxes. The fiscal variables, aid, debt relief, openness, agriculture and industry value-
added are expressed as percentages of GDP. Robust standard errors, clustered by country are reported in
parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Table 3.6: Static FE: Tax revenue models - Disaggregated aid disbursements into grants
and loans
Model TOT Model IPC Model GS Model TR
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Aid grants 0.021 -0.071 0.030 0.045 -0.014 -0.046 0.017 0.021
(0.017) (0.083) (0.034) (0.052) (0.030) (0.055) (0.021) (0.030)
Aid loans 0.078 0.042 0.015 0.114 0.051 -0.038 0.032 0.172**
(0.057) (0.161) (0.033) (0.094) (0.034) (0.086) (0.027) (0.079)
Interaction (ICRG*Aid grants) 0.301 -0.038 0.088 -0.003
(0.295) (0.103) (0.111) (0.074)
Interaction(ICRG*Aid loans) 0.071 -0.276 0.237 -0.396*
(0.478) (0.295) (0.260) (0.225)
ICRG 0.599 0.190 1.566 1.805 0.059 -0.231 -0.363 -0.039
(1.580) (1.707) (1.804) (1.881) (1.387) (1.439) (1.097) (1.099)
NGO aid 0.027 0.027 -0.025 -0.025 -0.020 -0.020 0.001 0.001
(0.026) (0.026) (0.038) (0.037) (0.019) (0.019) (0.017) (0.017)
Debt relief -0.033 -0.025 -0.040 -0.053* -0.020 -0.005 0.012 -0.000
(0.029) (0.032) (0.027) (0.029) (0.022) (0.025) (0.018) (0.019)
GDP per capita -0.279 -0.254 1.097 1.141 0.080 0.019 -0.375 -0.332
(1.031) (1.033) (1.266) (1.267) (0.603) (0.603) (0.614) (0.604)
Openness 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.012* 0.012* 0.007 0.007
(0.009) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005)
Agriculture value-added -0.075** -0.071** -0.020 -0.018 -0.060*** -0.062*** -0.021 -0.019
(0.030) (0.029) (0.029) (0.030) (0.021) (0.021) (0.020) (0.020)
Industry value-added -0.147*** -0.145*** 0.044 0.043 -0.067*** -0.067*** -0.001 -0.001
(0.031) (0.032) (0.052) (0.052) (0.021) (0.021) (0.019) (0.019)
R2 0.342 0.344 0.117 0.117 0.294 0.296 0.151 0.155
F-test 20.934 18.482 8.315 9.422 4.634 4.376 5.522 7.167
No. of countries 59 59 69 69 70 70 69 69
N 926 926 1045 1045.000 1093 1093 1107 1107
All specifications control for a full set of country and year fixed effects. Column titles refer to the dependent
variable (TOT: total taxes; IPC: Income, Profits and Capital gains taxes, GS: Goods and Services taxes;
and TR: Trade taxes. The fiscal variables, aid, debt relief, openness, agriculture and industry value-
added are expressed as percentages of GDP. Robust standard errors, clustered by country are reported in
parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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(a) Total taxes (b) Income, profits and capital gains taxes
(c) International trade taxes (d) Taxes on goods and services
Figure 3.1: The conditional effects of total aid disbursements
The effects are calculated from Table 3.5. Standard errors are calculated us-
ing the Delta method. Confidence intervals at the 95% level are shown.The
conditional effect is estimated over the range of the ICRG variable, where
higher values indicate higher institutional quality.
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(a) Total taxes (b) Income, profits and capital gains taxes
(c) International trade taxes (d) Taxes on goods and services
Figure 3.2: The conditional effects of total aid grants
The effects are calculated from Table 3.6. Standard errors are
calculated using the Delta method. Confidence intervals at the
95% level are shown.The conditional effect is estimated over the
range of the ICRG variable, where higher values indicate higher
institutional quality.
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(a) Total taxes (b) Income, profits and capital gains taxes
(c) International trade taxes (d) Taxes on goods and services
Figure 3.3: The conditional effects of total aid loans
The effects are calculated from Table 3.6. Standard errors are
calculated using the Delta method. Confidence intervals at the
95% level are shown.The conditional effect is estimated over the
range of the ICRG variable, where higher values indicate higher
institutional quality.
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Appendix B:
B.1 Descriptive statistics
Appendix B.1 contains information on the variables used for the analysis.
Figure B.1.1 shows the normal distribution of the ICRG variable used.
Figure B.1.1: ICRG distribution
B.2 Empirical results: Robustness checks
Appendix B.2 displays the conditional effects of aggregate aid, aid grants and aid loans
using panel time-series techniques using PCSEs regressions with an AR(1) component.
Figure B.2.1 shows the conditional effects of total aid disbursements for the different
models of tax revenues at the range of the ICRG variable. Figures B.2.2 and B.2.3 shows
the conditional effect of total aid grants and aid loans, respectively.
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(a) Total taxes (b) Income, profits and capital gains taxes
(c) International trade taxes (d) Taxes on goods and services
Figure B.2.1: The conditional effects of total aid disbursements
PCSEs regressions are estimated with an AR(1) component. Standard errors
are calculated using the Delta method. Confidence intervals at the 95% level
are shown.The conditional effect is estimated over the range of the ICRG
variable, where higher values indicate higher institutional quality.
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(a) Total taxes (b) Income, profits and capital gains taxes
(c) International trade taxes (d) Taxes on goods and services
Figure B.2.2: The conditional effects of total aid grants
PCSEs regressions are estimated with an AR(1) component. Stan-
dard errors are calculated using the Delta method. Confidence inter-
vals at the 95% level are shown.The conditional effect is estimated
over the range of the ICRG variable, where higher values indicate
higher institutional quality.
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(a) Total taxes (b) Income, profits and capital gains taxes
(c) International trade taxes (d) Taxes on goods and services
Figure B.2.3: The conditional effects of total aid loans
PCSEs regressions are estimated with an AR(1) component. Stan-
dard errors are calculated using the Delta method. Confidence
intervals at the 95% level are shown.The conditional effect is es-
timated over the range of the ICRG variable, where higher values
indicate higher institutional quality.
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B.3 Sample
Appendix B.3 displays the countries included in the empirical estimations.
Country Model
TOT
Model IPC Model GS Model TR
Albania D D D D
Algeria D D D D
Angola D D D D
Armenia D D D
Azerbaijan D D D D
Bangladesh D D D D
Belarus D D D D
Bolivia D D D D
Botswana D D D D
Burkina Faso D D D D
Cameroon D D D D
Colombia D
Congo, Dem. Rep. D D D
Congo Rep. D D D D
Costa Rica D D D D
Cote d’Ivoire D D D
Cuba D D D
Dominican Republic D D D D
Ecuador D D D D
Egypt, Arab Rep. D D D
El Salvador D D D D
Ethiopia D D D
Gabon D D D
Ghana D D D D
Guatemala D D D D
Guinea D D D
Guinea-Bissau D D D D
Guyana D D D
Honduras D D D
India D D D D
Indonesia D D D D
Iran, Islamic Rep. D D D
Jamaica D D D D
Kenya D D D D
Liberia D D D D
Madagascar D D D D
Malawi D D D D
Malaysia D D D D
Mali D D D D
Mexico D D D D
Moldova D D D D
117
Country Model
TOT
Model IPC Model GS Model TR
Mongolia D D D D
Morocco D D D D
Mozambique D D D D
Namibia D D D D
Nicaragua D D D
Niger D D D D
Nigeria D D D D
Pakistan D D D D
Panama D D D D
Papua New Guinea D D D D
Paraguay D D D D
Peru D D D D
Senegal D D D D
Serbia D D D D
Sierra Leone D D D D
South Africa D D D D
Sri Lanka D D D D
Sudan D D D D
Suriname D D D
Tanzania D D D D
Thailand D D D D
Togo D D D D
Tunisia D D D D
Uganda D D D D
Ukraine D D D D
Venezuela, RB D D D D
Vietnam D D D D
Yemen, Rep. D D D D
Zambia D D D D
Zimbabwe D D D
Total 71 69 70 69
B.4 Definitions and sources of variables
Appendix B.4 shows detailed definitions and sources of the main variables of interest
(taxation revenue, foreign aid and institutional quality), as well as the control variables
used in the empirical models.
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Variables Definitions Sources
Total tax revenue, (percent-
ages of GDP)
Total revenue from direct and indirect taxes. Direct taxes include taxes on
income, profits and capital gains and property taxes. Indirect taxes include
taxes on goods and services, taxes on international trade and other taxes.
Tax revenue refers to compulsory transfers to the central government for
public purposes. Certain compulsory transfers such as fines, penalties, and
most social security contributions are excluded. Refunds and corrections
of erroneously collected tax revenue are treated as negative revenue.
Government Revenue Dataset
(GRD), developed by the
ICTD. The dataset meticu-
lously combines data from
several major international
databases, as well as draw-
ing on data compiled from all
available IMF Article IV re-
ports.
Income, profits and capital
gains tax revenue, (percent-
ages of GDP)
Revenue from income, profits and capital gains tax revenue that consti-
tute taxes on individuals and on corporations. Taxes on income, profits,
and capital gains are levied on the actual or presumptive net income of
individuals, on the profits of corporations and enterprises, and on capi-
tal gains, whether realized or not, on land, securities, and other assets.
Intragovernmental payments are eliminated in consolidation.
GRD developed by the ICTD.
International trade tax, (per-
centages of GDP)
Revenue from international trade taxes on exports and imports. Taxes on
international trade include import duties, export duties, profits of export
or import monopolies, exchange profits, and exchange taxes.
GRD developed by the ICTD.
Taxes on goods and services,
(percentages of GDP)
Taxes on goods and services include general sales and turnover or value
added taxes, selective excises on goods, selective taxes on services, taxes
on the use of goods or property, taxes on extraction and production of
minerals, and profits of fiscal monopolies.
GRD developed by the ICTD.
Total aid disbursements (per-
centages of GDP)
Disbursements show actual payments in each year. They show the realisa-
tion of donors’ intentions and the implementation of their policies. They
are required to examine the contribution of donors’ actions in development
achievements and they better describe aid flows from a recipient’s point of
view. These values are computed using aid disbursements in current USD
calculated over GDP in current USD.
Author’s calculations using
WDI (2015) and CRS data of
the OECD-DAC.
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Variables Definitions Sources
Aid grants, (percentages of
GDP)
Grants are transfers in cash or in kind for which no legal debt is incurred by
the recipient. The grant element in the ODA definition is a mathematical
assessment of the financial terms of a transaction or set of transactions.
It is the difference between the face value of a loan and the present value
(calculated at a rate of discount of 10 per cent) of the service payments the
borrower will make over the lifetime of the loan, expressed as a percentage
of the face value. Three factors determine the grant element: interest rate
(per cent per annum), grace period, i.e. the interval from commitment date
to the date of the first payment of amortisation, maturity, i.e. the interval
from commitment date to the date of the last payment of amortisation.
Author’s calculations using
WDI (2015) and CRS data of
the OECD-DAC.
Aid loans, (percentages of
GDP)
Loans are transfers in cash or in kind for which the recipient incurs a legal
debt. Official loans are those with fixed maturities made by governments
(central and local) or official (non-monetary) agencies, for which repayment
is to be made by the recipient country. This includes loans repayable in the
borrowers currency whether the lender intends to repatriate the repayments
or to use them in the borrowing country.
Author’s calculations using
WDI (2015) and CRS data of
the OECD-DAC.120
Variables Definitions Sources
ICRG The mean value of the ICRG variables ‘Corruption’, ‘Law and Order’ and
‘Bureaucracy Quality’, ranging between 0 and 1. The index has been
rescaled so that higher values indicate low quality of governance. This
political risk rating assesses various political components and how they are
a ’threat’ to foreign/international investment/business. The component of
corruption assesses corruption within the political system and is mostly
concerned with actual or potential corruption in the form of excessive pa-
tronage, nepotism, job reservations, ‘favor-for-favors’, secret party funding
and suspiciously close ties between politics and business. The components
of law and order are assessed separately. The Law sub-component is an
assessment of the strength and impartiality of the legal system, while the
Order sub-component is an assessment of popular observance of the law.
The bureaucracy quality component measures the institutional strength
and quality of the bureaucracy and high points are given to countries where
the bureaucracy has the strength and expertise to govern without drastic
changes in policy or interruptions in government services.
QoG (2015) dataset published
by the University of Gothen-
burg (Original sources: ICRG
by the Political Risk Services
(PRS) Group).
Debt relief (percentages of
GDP)
The sum of debt forgiveness and rescheduling, other action on debt, and
offsetting entries for debt forgiveness. Groups all actions relating to debt
(forgiveness, conversions, swaps, buybacks, rescheduling, refinancing) and
their offsetting entries.
OECD-DAC, Table DAC2a.
NGO aid (percentages of
GDP )
Aid flows having NGOs as the first implementing agent. These flows cor-
respond to the total aid or for each sector or purpose that are given on
concessional terms.
Author’s calculations using
WDI (2015) and CRS data of
the OECD-DAC.
GDP per capita, PPP inter-
national $
GDP per capita based on Purchasing Power Parity (PPP). GDP at pur-
chaser’s prices is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in
the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included
in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions
for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of
natural resources. Data are in constant 2005 international dollars.
WDI (2015) (Original source:
WB International Compari-
son Program database).
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Variables Definitions Sources
Agriculture value-added (per-
centages of GDP)
Agriculture corresponds to ISIC divisions 1-5 and includes forestry, hunt-
ing, and fishing, as well as cultivation of crops and livestock production.
Value added is the net output of a sector after adding up all outputs and
subtracting intermediate inputs. It is calculated without making deduc-
tions for depreciation of fabricated assets or depletion and degradation of
natural resources. The origin of value added is determined by the Interna-
tional Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC), revision 3. Note: For VAB
countries, gross value added at factor cost is used as the denominator.
WDI (2015) (Original source:
WB national accounts data,
and OECD National Ac-
counts data files).
Industry value-added, (per-
centages of GDP)
Industry corresponds to ISIC divisions 10-45 and includes manufacturing
(ISIC divisions 15-37). It comprises value added in mining, manufacturing
(also reported as a separate subgroup), construction, electricity, water, and
gas. Value added is the net output of a sector after adding up all outputs
and subtracting intermediate inputs. It is calculated without making de-
ductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or depletion and degradation
of natural resources. The origin of value added is determined by the Inter-
national Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC), revision 3. Note: For
VAB countries, gross value added at factor cost is used as the denominator.
WDI (2015) (Original source:
WB national accounts data,
and OECD National Ac-
counts data files.).
Openness (percentages of
GDP)
Trade is the sum of exports and imports of goods and services measured
as a share of gross domestic product.
WDI (2015) (Original source:
WB national accounts data,
and OECD National Ac-
counts data files).
Population ages 0-14 (per-
centages of total)
Population between the ages 0 to 14 as a percentage of the total population.
Population is based on the de facto definition of population.
WDI (2015) (Original source:
The UN Population Divi-
sion’s World Population
Prospects).
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Chapter 4
Foreign aid, political incentives and favouritism
4.1 Introduction
4.1.1 Background and motivation
It is evident from the literature that foreign aid may not be used by recipient countries the
way it was intended by the donors. This issue of aid fungibility, identified in the findings
of Chapter 2, is exacerbated in environments of poor quality institutions, weak rule of law,
lack of transparency in transactions and poor management of public funds (Bra¨utigam and
Knack, 2004). The primary recipients of foreign aid flows are the recipient governments.
Given that they have more information than the donors, it can be assumed that the
recipient governments in power have the discretion to handle and distribute the allocated
aid flows (Wright and Winters, 2010).
This creates incentives for political leaders to distribute foreign aid in a way that is bene-
ficial to them, i.e. in exchange for political support and to maximise their vote share and
tenure in office (Masaki, 2015, Licht, 2010). The literature on distributive politics offers
two theories about how political leaders allocate public resources for electoral purposes:
the ‘core vote hypothesis’ and the ‘swing voter hypothesis’ (Lindbeck and Weibull, 1987).
Core voters are considered those that continuously support the incumbent uncondition-
ally (Cox and McCubbins, 1986). Swing voters are considered those that have ‘weak party
preferences’, are indifferent to voting for a specific political leader and can be easily swayed
into favouring the incumbent (Lindbeck and Weibull, 1987). In the context of Africa, how-
ever, ethnicity plays a vital role in politics since the voting patterns in Africa are based
on ethnic cleavages (Weghorst and Lindberg, 2013, Posner, 2007).4.1 Along these lines,
political leaders might favour co-ethnic regions and distribute resources to members of
their own ethnic group or to their home region (Kasara, 2007).
Ethnic or political favouritism can be achieved through various ways: by providing jobs,
goods and services, investment, favourable taxation or in the context of foreign aid by di-
verting aid projects to regions where voters of ‘high returns’ would benefit from (Robinson
and Verdier, 2013, Kasara, 2007). Targeting a specific group of voters can be considered
as an investment on behalf of the political leaders and ‘high-returns’ in terms of voters
4.1Ethnicity in Africa can be defined in various ways: for example, it can be based on religion, language
or tribal affiliation (Posner, 2007).
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corresponds to a higher number of votes received by the incumbent (Cox and McCubbins,
1986). This process refers to patronage, defined by Weingrod (1968) as ‘the ways in which
party politicians distribute public jobs or special favours in exchange for electoral support’.
The literature on foreign aid has mostly focused on the allocation of foreign aid at the
donor level and identified that different donors have various motives behind aid giving.
For example, the French are more likely to allocate aid to their former colonies (McKinlay
and Little, 1979). Multilateral agencies such as the World Bank (WB) reward high insti-
tutional quality and good policies. Bilateral donors such as the United Kingdom or the
Scandinavian countries focus on recipient need, whereas strategic interests, such as access
to natural resources or former colonies are also found to be important for bilateral donors
such as the United States (Nunnenkamp and Thiele, 2006, Alesina and Dollar, 2000, Frey
and Schneider, 1986). The recent collection of sub-national data from different donors
and different recipient countries allows us to examine aid allocation at the recipient level.
More precisely, how aid projects are allocated to different provinces and districts within
recipient countries (Dreher et al., 2016, Briggs, 2014, Jablonski, 2014, Briggs, 2012). This
study aims to explore how political leaders allocate foreign aid across districts, naming in
which cases ethnic or political economy motives prevail.
Foreign aid flows have been increasing in recent years, particularly from non-traditional
‘new’ donors, who are not part of the Development Assistance Committee of the Or-
ganisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD-DAC) (Dreher et al.,
2011, Woods, 2008, Manning, 2006). Aid from donors such as China, Saudi Arabia and
Venezuela has been referred to as ‘rogue’ aid, which is defined to be non-democratic
and non-transparent that undermines development policies set by the traditional Western
donors (Na´ım, 2007). The motives behind aid allocation from these ‘new’ and ‘emerging’
donors are found to follow somewhat different patterns than that of the traditional and
‘established’ ones (Dreher and Fuchs, 2015, Dreher et al., 2011, Woods, 2008, Villanger,
2007). For example, recipient need or good institutional quality is not rewarded by new
donors, whereas strategic or political interests are not found to be more important (Dreher
et al., 2011).
Along these lines, Chinese aid is found to be shaped by motives relating to trade partner-
ships and natural resources in recipient countries (Dreher et al., 2011, Tull, 2006). One
of the principles of Chinese aid is ‘respect for sovereignty with no conditions attached’
(Bra¨utigam, 2011). It is mainly given to promote and forge a partnership between China
and Africa for trade and investment (Nissanke and So¨derberg, 2011). It is generally given
without much monitoring, lack of transparency and no conditions and its sub-national
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allocation is, therefore, up to the discretion of the recipient governments. These charac-
teristics make such flows more vulnerable to political capture, thus serving the interests
and agendas of political leaders (Manning, 2006). On the other hand, aid from traditional
and ‘established’ Western donors such as the WB or the OECD-DAC can be characterised
as aid targeted for specific projects where there is greater monitoring, thus making such
flows more difficult to be used for political purposes (Dreher et al., 2016, Winters, 2010).
Nevertheless, Masaki (2015) and Jablonski (2014) find evidence that the allocation of WB
aid is also driven by political motives.
4.1.2 Research question and data
The purpose of this study is to investigate the possibility of ethnic and/or political econ-
omy motives in the sub-national allocation of foreign aid in a panel of 17 African countries.
Political leaders might allocate resources towards their own constituencies and to their core
voters that support the incumbent unconditionally. On the other hand, leaders might tar-
get swing voters, whose ‘political support for opposition parties can be swayed depending
on the government’s development awards’ (Masaki, 2015). Alternatively, political leaders
might find optimal to divert resources towards their co-ethnic or birth regions. This study
focuses mainly on aid commitments from the WB, which are subsequently aggregated with
aid commitments from China to examine if the degree of electoral competitiveness makes
political leaders to distribute aid flows differently amongst regions for political economy
reasons, i.e. to get re-elected, or towards co-ethnic regions to favour members of their own
ethnic group. Chinese aid is not considered independently since there is lower variability
than for the case of WB aid due to the large number of zeros in the dataset.
Foreign aid allocation is examined at the donor level and few country-specific studies fo-
cus on the point of view of the recipient and explore their political motives (Dreher et al.,
2016, Jablonski, 2014, Masaki, 2015, Dionne et al., 2013, Briggs, 2012). For example,
Jablonski (2014) examines the sub-national allocation of multilateral aid together with
electoral strategies across Kenyan constituencies and finds evidence to support the ‘core
voter hypothesis’ and ethnic favouritism, whereas in a similar context Masaki (2015) fo-
cuses on Zambia and finds evidence to support the ‘swing voter hypothesis’. Dreher et al.
(2016) focus on a large number of African countries and examines the sub-national alloca-
tion of aid across birth regions, however, electoral incentives are beyond the scope of their
paper. For the purposes of this study, the econometric framework and methodology of
Dreher et al. (2016) is followed and a specification similar to Jablonski (2014) is adopted
in terms of the political variables used. The studies that investigate the electoral incen-
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tives of leaders focus on specific countries and yield mixed empirical results as to which
electoral strategies leaders adopt. This study aims to bridge the gap in the literature by
exploring both electoral incentives and regional favouritism using a sample of 17 African
countries. To this end, this study uses a newly constructed dataset for African districts.
Established geo-referenced data are merged together from various sources matched at the
district and province levels, such as foreign aid commitments from China and the WB,
night-time light intensity and population measures. The electoral data used are geo-coded
for the purposes of this study from the constituency level to districts and provinces based
on their geographical coordinates using ArcGIS.
4.1.3 Research findings
At a first glimpse, the empirical results suggest that aid is not used for political purposes.
However, when the competitiveness of elections is considered, WB aid is targeted away
from districts with core supporters of the incumbent and co-ethnic districts. In contrast,
when elections are not competitive aid is targeted only to co-ethnic districts. At a second
stage, the aggregate allocation of both WB and Chinese aid is considered. The fact that
political leaders have higher discretion to manipulation Chinese aid makes these results
even stronger.
Interestingly, findings in competitive political environments contradict both the ‘core’ and
‘swing’ voter hypotheses. However, political motives are found, since evidence suggests
that political leaders seek to maximise their vote share by targeting districts that would
otherwise support the opposition. Such districts would yield higher electoral returns if
the aid targeting is successful. These results in competitive environments agree with the
findings of Masaki (2015) for Zambia, but contradict those of Jablonski (2014) for Kenya.
In non-competitive electoral environments without strong political incentives leaders prefer
to target their co-ethnic regions and all political variables are statistically insignificant.
These results are robust to alternative specifications, econometric methods and samples.
4.1.4 Structure
The next Section describes the main theories and results of the literature. Section 4.3
shows the empirical methodology for the different models that are estimated. Section 4.4
describes the data used and Section 4.5 discusses the results obtained along with various
robustness checks. Lastly, Section 4.6 concludes. The results are presented in Section 4.7.
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4.2 Literature Review
4.2.1 Distributive politics
The literature on comparative politics suggests that political leaders are ‘self-centered’,
where they care only about their own political agenda and getting re-elected (Persson
and Tabellini, 1999, Nordhaus, 1975). The ‘Political Business Cycle’ model suggests that
politicians engage in manipulating policies and increase spending patterns just before
elections to maximise votes and achieve re-election (Nordhaus, 1975). Although the timing
of elections is not relevant for the purposes of this study, the theoretical and empirical
results of the literature show that political leaders manipulate policy instruments and
government revenue for political purposes (Shi and Svensson, 2006, Block, 2002).
Political favouritism and the targeting of voters can be achieved through various ways:
by providing jobs, goods and services, investment and spending, biased taxation, redis-
tributive transfers or in the context of foreign aid by diverting aid projects to certain
regions (Robinson and Verdier, 2013, Persson and Tabellini, 1999). This process refers to
patronage, defined by Weingrod (1968) as ‘the ways in which party politicians distribute
public jobs or special favours in exchange for electoral support’. A study on Ghana gives
several examples for patronage practices, including paying for school fees, electricity and
water bills or personal assistance in dealing with the authorities (Lindberg and Morrison,
2008).
This concept of clientelist exchange between politicians and voters might be more relevant
in highly competitive elections (Hicken, 2011, Lindberg and Morrison, 2008). Although it
is expected that political competition would limit corrupt or clientelistic practices (Persson
et al., 2003), participating in a competitive election under low institutional quality gives
politicians the incentive to engage in such activities and apply clientelistic and patronage
practices (Nyblade and Reed, 2008). This study does not focus on corrupt or illegal
activities, rather than it focuses on the favours and resources provided by political leaders
in return for votes.
The literature on distributive politics offers two theories about political leaders targeting
voters for electoral purposes: the ‘core voter hypothesis’ and the ‘swing voter hypothesis’
(Dixit and Londregan, 1996, Lindbeck and Weibull, 1987, Cox and McCubbins, 1986).
Core voters are considered those that continuously support the incumbent unconditionally
(Cox and McCubbins, 1986). Political leaders, particularly those that are risk-averse,
can target their core and loyal voters and reward them for their support by distributing
resources to them (Cox and McCubbins, 1986). On the other hand, core voters may
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support a specific candidate or party for other reasons beyond the benefits provided to
them. For example, the political preferences of voters might be aligned with the positions
of the party or the candidate (Lindbeck and Weibull, 1987). Such voters are likely to keep
voting even without receiving favours (Moser, 2008).
By targeting districts of the political base of the incumbent, resources might be considered
as wasted (Stokes, 2005). Instead, core voters could be taken for granted and leaders
could target the groups of voters who are not attached to any political preferences and
party ideologies and who could be easily swayed using patronage (Masaki, 2015, Dixit and
Londregan, 1996). Swing voters are those that give the highest rate of electoral returns
and are considered the voters who weakly support the opposition but can change their
vote depending on the benefits they receive (Masaki, 2015, Weghorst and Lindberg, 2013,
Persson and Tabellini, 1999, Dixit and Londregan, 1996, Cox and McCubbins, 1986).
There is evidence for Africa to suggest that engaging in clientelist practices, swing voters
are influenced and swayed towards the incumbent (Weghorst and Lindberg, 2013).
Empirical evidence is mixed, giving support to both theories. A possible explanation
could be that leaders in different countries and regimes with heterogeneous characteristics
adopt alternative electoral strategies. For example, Miguel and Zaidi (2003) examine
federal government funds and Weinstein (2011) examines spending and finding evidence
for the ‘core voter hypothesis’ for Ghana and Tanzania, respectively. Jablonski (2014)
investigates aid flows and finds evidence to support the ‘core voter hypothesis’ in Kenya.
On the other hand, Banful (2011) finds that leaders in Ghana targeted districts with
voucher allocations for a subsidy, which they lost in the last election, providing evidence
against the ‘core voter hypothesis’. Casas (2012) finds evidence in favour of the ‘swing
voter hypothesis’ in Argentina using government spending measures.
Birth and ethnic favouritism also plays a significant role in African politics since voting
patterns are largely based on ethnic cleavages (Weghorst and Lindberg, 2013, Kasara,
2007). Ethnic identity in Africa can take many forms and can be based on religion,
language or tribal affiliation and these different ethnic identities in Africa allow voters to
identify with several ethnic groups (Posner, 2007). Leaders might favour specific regions
by spending more resources in areas of their own ethnic group or to their home base
(Franck and Rainer, 2012). In competitive electoral environments, the theory of ethnic
favouritism largely relates to the ‘core voter hypothesis’ of Cox and McCubbins (1986)
and Dixit and Londregan (1996), where core voters can be thought of as the voters that
belong to the same ethnic group of the political leaders. As explained earlier, some of
the core voters have political preferences that are aligned with the candidate’s or party’s
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positions and such voters would vote for a candidate or a party unconditionally because
of these positions. Chandra (2007) describes as ‘psychic benefits’ the benefit that voters
receive by electing a co-ethnic in office. Co-ethnic voters receiving these ‘psychic benefits’
and co-ethnic voters with aligned political preferences to the leader can be thought as
voters that are voting for co-ethnic leaders unconditionally (Kasara, 2007).
Evidence in the literature suggests that night-time light intensity is higher in the leaders’
birth and co-ethnic regions (De Luca et al., 2015, Hodler and Raschky, 2014). Night-time
light intensity acts as a proxy of economic performance as it measures man-made light of
large-scale infrastructure projects such as roads, bridges or buildings (Henderson et al.,
2012). Burgess et al. (2015) finds evidence of ethnic favouritism in Kenya with regard to
paved roads. On the other hand, Kramon and Posner (2013) test for ethnic favouritism
over different outcomes in six African countries and find evidence for ethnic favouritism
for some of the outcomes in different countries, suggesting that ethnic favouritism can not
be generalised for all outcomes or for all of the countries in Africa.
4.2.2 The political economy of aid
In the same way that political leaders use policy instruments for their own political benefits
in the face of elections, foreign aid can be used for political purposes. This use of aid by
recipient countries relates to the issue of ‘fungibility’, where foreign aid is used in a different
way than was intended by the donors. We assume that the recipient government or else
the executive leaders to be responsible for the allocation of aid flows across districts, firstly
because they have more information than the donor, and secondly because they are the
first channel of delivery of aid and are responsible for the handling of funds (Wright and
Winters, 2010).
The literature on foreign aid has identified various motives behind aid allocation of different
donors. This study focuses on two types of aid: multilateral WB aid and aid from China,
which is considered a ‘new’ and ‘emerging’ donor (Na´ım, 2007). Multilateral WB aid is
generally found to respond to good policies to ensure aid is used for development purposes
(Winters, 2010, Nunnenkamp and Thiele, 2006, Alesina and Dollar, 2000). WB aid is
characterised by aid for specific projects with monitoring. Aid from ‘new’ and ‘emerging’
donors is considered as ‘rogue’ aid, which is given to recipient countries to serve the
donors’ political and strategic interests, rather than to promote growth and development
(Dreher et al., 2011, Na´ım, 2007, Tull, 2006). Chinese aid is important in this context
since its characteristics make such flows more vulnerable to political capture to serve the
leaders’ political interests (Manning, 2006). Although WB aid can be thought as being less
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vulnerable to political capture, based on the assumption that the sub-national allocation
of all aid flows are at the discretion of the executive leaders, aid flows from both donors
are expected to be captured.
De Mesquita and Smith (2009) developed a theoretical model and show that foreign aid
can be used as a political tool to reward the core constituents of political leaders. Foreign
aid can be used in exchange for political support, for example to maximise the leaders’
vote share, their tenure in office or to decrease the risk of not getting re-elected (Licht,
2010). Patronage practices regarding foreign aid can occur when leaders allocate aid in
specific districts, where a small group of voters are going to benefit and this allocation
would be independent of need. Political leaders have the incentive to use aid strategically
based on the electoral strategy they choose to use and channel it to the districts that
results in the highest electoral and political returns (Werker, 2012).
The empirical literature on the electoral strategies used by political leaders yields mixed
results. Some studies show that leaders target aid to core voters (Jablonski, 2014, Dionne
et al., 2013, Briggs, 2012), whereas there is also evidence of targeting away from core
voters and towards swing and opposition voters (Masaki, 2015).
In a case study of the 2000 election in Ghana and a regional WB-funded electrification
project, Briggs (2012) reports that leaders strategically targeted core voters. Nevertheless,
this paper focuses on a single aid project across the ten provinces. Evidence for the ‘core
voter hypothesis’ is identified in a study for Malawi by Dionne et al. (2013). The scope of
this paper is aid effectiveness, which could be affected by the allocation of aid across dis-
tricts in Malawi. Their results, based on Tobit estimations, suggest that the sub-national
allocation depends on district need as well as on co-ethnicity to the executive leader. The
authors also differentiate aid by different sectors and find that need does not play a robust
role in the targeting of education aid, but plays a role in the case of health aid. On the
other hand, aid for education purposes is found to be targeted to districts that support
the incumbent based on electoral vote shares, whereas aid for the purposes of health is
not found to be allocated based on political purposes. Jablonski (2014) focuses on Kenyan
districts between the period of 1993 - 2010 using Fixed Effects (FE). Jablonski (2014)
estimates models for multilateral aid per capita at the constituency level to investigate
which electoral strategy leaders adopt. The findings suggest that leaders in Kenya target
aid towards their core voters, for example constituencies with higher victory margins and
higher vote shares for the incumbent. Core voters that strongly support the incumbent,
as captured by a polynomial of the victory margin, are also rewarded, whereas core voters
of the opposition receive less aid.
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Contradicting the above results, Masaki (2015) focuses on districts in Zambia between the
period 1991 - 2010. This paper estimates the allocation of multilateral aid from three donor
organisations using Poisson regressions and also replicates the empirical methodology and
results of Jablonski (2014). The results of this paper, however, contradict the ‘core voter
hypothesis’ and the findings of Jablonski (2014). The results suggest that leaders allocate
multilateral aid to districts with core voters of the opposition and away from districts with
core voters of the incumbent to sway opposition voters towards voting for them.
There are also some mixed results regarding ethnic favouritism. Dionne et al. (2013) and
Jablonski (2014) also examine ethnic favouritism and find evidence that co-ethnic districts
are favoured. On the other hand, Masaki (2015) finds evidence that co-ethnic districts are
treated as core voter districts and less aid is targeted to such districts.
Dreher et al. (2016) investigate whether Chinese and WB aid are subject to political
capture by investigating whether or not aid is targeted to the birth districts of leaders.
Based on the characteristics of Chinese aid, the authors expect just Chinese aid to be
captured and their empirical findings agree with their hypothesis. The authors use the
geo-coded aid dataset that is used for the purposes of this study for Chinese and WB
aid in a sample of 47 African countries. They estimate their empirical models on aid
flows in levels using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) with country-year fixed effects. As a
robustness check, they include district fixed effects but by doing so they point out that
they lose significant variation of time-invariant variables. Dreher et al. (2016) also extend
this analysis on ethnic favouritism and their findings somewhat agree with De Luca et al.
(2015) and Dionne et al. (2013): they find weak evidence for ethnic favouritism with regard
to Chinese aid.
4.2.3 Contribution
In light of the studies mentioned, the focus of this study is to identify firstly whether or not
political leaders use aid for political purposes and secondly, which strategy they adopt with
regard to the sub-national allocation of foreign aid. Multilateral WB aid is considered at
first, which is assumed to be allocated at the discretion of the executive leader. Aid from
China and the WB aggregated together is considered further, where we expect that any
use for political purpose would be even stronger based on the characteristics of Chinese
foreign aid mentioned previously.
Political leaders can either target districts of their political base, or else core voters, which
can be also thought of as co-ethnic regions in the context of ethnic identities, to reward
them for their loyalty and political support. On the other hand, if leaders believe that
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their core voters are going to vote for them unconditionally and do not wish to waste
resources on securing their already secure votes, they could target districts that support
the opposition in an attempt to sway them towards voting for them.
In addition to looking at the pooled regressions to understand how aid is used, the ef-
fect of competitive elections is also examined. The way political leaders target aid flows
could depend on their certainty of getting re-elected, which stems from the degree of
competitiveness. Leaders are likely to respond differently in environments of low or no
electoral competition, where they know that getting re-elected is almost certain, compared
to environments of stiff competition, where every vote counts (Hicken, 2011).
As evident by the studies mentioned earlier, political leaders in different circumstances
use aid in different ways. Dionne et al. (2013) find evidence of ethnic favouritism in the
context of Malawian districts. Jablonski (2014) also finds evidence to support the ‘core
voter hypothesis’ in the context of Kenyan constituencies. Masaki (2015), however, finds
evidence against the ‘core voter hypothesis’ in the context of Zambian constituencies.
Dreher et al. (2016) find evidence of ethnic and regional favourism with regard to Chinese
aid in Africa. Table 4.1 lists the key studies of the literature.
Table 4.1: Summary of key studies in the literature
Study Sample Estimation Results
Jablonski (2014) Kenya FE Core-voter hypothesis
with multilateral aid
Masaki (2015) Zambia Poisson re-
gressions
Against core voter hy-
pothesis and ethnic
favouritism with multi-
lateral aid
Dreher et al. (2016) 47 African coun-
tries
OLS (country-
year fixed ef-
fects)
Regional favouritism with
Chinese aid
Overall, examining the allocation of foreign aid from the recipients’ perspectives has mostly
focused on single-countries studies, with the exception of Dreher et al. (2016) who investi-
gate ethnic and regional favouritism, however, electoral and political incentives are beyond
the scope of the paper. This study attempts to bridge the gap in the literature on the
sub-national allocation of foreign aid in a sample of different countries that have different
political characteristics and different levels of electoral competitiveness.
We focus on a panel of 17 African countries using a newly constructed dataset combining
geographical data from various sources as well as electoral data at the constituency level,
which have been geo-coded for the purposes of this study from constituencies to districts
based on their geographical coordinates. The sample studied consists of 645 districts
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over the period 2000 - 2011. These 17 countries are chosen provided they had elections
during the time period examined and received foreign aid from both donors. The political
variables used follow the specification of Jablonski (2014) and the econometric framework
and methodology used follows Dreher et al. (2016) with appropriate country-year fixed
effects to allow for the estimation of time-invariant variables that could prove important
for the empirical analysis, such as ethnicity and the birth region of the leader.4.2
Despite the data availability for two donors, namely China and the WB, we focus inde-
pendently on WB flows and then sum together aid from both donors. This is because
the variability of Chinese aid is very small, compared to the WB, with most observations
taking zero values. To exploit the variability of WB aid flows, we sum aid flows from both
donors to examine whether the characteristics of Chinese aid make aggregate aid flows
subject to more political capture.
4.3 Methodology
The purpose of this study is to investigate the sub-national allocation of foreign aid to
identify whether political leaders use foreign aid for political purposes and what electoral
strategies they adopt.
To answer these questions the empirical methodology of Dreher et al. (2016) is followed,
where empirical models are estimated as follows:
log(Aid/population)cit = αct+β1V ictoryMargincit+β2Favouritismcit+φXcit+cit (4.1)
where the variables correspond to:
• Aid/populationcit: Per capita foreign aid flows (WB or aggregate) in country c,
region i and year t
• V ictoryMargincit: Percentage of votes obtained by the incumbent party minus per-
centage of votes obtained by the leading opposition party in country c, region i and
year t
• Favouritismcit: Dummy variables capturing regional favouritism: Co-ethnic regions
dummy (full co-ethnicity) or birth region dummy in country c, region i and year t
4.2This also applied for countries that only have one election or no change in the regime elected, since
the political variables change slowly (Beck, 2001).
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• Xcit: A vector of regional controls (e.g. other aid, night-time light intensity, popula-
tion, capital region dummy, mineral facilities dummy, petroleum dummy) in country
c, region i and year t:
• αct: Country-year fixed effect
• cit: The error component
These models are estimated with several variations to test for the different electoral strate-
gies at the district (ADM2) level. A polynomial of the victory margin is also included.
The variable capturing the victory margin is replaced firstly by a variable capturing the
vote share of the incumbent where the same sign is expected as with the victory margin
variable, and secondly by a variable capturing the vote share of the opposition where an
opposite effect is expected as with the victory margin or incumbent vote share variables.
The hypothesis derived from the literature and tested are as follows:
1. Core-voter hypothesis: We examine whether or not districts that support the in-
cumbent are rewarded for their loyalty and electoral support. We expect a positive
coefficient on the victory margin or on the incumbent vote share. This hypothesis
can be reinforced by a positive coefficient on the polynomial of the victory margin.
2. Swing-voter hypothesis: We examine whether or not swing districts that can be
easily swayed are targeted. We expect a negative coefficient on the polynomial of
the victory margin.
3. Opposition: We examine whether or not districts that support the opposition are
targeted. We expect a negative coefficient on the victory margin or a positive coef-
ficient on the opposition vote share.
4. Regional favouritism: The dummy variables capturing favouritism (birth region and
co-ethnicity) are also included in the specification to explore whether political leaders
favour their birth region or co-ethnic regions. Positive coefficients on these dummies
show that leaders favour their co-ethnic or home bases.
The sample studied includes countries whose executive leader in power or party in power
span a long period of time. For example, the president of Angola, Jos Eduardo dos Santos
of the People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) was elected in 1979 and
served until 2017, during which the executive elections were thought to not be competitive.
The competitiveness of elections can prove to be important in these contexts. Political
leaders that know they are going to be elected are likely to target aid in a different way
than leaders who aim to maximise votes to achieve getting elected.
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Model 4.1 is extended to include interaction terms between the political and co-ethnic
variables and the Competitivenessct variable, which is defined as an indicator of execu-
tive electoral competitiveness based on the Database of Political Institutions (DPI) 2015
(Keefer, 2015, Beck et al., 2001). In the econometric specification of model 4.2, two
dummies are included to identify the marginal effects . The first one when elections are
considered competitive (Competitivenessct) and a second one in all the remaining cases
when elections are not considered competitive (1− Competitivenessct).
log(Aid/population)cit = αct + β1V ictoryMargincit ∗ (1− Competitivenessct)
+β2V ictoryMargincit ∗ Competitivenessct + β3Favouritismcit ∗ (1− Competitivenessct)
+β4Favouritismcit ∗ Competitivenessct) + β5Competivenessct + φXcit + cit
(4.2)
The β1 coefficient corresponds to the marginal effect of the victory margin in environments
of non-competitive elections and β2 in environments of competitive elections. β3 corre-
sponds to the marginal effect of ethnic favouritism in environments of non-competitive
elections and β4 in environments of competitive elections. Model 4.2 is extended in the
same way as model 4.1: the victory margin is replaced firstly with the incumbent vote
share and secondly with the opposition vote share.4.3
These models allow us to identify which electoral strategy politicians adopt. If politicians
favour their core constituents and want to reward them for their loyalty, the effect of
the victory margin or the vote share of the incumbent would be positive (Jablonski, 2014,
Dixit and Londregan, 1996, Cox and McCubbins, 1986). In the case where political leaders
strongly favour their core voters, the coefficient of the polynomial of the victory margin
would also be positive (Jablonski, 2014). On the other hand, political leaders might believe
that their core constituencies are going to vote for them unconditionally so they prefer
to divert their election resources towards swing or opposition voters in an attempt to
maximise their vote share (Licht, 2010, Moser, 2008). Swing voters are the voters that
weakly support the opposition but can easily change their vote depending on the rewards
the patron offers (Masaki, 2015, Weghorst and Lindberg, 2013, Lindbeck and Weibull,
1987). Politicians might target swing voters or core voters of the opposition by allocating
resources to them with the purpose of enticing them to vote for them rather than a rival.
In such cases, either the polynomial of the victory margin would be negative or the vote
share of the opposition would be positive, respectively (Stokes, 2005). Leaders might also
4.3The polynomial of the victory margin is also considered.
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regionally favour a specific location by diverting aid projects towards that administrative
district either because it is their region of birth or because it is populated by members
of their own ethnic group. In cases where political leaders favour specific regions, it is
expected that the dummy capturing regional favouritism would be positive (Dreher et al.,
2016, Jablonski, 2014).
In competitive environments, the probability of getting re-elected is lower than in non-
competitive environments and this uncertainty could result in leaders targeting opposition
or swing districts. Following this hypothesis, leaders could divert aid away from core dis-
tricts, since they know that their loyal voters are supporting them unconditionally. We
would, therefore, expect that the coefficient on the victory margin and the incumbent vote
share to be negative in competitive environments. These hypotheses can be extended in
the context of ethnicity, as co-ethnic districts can be considered as districts of core voters
and thus, we expect that the coefficient on co-ethnicity would be negative in competitive
environments. Nevertheless, in environments of low electoral competition, leaders might
have the flexibility to deviate from electoral strategies, thus targeting their co-ethnic re-
gions.
Table 4.2 shows the definitions of the key variables in the estimated models.
Table 4.2: Key Variables
Variable Definition
Aid per capita Aid/populationcit Foreign aid commitments
Victory margin
V ictoryMargincit
Percentage of votes obtained by the incumbent
minus the percentage of votes obtained by the
opposition.
Incumbent Incumbentcit Percentage of votes obtained by the incumbent
party.
Opposition Incumbentcit Percentage of votes obtained by the two main op-
position party.
Birth regions Favouritismcit Dummy variable taking the value of 1 for the
birth regions of political leaders.
Fully co-ethnic
regions
Favouritismcit Dummy variable taking the value of 1 for regions
populated only by members of the leaders’ ethnic
group.
Executive elec-
toral competi-
tiveness
Competitivenessct
Dummy variable taking the value of 1 for elec-
tions that are considered to have high levels of
electoral competition.
The vector of control variables included in the models consists of variables at the district
level, namely population size (log) and night-time light intensity (log). Population size
is included based on studies that find that a large population size might help explain
higher aid allocation (O¨hler and Nunnenkamp, 2014). Also, following the literature, night-
time light intensity is used as a proxy for economic activity at the regional level (Dreher
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et al., 2016, Hodler and Raschky, 2014, Henderson et al., 2012). Public infrastructure,
for example roads or bridges are lit during the night, which can be captured by this
variable. Furthermore, night-time light intensity can proxy for consumption based on
personal incomes. In some specifications where WB aid is the dependent variable, aid flows
from China are also controlled for.4.4 This is because aid allocation by political leaders
may depend on alternative sources of revenue, in this case aid from different donors. Also,
donors’ decisions on how much aid to allocate to each recipient country could depend on
the decision of other donors (Tierney et al., 2011).
Following Dreher et al. (2016), the area of districts (log) as well as a dummy variable
taking the value of 1 for the capital regions are included. Finally, mine facilities and
petroleum fields dummies are included so as to capture the effects of natural resources
in aid allocation and to test whether donors allocate more aid in resource-rich regions to
satisfy their own interests (Dreher and Fuchs, 2015, Dreher et al., 2016, Mthembu-Salter,
2012).
We follow Dreher et al. (2016) to include country-year FE, which allows us to capture the
effect of core independent variables that do not depict significant regional variation over
time; namely, the co-ethnic and birth region dummies. Moreover, within region variation
of our dependent variable is limited since the political variables consist of ‘slowly changing
variables’ (Beck, 2001). In the sample used, some countries have only one election or no
change in the regime elected. Thus, including district FE, as Masaki (2015) and Jablonski
(2014) do in the empirical literature, would not be appropriate as the FE would capture
most of the variation of these variables, thus making the control variables statistically
insignificant in the regressions (Beck, 2001). Masaki (2015) and Jablonski (2014), who
include regional FE, examine a longer time period with more than one election as well
as a change in the regime for the countries studied. Standard errors are clustered at
the district level to account for any autocorrelation within regions. The vote shares are
assumed to be exogenous in the model for the geographical allocation of foreign aid by
the construction of the vote share variables and the way the election data are forwarded.
Reverse causality is not an issue in the model since past election results do not depend
on future values of aid. Furthermore, this model assumes that the country level electoral
competitiveness is exogenous to the district level allocation of foreign aid.
4.4Undoubtedly, countries receive aid from other donors as well but these aid flows are either not geo-
coded or not available to the public.
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4.4 Data
4.4.1 Sources
Administrative boundaries
The database of Global Administrative Areas (GADM) (version 2.8, November 2015) offers
information on the names and the area of the first (ADM1) and second (ADM2) levels of
administrative areas that refer to provinces (ADM1) and districts (ADM2) within recipient
countries. There are 221 ADM1 regions that include 645 ADM2 regions in the sample of
the 17 countries. These countries are: Angola, Botswana, Cameroon, Cape Verde, the
Gambia, Ghana, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, South
Africa, Tanzania, Togo, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Out of the 645 ADM2 regions of the
sample, the 119 correspond to ADM1 regions due to limitations in the political variables.
When the CLEA dataset has election information only up to the first administrative level,
only the ADM1 regions are considered in constructing the dataset, even if the GADM
database provides information on the ADM2 regions.
See Appendix C.1 for more details.
Foreign aid
Aid data are obtained from the AidData project website that offers geocoded information
on aid flows from different donor agencies. Data for WB projects (version 1.4.1) are freely
available from AidData for the period 1995 - 2014, where 5684 aid projects are geocoded for
61243 locations across the world (AidData, 2016). Dreher et al. (2016) geocoded Chinese
flows for 49 African countries for the period 2000 - 2012 based on AidData’s Tracking
Underreported Financial Flows (TUFF) methodology (version 1.1.1) (Strange et al., 2017).
Overall, there are 1898 project-locations at the ADM1 level and 1585 project-locations at
the ADM2 level in this version. The aid dataset includes information on each aid project
given to recipient countries, such as the title of the project, its purpose, the type of aid
flow and the amount of aid committed to a specific geographical location. We focus on
the period 2000 - 2011 since the series on aid flows for 2012 is incomplete (Dreher et al.,
2016).
The aid datasets also include information on the precision of each geocoded aid flow. These
can be exact geographical coordinates that correspond to the exact location of the aid flow
(precision 1); coordinates that correspond to a known location within 25km of the specific
location of aid (precision 2); a district or second-order administrative division (ADM2)
where the aid flow was received (precision 3); a province or first-order administrative
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division (ADM1) (precision 4); estimated coordinates of a large feature (precision 5);
coordinates that correspond to the whole country and the exact location is not known
(precision 6); and lastly when coordinates correspond to the whole country since the aid
flow is given to a government agency (precision 8).
Aid project flows are classified by different flow types in the ways they were given from the
donor to the recipient for the data for Chinese projects. To follow the definitions of Official
Development Assistance (ODA) and Other Official Flows (OOF) used by the OECD-DAC,
we focus on aid commitment flows that correspond to ODA-like flows, OOF-like flows and
vague official finance. ODA is defined as ‘flows provided by official agencies, including state
and local governments, or by their executive agencies; and each transaction is administered
with the promotion of economic development and welfare of developing countries as its
main objective; and is concessional in character and conveys a grant element of at least 25
per cent’. OOF comprises of ‘loans from the government sector which are for development
and welfare but not sufficiently concessional to quality as ODA; and grants and loans
from the government sector not specifically directed to development or welfare purposes’
(OECD, 2010).
Following Jablonski (2014), flows of up to precision 5 are considered. For flows where the
precision is only up to an ADM1 (precision 4) or estimated coordinates (precision 5) that
are mapped to an ADM1 region, we scale the value of the project to the population share
of each province within each district.
To construct the aid variable from each donor, the values of aid projects for each donor
are summed together based on the following equation:
Aidit =
∑
(P1it + P2it + P3it) +
∑
([P4it + P5it] ∗ PopulationADM2
PopulationADM1
) (4.3)
where P1it corresponds to flows of precision 1, P2it corresponds to flows of precision 2,
and so on. This equation is based on the assumption that the projects allocated at the
province level benefit the entire population equally.4.5
Based on how the aid variables are constructed in our analysis, some missing values cor-
respond to zeros because of no available projects in such regions. Therefore, the missing
values for Chinese and WB aid are changed to be zero, unless we know that there is a
specific project in a specific administrative region whose project value is unknown. The
AidData project website includes a list of ongoing projects for Chinese aid and the obser-
4.5Alternative measures of aid are constructed based on scaling by area instead of population size and
are used as a robustness check.
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vations for aid at these locations of such projects are listed as missing in our dataset.
To obtain information on the total amount of commitments for each region, we add the
values of all projects within each region. There are cases where one aid project is allo-
cated to more than one location. In such cases, we assume that the project benefits each
region equally. Aid variables are converted to constant 2009USD. Per capita variables are
constructed by dividing the amount of aid for each region with the population of each re-
gion. Aggregate foreign aid corresponds to the sum of Chinese and WB aid flows received
in each district. Chinese aid is not considered independently due to the low variability,
compared to WB aid. More precisely, out of the 4999 observations of the sample only 625
observations correspond to non-zero values for Chinese aid, whereas 1882 observations
correspond to non-zero values for WB aid.
Appendix C.2 gives detailed information on the definitions of variables and how they were
constructed.
Political variables
The Constituency Level Elections Archive (CLEA) (16th edition, version October, 2016)
offers detailed elections results at the constituency level for different countries (Kollman
et al., 2016). Some of the information the dataset offers is the number of total eligible
voters, the total votes cast, the total valid votes cast, the votes received by each party and
each candidate in each constituency for legislative elections around the world.4.6 Each
constituency in CLEA is matched with the first and second administrative divisison of
the GADM database based on their name or with geographical coordinates relative to
the GADM shapefile. In cases where the constituency name did not match an ADM1
or ADM2 name of GADM, the geographical coordinates of the constituency are used to
identify its location on the GADM shapefile on ArcGIS. The number of votes are added
for all constituencies in each province and district.
Several problems arose with the matching of constituencies to administrative units and
these are outlined in Appendix C.2.
We forward the observations for the election years to non-election years to have a complete
panel. We use two alternative measures of forwarding: forward the election data up to and
including the year of the next election or forward the election data based on the month
of the election. For example, if the election occurs during the first semester, we forward
4.6Although the majority of countries in our sample are presidential regimes, CLEA provides data only
for legislative elections. However, in the vast majority of cases both elections take place in the same year,
where the same parties compete. Executive and legislative elections occur in the same year for 15 out of
the 18 countries of the sample. Moreover, following Jablonski (2014), we qualify presidential countries in
our sample only if results between the two elections at the national level are consistent about the winner
and the victory margin.
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the election data up to and including the year of the next election. If the election occurs
during the second semester, we forward the election data up to and including the year
after the next election. The results presented are based on the sample of the first method
and the second method of forwarding is used as a robustness check.
Political leaders
We use the Archigos dataset by Goemans et al. (2009) to identify the effective leaders
of each country in the sample. The dataset gives information on political leaders, when
they came to power and how, their birth region and their ethnicity. An effective leader
is identified as ‘the person that de facto exercised power in a country’ (Goemans et al.,
2009). In parliamentary regimes, the effective leader is the prime minister, whereas in
presidential systems the effective leader is the president. Using the Archigos dataset we
identify the district and province each political leader was born in and identify the ethnic
group that they belong to.
Ethnic groups
The Geo-referencing Ethnic Power Relations (GeoEPR) Dataset 2014 constructed by Vogt
et al. (2015) is used to identify the location across the administrative boundaries of the
leaders’ ethnic group. The authors follow Weber (1978) and define ethnicity as ‘a subjec-
tively experienced sense of commonality based on a belief in common ancestry and shared
culture’, where commonalities can be described by language, faith or physical features (Ce-
derman et al., 2010). The GeoEPR dataset geocodes the ethnic groups from the Ethnic
Power Relations (EPR) Core Dataset 2014, which identifies ‘all politically relevant ethnic
groups’ as well as their access to state power. The authors identify an ethnic group as po-
litically relevant ‘if at least one political organisation has claimed to represent its interests
at the national level or if its members are subjected to state-led political discrimination,
where discrimination is defined as ‘political exclusion directly targeted at an ethnic com-
munity’ (Cederman et al., 2010). The original version of the EPR dataset was composed
based on an online survey of one hundred country and regional experts to identify the
politically relevant ethnic group. This is a dynamic dataset, compared to the commonly
used by the literature (De Luca et al., 2015, Dreher et al., 2016) Geo-referencing of Ethnic
Groups (GREG) dataset constructed by Weidmann et al. (2010) since it identifies eth-
nic groups throughout time (1946 - 2013) instead of providing an ‘one-time snapshot’ of
the ethnic group landscape, which is likely to be outdated (Wucherpfennig et al., 2011).
The location of ethnic groups is identified with respect to the administrative boundaries
pictured in Figure C.1.1, allowing us to identify in which province or district the leaders’
ethnic groups are located as well as the number of ethnic groups in each administrative
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region.
A dummy variable taking the value of 1 is constructed when an administrative region
is occupied by the ethnic group of the political leader and 0 otherwise. Some cases of
administrative regions have more than one ethnic group. The limitation of using the
dummy variable of ethnicity is that we do not know the share of the population of the
different ethnic groups residing in regions with more than one ethnic group. For this
reason, a dummy variable of full co-ethnicity is constructed. Full co-ethnicity corresponds
to cases where the administrative region is occupied by only one ethnic group and it is
that of the political leader. In the empirical models, full co-ethnicity is considered and the
original dummy variable of ethnicity is used as a robustness check.
Other control variables
The DMSP-OLS Night-time Lights Time Series dataset (version 4) by the National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) is used to capture night-time light intensity.
Georeferenced images are available for different satellites and different years to capture
the ‘average visible, stable lights and cloud free coverages’. The images are 30 arc second
grids, spanning -180 to 180 degrees longitude and -65 to 75 degrees latitude. For cases
where two satellites report night time light intensity the average of the two satellite is
used. Each pixel of the image takes a value between 0 - 63, where higher values indicate
higher light intensity. The average of the variable is measured for each administrative
polygon and following the literature, we add 0.01 when taking the log (Henderson et al.,
2012).
The Gridded Population of the World (GPW) dataset (version 4) by the Center for Inter-
national Earth Science Information Network (CIESIN) is used and more specifically the
UN-Adjusted population count variable that is available for 2000, 2005, 2010 and 2015.
Interpolation is used to fill out the missing values for each country (CIESIN, 2016).
The Mineral Resources Data System (MRDS) of the United States Geological Survey
(USGS, 2005) is used to obtain information on the number and location of mineral faci-
tilies, which is time-invariant in our sample. The Petroleum Dataset (PETRODATA) is
used to obtain information on the location of onshore and offshore oil and gas fields across
the administrative boundaries, which are time-invariant for the sample of this analysis
(Lujala et al., 2007).
Some variables at the country-level are used to characterise countries, such as variables
from the DPI 2015 (Keefer, 2015, Beck et al., 2001). The DPI 2015 dataset contains an
executive index of electoral competitiveness, where competitive elections are defined as
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those whose largest party or elected executive received less than 75% of the votes (values
of 7 in the DPI dataset). This scale defines executive as those who are ‘either elected
directly by the population or elected by an electoral college that is elected by the people
and has the sole purpose of electing the executive’. Values below 7 in the DPI dataset can
correspond to environments of no competition, for example when there is only one party
competing in the elections, or environments of low competition, where although multiple
parties compete and win votes in the election the largest party receives more than 75% of
the votes. The dummy variable of electoral competitiveness used in the empirical models
takes the value of 1 in cases where the DPI measure of competitiveness classifies elections
are competitive (value of 7). When the dummy variable takes the value of 0, it corresponds
to cases of low or no electoral competition.
4.4.2 Descriptive statistics
Figure 4.1 shows the allocation of WB aid flows. Ghana, Sierra Leone and some districts
of Cameroon and Tanzania are among the largest recipients of WB aid (darker shades on
the map). Appendix C.3 shows the sub-national allocation of Chinese aid flows to Africa
as well as the pattern of co-ethnic regions.
Table 4.3 shows the summary statistics for the variables of interest over the sample of
4999 observations at the district level. As can be seen from the Table, WB aid is larger
in levels and in per capita terms than Chinese aid. Aggregate aid flows correspond to
the addition of Chinese and WB aid. Based on some calculations using the countries’
GDP figures as well as their spending (World Bank, 2015), WB aid is of larger importance
than Chinese aid. Around 3% of the districts of the sample correspond to birth regions
of political leaders and around 40% of the districts correspond to districts occupied by
the ethnic group of political leaders of which around 11% corresponds to fully co-ethnic
regions. Around 65% of the districts have competitive elections. For districts that have
environments of competitive elections, the mean (median) duration that the executive
party is in power is 10 (7) years, whereas for non-competitive elections the mean (median)
duration is 25 (28). As expected, these statistics indicate the higher possibility of re-
election of an executive party in power in environments of non-competitive elections. The
incumbent vote share has a minimum value of 0, due to the construction of the variable.
To construct the incumbent vote share, we considered the first three parties in terms of
vote share (See Appendix C.2). There are 160 regions in the sample, where the executive
is not one of the top three parties, therefore, the incumbent vote share takes the value of
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4.5 Results
4.5.1 Empirical models
Table 4.4 shows the empirical results of model 4.1, which includes country-year fixed
effects and per capita WB aid as the dependent variable. The regressions in column (1)
only includes country-year FE and the vote share (victory margin/incumbent/opposition).
Geographical controls at the district level are added in column (2), namely a variable
capturing the capital region, two resource variables and area. District level controls are
added in column (3), namely population and night-time light intensity. The regressions
in column (4) control for the variables testing regional favouritism: birth regions and co-
ethnic regions and column (5) adds a measure of Chinese aid as an additional source of
aid flows.
The different panels of the Tables test the hypotheses for the different electoral strategies.
Overall, the variables of the victory margin, the incumbent vote share, the opposition
vote share and the dummy capturing full co-ethnicity are all statistically insignificant. The
coefficients on the victory margin, the incumbent vote share and fully co-ethnic regions are
negative, whereas the coefficient on the opposition vote share is positive. The polynomial
of the victory margin is significantly positive in columns (4) and (5) with a coefficient
of 0.168. These results suggest that political leaders do not allocate WB aid in response
to their political agendas or to ethnic favouritism: core voters, opposition voters and co-
ethnic regions do not receive higher aid than other voters. Both measures of the opposition
vote share yield the same results.
Out of the variables that are controlled for but not shown, the dummy capturing mineral
facilities at the district level is significantly positive at the 1% level for WB aid per capita.
Additionally, the variable capturing petroleum fields is positively significant at the 10%
level, although this finding is not robust. These results shows that districts with mineral
facilities receive more aid than regions without such facilities, giving some evidence that
WB aid allocation is driven by the motive to gain access to natural resources. Night-
time light intensity is also significantly positive at 1%, suggesting that regions with higher
economic performance as proxied by night-time lights receive more aid.
Table 4.5 shows the marginal effects of model 4.2, where the political variables and the co-
ethnicity dummy are interacted with the two dummies of electoral competitiveness. It can
4.7We remove these 160 observations from the sample as a robustness check.
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be observed that the insignificant effects of Table 4.4 are driven mostly by non-competitive
elections.
The effects of the victory margin, incumbent vote share and opposition vote share in
non-competitive elections are statistically insignificant.4.8 The coefficients on the victory
margin and the incumbent vote share is positive, whereas the coefficient on the opposition
vote share is negative. In competitive elections, however, we find some different results.
The marginal effects of the victory margin and the opposition vote share continue to
be insignificant. The opposition vote share consists of the vote shares of the two leading
parties. As a robustness check, the vote share of the leading opposition party is considered
and the results are the same. The significantly negative marginal effect of the incumbent
vote share suggests that political leaders allocate less aid to the districts of their core
voters in competitive environments. These results indicate that political leaders take
their core voters for granted since they are certain of their loyalty and could be targeting
other regions to maximise their vote shares. This idea is also supported by the signs on
the insignificant marginal effects of the victory margin and the opposition vote share in
competitive elections, which are negative and positive, respectively.
With regard to ethnicity, consistent with the findings for incumbent support, in compet-
itive environments, political leaders seem to divert aid away from fully co-ethnic regions.
In contrast, in non-competitive electoral environments without strong political incentives
leaders prefer to target and favour their co-ethnic regions. Although in these regions
core voters of the incumbent potentially can be targeted, this cannot be seen as evidence
in favour of the ‘core voter hypothesis’ since in non-competitive elections the re-election
motives are weaker than in the case of competitive environments. The full regression
coefficients and marginal effects when the victory margin is controlled for, including the
additional control variables, are depicted in Table C.4.1 of Appendix C.4.
So far the empirical analysis has focused on WB aid, a traditional Western donor. The
finding that WB aid is used for political purposes to advance the political aspirations of
leaders is not surprising based on the literature. Both Jablonski (2014) and Masaki (2015)
assume that executive leaders have the discretion to allocate all aid receipts as they see fit.
Nevertheless, ‘rogue’ aid by ‘new’ and ‘emerging’ donors, such as China, would generally
be expected to raise the significance of the above results since based on its characteristics,
it can enable the use of aid for political purposes (Na´ım, 2007). For this reason, the same
empirical analysis is carried out for aggregate aid per capita as a dependent variable, where
aggregate aid is defined as the addition of WB aid and Chinese aid. Table 4.6 displays the
4.8The polynomial of the victory margin is also considered and the results remain insignificant at different
environments of electoral competitiveness for each specification.
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marginal effects of the vote shares in competitive and non-competitive elections. The full
regression coefficients of the models with aggregate aid per capita as a dependent variable
are shown in Table C.4.2 of Appendix C.4.
The results with aggregate aid as a dependent variable agree with the previous findings,
but are somewhat stronger. In particular, the findings indicate a negative association
between the victory margin and aggregate aid in competitive elections. Additionally, the
marginal effect of the opposition vote share becomes significantly positive in competitive
elections. This positive effect suggests that political leaders aim to maximise their vote
share by targeting districts of the opposition in an attempt to sway such voters towards
them (Kasara, 2007, Stokes, 2005). In non-competitive elections, the marginal effects
remain statistically insignificant and follow the same patterns as with WB aid.
With regard to ethnicity, the significantly negative effect of fully co-ethnic districts on WB
aid in environments of competitive elections disappears when aggregate aid is examined.
The fact that significance disappears could be an indication that Chinese aid is targeted
towards fully co-ethnic districts in competitive environments, whereas WB aid is found to
be targeted away from fully co-ethnic districts. The significantly positive effect of fully
co-ethnic districts in non-competitive elections, however, still holds. Ethnic favouritism is
observed in our sample and is found to occur in non-competitive elections, where political
leaders know that they are going to be re-elected; therefore, they can allocate resources
to members of their own ethnic group instead of attempting to gather votes elsewhere.
Thus, the ethnic favouritism result identified in the empirical literature is supported in
these findings only when elections are non-competitive.
Overall, these result contradict the ‘core’ or ‘swing’ voter hypothesis (Lindbeck and
Weibull, 1987, Cox and McCubbins, 1986) as well as results of ethnic favouritism found
in the literature in the context of competitive elections. A possible explanation for these
results in competitive environments is that political leaders do not want to waste their
resources by targeting districts that are loyal and are going to vote for them uncondition-
ally, such as regions with their core voters or members of their own ethnic group (Kasara,
2007). In such competitive elections, political leaders seem to be targeting aid to support-
ers of the opposition to sway them to vote for them and maximise their vote share, since
the core and co-ethnic voters are certain votes. In contrast, in non-competitive electoral
environments without strong re-election incentives leaders prefer to target their co-ethnic
regions.
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4.5.2 Robustness checks
Alternative specifications and estimation techniques are considered. The results remain
robust to these alternative specifications.
Firstly, a different way of forwarding the election vote shares variables is used. More
precisely, if the election took place in the first semester of the year, then it is assumed
that the new party in power takes office a year after the year of election, whereas if the
election took place in the second semester, then the new party takes power two years after
the election year. See Table C.4.3 in Appendix C.4 for the results with the alternative
method of forwarding using aggregate aid flows as a dependent variable.
Secondly, the empirical models are estimated over a sample of countries in which the coun-
tries that received the least aid were removed to ensure that we investigate the strategies
of leaders in countries where aid can be used as a political tool due to its volume. These
countries are Cape Verde, the Gambia, Mauritius and Zimbabwe. See Table C.4.4 in Ap-
pendix C.4 for the results when the four countries that receive the least aid are removed
from the sample.4.9
Thirdly, models for aggregate aid flows in levels are estimated as in the study of Dreher
et al. (2016). Using the reduced sample that removes countries that received the least aid,
aggregate aid in levels is used as a dependent variable and the results become stronger
(See Table C.4.5 of Appendix C.4).
Furthermore, the dependent variables in the results shown are scaled based on the popu-
lation share (Appendix C.2), alternatively, the models are estimated with the dependent
variables being scaled based on area instead of population share for the cases of aid flows
having precision 4 and 5. It is also worth noting that when the 160 observations where
the incumbent vote share takes the value of 0 are also removed from the sample the re-
sults remain robust. Using the alternative measure of ethnicity, the results remain robust.
Including the dummy of co-ethnicity that does not distinguish between partial or full co-
ethnicity leaves the results the same. These results are not shown but are available upon
request.
Overall, these findings agree with the previous results, which show that in competitive
electoral environments, political leaders divert aid flows away from their strong supporters
and away from co-ethnic districts, but towards districts of core supporters of the opposition
party. These findings suggest that political leaders attempt to reward opposition voters
that would otherwise not vote for them to achieve ‘high electoral returns’ and maximise
4.9The number of observations fall from 4999 in 645 districts to 4511 in 551 districts.
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their vote share relative to the opposing candidate, rather than waste aid resources in
districts where they enjoy strong support and electoral loyalty (Masaki, 2015, Kasara,
2007). This finding, however, only holds when elections are competitive and political
leaders are uncertain about whether they will be getting elected and therefore, use aid for
political purposes to achieve re-election. When elections are not competitive, leaders are
found to only use aid to favour their ethnic network.
4.6 Conclusion
Chapters 2 and 3 examined the effect of institutional quality and corruption on how aid is
spent across the budget of recipient countries in an attempt to investigate whether aid is
used as intended. This study examined whether the political agenda of leaders plays a role
for the allocation of foreign aid across administrative regions. The aim of this study was to
investigate the sub-national allocation of foreign aid per capita, in an attempt to identify
whether and how foreign aid is used by political leaders for political purposes. Multilateral
WB foreign aid flows as well as aggregated aid flows received from both the WB and China
were considered and were expected to be used by leaders to advance their own political
agendas. Although the characteristics of Chinese aid enable political leaders to use it for
their own interests, as the allocation does not respond to need and its effectiveness is not
monitored, aid from both donors was expected to be manipulated for political purposes
since the executive leader is responsible for the sub-national allocation of flows between
districts. Several electoral strategies were investigated: the ‘core voter hypothesis’, the
‘swing voter hypothesis’ as well as ethnic favouritism and how it relates to these models.
The ‘core voter hypothesis’ suggests that political leaders target their loyal voters and
reward them for their support, whereas the ‘swing voter hypothesis’ suggests that leaders
target weak supporters of the opposition that can be easily swayed towards voting for them
(Lindbeck and Weibull, 1987, Cox and McCubbins, 1986). Investigating the sub-national
allocation of aid shows which strategies leaders use and why. The literature on electoral
strategies yields mixed results and different countries under different regimes could target
either core voters or swing voters. Following studies that focus on single countries, such as
Jablonski (2014) for Kenya and Masaki (2015) for Zambia, as well as a multi-country study
using the newly geo-coded aid data used (Dreher et al., 2016), static panel data models
were estimated for aid per capita at the district level using country-year fixed effects.
The initial results found no aid targeting towards specific districts, which indicated that
aid is not used for political purposes. Upon considering executive electoral competitiveness
the results suggest that political leaders use aid targeting in the face of competition. WB
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aid is found to be targeted away from districts of core voters and away from co-ethnic
districts in competitive environments. This result is not surprising, since co-ethnic voters
can be thought as core voters, who will vote for the co-ethnic leader unconditionally since
they receive ‘psychic benefits’ (Chandra, 2007). In this sample of 17 African countries,
political leaders prefer not to waste their resources on their base. In environments of non-
competitive elections, however, the ethnic favouritism result identified in the literature
prevails.
When aggregate aid flows are considered, it was expected that the results would become
stronger due to Chinese aid being vulnerable to strong political capture. This hypothesis
is supported by our results, which become stronger in terms of significance. Political
leaders are found to target more aid towards districts of core voters of the opposition,
possibly because they prefer to target aid in regions that would yield them high electoral
returns by swaying opposition voters towards their side. The finding that opposition and
not swing districts are targeted could be explained by electoral rules. In our sample, the
majority of countries have a presidential system and in all cases the president is elected
by direct popular vote; i.e. only the national vote matters. Therefore, the executive may
find it optimal to target a larger number of districts based on their opposition shares,
rather than targeting a small number of marginal/swing districts (which could be the
optimal strategy when the regional vote plays an important role for the election of the
executive). These results remain robust to alternative specifications, different econometric
methods and different samples. Electoral competitiveness is found to play a significant
role in aid targeting. Political leaders are found to favour their core co-ethnic voters only
in environment of no or low electoral competition without strong political incentives.
The results are focused on 17 heterogeneous countries that have different characteristics
in terms of regimes, electoral systems and electoral rules. For example, in this sample
there are countries that experienced a change in the regime throughout the time period
(Ghana and Mauritius). Investigating the allocation of aid under the different regimes
using appropriate econometric techniques could prove beneficial in identifying how specific
countries and regimes used the aid received. This might prove particularly interesting for
the case of Ghana, which is one of the largest recipients of foreign aid flows from China.
Furthermore, investigating the different characteristics of these countries and their roles
in aid targeting is another important potential development of this study.
For the purposes of this study, ethnic identity is captured by the identification of ethnic
groups and their geographical allocation across districts. Nevertheless, as pointed out by
Posner (2007), ethnic identity can be based on other factors, one of which is language.
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Exploiting language data and family ties between languages is another interesting potential
development. Furthermore, the fact that political leaders use aid for the purposes of
getting re-elected does not indicate that it achieves the desired outcome. Examining
whether the electoral strategies and the aid targeting techniques used as successful is
another interesting expansion.
With regard to the ‘new’ and ‘emerging’ donors discussed, data on aid flows have just
recently started being geo-coded. The AidData project intends to geo-code and publicise
aid data from other ‘emerging’ donors such as India and Saudi Arabia. The extensive
literature on the models of aid allocation identifies different reasons behind the motives
of various donors and also different characteristics of aid from these donors. Examining
the allocation from both the donor and the recipient perspective of aid from various
‘emerging’ donors could have important policy implications for international donors as a
whole as it could help identify the reasons behind the initial allocation and whether such
flows are used, abused or leaked into private pockets. The results of this study contradict
the literature that distinguishes between multilateral and bilateral ‘emerging’ donors and
finds similar results: aid from both donors is used for political purposes.
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4.7 Figures and Tables
Figure 4.1: World Bank aid commitments per district in Africa (per capita in constant
2009USD, 2000 - 2011)
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Table 4.3: Descriptive statistics, 2000 - 2011
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Chinese aid flows (levels) 234707.900 4087960 0 1.21e+08
Chinese aid per capita 1.106 19.151 0 777.819
World Bank aid flows (levels) 2981549 3.23e+07 0 2.05e+09
World Bank aid per capita 8.777 39.159 0 1395.164
Aggregate aid flows (levels) 3216257 3.26e+07 0 2.05e+09
Aggregate aid per capita 9.884 43.599 0 1395.164
Victory margin 0.118 0.435 -0.995 0.957
Incumbent vote share 0.502 0.232 0 0.969
Opposition vote share (two parties) 0.447 0.217 0.015 0.998
Birth regions 0.027 0.161 0 1
Full co-ethnicity 0.110 0.312 0 1
Partial co-ethnicity 0.293 0.455 0 1
Competitiveness 0.647 0.478 0 1
Night-time light intensity 4.894 5.784 1.678 61.951
Population (levels) 404284.900 981593.100 0.031 1.24e+07
Area 13173.870 31969.390 7.178 372916.500
Capital regions 0.033 0.178 0 1
Mineral facilities dummy 0.320 0.466 0 1
Petroleum dummy 0.030 0.171 0 1
These descriptive statistics are based on the sample of the 4999 observations used in the regressions for the
ADM2 regions in the 17 countries. Foreign aid is measured in constant 2009USD.
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Table 4.4: World Bank aid per capita (log) models: District-level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Victory margin -0.003 -0.014 -0.023 -0.022 -0.022
(0.044) (0.043) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044)
Fully co-ethnic regions dummy -0.062 -0.061
(0.065) (0.065)
R-squared 0.336 0.344 0.346 0.347 0.347
Victory margin -0.004 -0.015 -0.024 -0.021 -0.022
(0.044) (0.043) (0.043) (0.044) (0.043)
Victory margin squared 0.095 0.100 0.138 0.168* 0.168*
(0.089) (0.088) (0.086) (0.086) (0.086)
Fully co-ethnic regions dummy -0.093 -0.092
(0.064) (0.064)
R-squared 0.337 0.344 0.347 0.347 0.347
Incumbent vote share -0.088 -0.102 -0.110 -0.105 -0.107
(0.088) (0.086) (0.087) (0.088) (0.088)
Fully co-ethnic regions dummy -0.058 -0.057
(0.065) (0.065)
R-squared 0.337 0.344 0.347 0.347 0.347
Opposition vote share (two parties) 0.006 0.027 0.046 0.042 0.043
(0.087) (0.085) (0.087) (0.088) (0.087)
Fully co-ethnic regions dummy -0.062 -0.061
(0.065) (0.065)
R-squared 0.336 0.344 0.346 0.347 0.347
Country-year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographical controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes
District controls No No Yes Yes Yes
Regional favouritism No No No Yes Yes
Other aid No No No No Yes
No. of districts 645 645 645 645 645
N 4999 4999 4999 4999 4999
Standard errors clustered at the district level in parentheses. * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01. Country-
year fixed effects are included. Geographical controls include the capital region dummy, the area of the
district (log), the mineral facility dummy and the petroleum field dummy. District controls include night-
time light intensity (log) and the population of the district (log). Regional favouritism corresponds to the
birth region dummy and the full co-ethnicity dummy. Other aid corresponds to Chinese aid per capita
flows.
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Table 4.5: World Bank aid per capita (log) models - Marginal effects of electoral com-
petitiveness: District-level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Victory margin*No competition 0.055 0.089 0.079 0.053 0.053
(0.079) (0.073) (0.076) (0.080) (0.080)
Victory margin*Competition -0.028 -0.058 -0.067 -0.070 -0.071
(0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.053)
Fully co-ethnic regions*No competition 0.201* 0.200*
(0.111) (0.111)
Fully co-ethnic regions*Competition -0.175** -0.173**
(0.070) (0.070)
R-squared 0.337 0.344 0.347 0.348 0.348
Incumbent vote share*No competition 0.103 0.182 0.171 0.114 0.115
(0.154) (0.142) (0.148) (0.157) (0.157)
Incumbent vote share*Competition -0.173 -0.227** -0.235** -0.234** -0.236**
(0.108) (0.107) (0.108) (0.108) (0.107)
Fully co-ethnic regions*No competition 0.195* 0.195*
(0.113) (0.112)
Fully co-ethnic regions*Competition -0.172** -0.171**
(0.069) (0.070)
R-squared 0.337 0.344 0.347 0.349 0.349
Opposition vote share*No competition -0.104 -0.185 -0.165 -0.108 -0.109
(0.153) (0.143) (0.149) (0.158) (0.158)
Opposition vote share*Competition 0.054 0.118 0.136 0.142 0.144
(0.108) (0.107) (0.108) (0.107) (0.107)
Fully co-ethnic regions*No competition 0.199* 0.198*
(0.113) (0.113)
Fully co-ethnic region*Competition -0.174** -0.173**
(0.070) (0.070)
R-squared 0.337 0.344 0.347 0.348 0.348
Country-year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographical controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes
District controls No No Yes Yes Yes
Regional favouritism No No No Yes Yes
Other aid No No No No Yes
No. of districts 645 645 645 645 645
N 4999 4999 4999 4999 4999
Standard errors clustered at the district level in parentheses. * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01. Country-
year fixed effects are included. Geographical controls include the capital region dummy, the area of the
district (log), the mineral facility dummy and the petroleum field dummy. District controls include night-
time light intensity (log) and the population of the district (log). Regional favouritism corresponds to the
birth region dummy and the full co-ethnicity dummy. Other aid corresponds to Chinese aid per capita
flows.
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Table 4.6: Aggregate aid per capita (log) models - Marginal effects of electoral compet-
itiveness: District-level
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Victory margin*No competition 0.073 0.104 0.092 0.065
(0.085) (0.077) (0.079) (0.083)
Victory margin*Competition -0.071 -0.101* -0.110* -0.112**
(0.057) (0.056) (0.057) (0.056)
Fully co-ethnic regions*No competition 0.202*
(0.112)
Fully co-ethnic regions*Competition -0.114
(0.080)
R-squared 0.358 0.365 0.368 0.369
Incumbent vote share*No competition 0.139 0.214 0.199 0.142
(0.168) (0.150) (0.155) (0.165)
Incumbent vote share*Competition -0.262** -0.317*** -0.325*** -0.322***
(0.112) (0.111) (0.112) (0.112)
Fully co-ethnic regions*No competition 0.195*
(0.114)
Fully co-ethnic regions*Competition -0.109
(0.079)
R-squared 0.358 0.365 0.369 0.370
Opposition vote share*No competition -0.137 -0.212 -0.188 -0.130
(0.166) (0.150) (0.155) (0.165)
Opposition vote share*Competition 0.138 0.203* 0.223* 0.225**
(0.113) (0.113) (0.114) (0.113)
Fully co-ethnic regions*No competition 0.199*
(0.114)
Fully co-ethnic regions*Competition -0.113
(0.080)
R-squared 0.358 0.365 0.368 0.369
Country-year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographical controls No Yes Yes Yes
District controls No No Yes Yes
Regional favouritism No No No Yes
No. of districts 645 645 645 645
N 4999 4999 4999 4999
Standard errors clustered at the district level in parentheses. * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01. Country-
year fixed effects are included. Geographical controls include the capital region dummy, the area of the
district (log), the mineral facility dummy and the petroleum field dummy. District controls include night-
time light intensity (log) and the population of the district (log). Regional favouritism corresponds to the
birth region dummy and the full co-ethnicity dummy.
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Appendix C:
C.1 Sample
17 countries are selected provided they had elections between the period 2000 - 2012 (and
provided there is available information in the CLEA dataset), when geocoded aid data
are available from both donors. These countries are: Angola, Botswana, Cameroon, Cape
Verde, the Gambia (only available for WB aid), Ghana, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Mau-
ritius, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania, Togo, Zambia and Zimbabwe
(only available for Chinese aid).
Benin is excluded from the sample although there is available information in the CLEA
dataset due to the fact that it only has six aid observations for its 12 ADM1 units over
the 12-year time period. Nepal is excluded from the sample although there is available
information in the CLEA dataset since it does not have any information for Chinese aid
and very few observations for WB aid. Nigeria is excluded from the sample, although
it receives aid from both donors, because the constituencies in the CLEA dataset could
not be matched to administrative regions (numerical codes were given instead of names in
the CLEA dataset). Rwanda is also excluded from the sample as there is no information
available on its administrative boundaries in the GADM database. Guinea-Bissau is also
excluded from the sample due to inconsistent electoral results, which are explained in
Appendix C.2. Jablonski (2014) examines districts in Kenya, which is not included in the
sample because the CLEA dataset did not have any information on its elections during
the time period examined.
A more recent version of CLEA (16th edition, May 2017) includes more countries that
could be used in future analysis: Ivory Coast, Ethiopia, Niger, Senegal and Uganda.
Figure C.1.1 shows the spatial map of Africa and the administrative boundaries of the 17
countries included in the sample.
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Figure C.1.1: Administrative boundaries in Africa
C.2 Construction of dataset
Appendix C.2 describes any issues with regard to the data, a detailed construction method
of some of the variables and gives the definitions and sources of the variables of interest.
Administrative boundaries
The GADM database only has information for the 137 old districts of Ghana and not the
170 new ones, therefore, for the purposes of this analysis the data are matched to the 137
districts of GADM.
Foreign aid
Following the definition of the OECD for ODA, we focus on aid commitment flows that
correspond to ODA-like flows, OOF-like flows and vague official finance. This is done
to follow the definitions of ODA and OOF used by the OECD-DAC. Commitments are
defined by the OECD-DAC as ‘a firm obligation, expressed in writing and backed by
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the necessary funds, undertaken by an official donor to provide specified assistance to
a recipient country or a multilateral organisation’. Commmitments are ‘recorded in the
full amount of expected transfer, irrespective of the time required for the completion of
disbursements’ (Stewart and Russell, 2015).
ODA-like flows correspond to ‘flows of official financing administered by a non-DAC donor
which meets the standards of official development assistance; the promotion of the eco-
nomic development and welfare of developing countries as its main objective, and a per-
ceived to be concessional in character with a grant element of at least 25 percent (using
a fixed 10 percent of discount)’. OOF-like flows are defined as ‘i) financing to developing
countries for representational or essentially commercial purposes provided by a non-DAC
donor, ii) official bilateral transactions intended to promote development but having a
grant element of less than 25 percent, iii) official bilateral transactions, whatever their
grant element, that are primarily export-facilitating in purpose. This category includes
by definition export credits extended directly to an aid recipient by an official agency or
institution (”official direct export creedits”); iv) the net acquisition by governments and
central monetary institutions of securities issued by multilateral development banks at
market terms; v) subsidies (grants) to the private sector to soften its credits to developing
countries; iv) funds in support of private investment’. Vague Official Finance is defined as
‘TUFF projects financed by an official agency but which lack sufficient information on the
intent or concessionality of an agreement to accurately sort into the ODA-like, OOF-like
or Official Investment categories’. These definitions are taken from the AidData Data
Management Plan (Stewart and Russell, 2015).
There were cases where aid flows were recorded for one country, but the geographical co-
ordinates put the aid flow in another country. In such cases the precision code of each flow
was considered, for example if the precision was 3 (ADM2), the geographical coordinates
that put the aid flow to another country were ignored and information on ADM2 was
considered. There were also cases where the aid flow had contradicting information on
its location for neighbouring countries, particularly in road transport projects and water
projects. In those cases the project number of each flow was considered. Some aid flows
are divided between many locations in one specific country and the project number was
used to identify in which country the flow belonged to.
Political variables
The share of votes for each party available from the CLEA dataset is unreliable (there are
cases where it is higher than one due to incorrect coding), so party vote share measures are
constructed manually by taking the total number of votes received by each party divided
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by the sum of all party votes received in each district.
Based on this share, all parties are ranked for each region and each election and the top
three parties are identified to capture the vote share of the top three parties. The top
three parties that are identified are checked against the aggregate country election results
to make sure the data are consistent with the results at the legislative elections.
Three dummy variables at the district level capturing the regime for each district are
constructed. The variables take the value of 1 when each of the three parties (three
dummies are constructed) in each district won the election nationally. For example, a
variable regime1 equals to 1 if the first party of each region is the party that won the
national election. This variable equals to 0 if the party that won the national election is
either the second or third party in each region.
The INC variable (incumbent vote share) is defined as follows:
INC = voteshareparty1 ∗ regime1 + voteshareparty2 ∗ regime2
+voteshareparty3 ∗ regime3
(C.1)
where the vote shares of the top three parties as well as the dummy variable for each party
being in power are considered.
The OPP variable (opposition vote share) is defined as follows:
OPP = voteshareparty1 ∗ (1− regime1) + voteshareparty2 ∗ (1− regime2)
+voteshareparty3 ∗ (1− regime3)
(C.2)
Furthermore, the opposition vote share is also constructed for the main opposition party,
rather than the two main opposition parties.
The VM variable (victory margin) is the difference between the share of the incumbent
and the share of the opposition:
VM = INC −OPP (C.3)
The opposition vote share is firstly captured by taking the vote share of the largest op-
position party, and secondly by taking the two largest opposition parties as a robustness
check. The victory margin is based on the opposition share of the largest opposition party.
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When the CLEA dataset has election information only up to the first administrative level,
only the ADM1 regions are considered in constructing the dataset, even if the GADM
database provides information on the ADM2 regions (Angola, Cape Verde, Lesotho,
Liberia, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique and South Africa). Several other problems arose
with the CLEA dataset. In some cases the constituency names did not match region
names of GADM and no information was found on the internet either, therefore, such
constituencies were excluded from the analysis. Also, there were cases that two or more
GADM regions were aggregated into one constituency in the CLEA dataset and in those
cases the two or more administrative units are merged into one. For example, a con-
stituency named ‘Gushiegu and Karaga’ is available for Ghana in CLEA, where Gushiegu
and Karaga correspond to two different administrative regions (ADM2) in GADM. As a
result, all remainder variables for these two administrative regions are summed together
and one administrative region is used instead of two.
Another issue is that we are proxying the power of the executive in aid allocation decisions
using legislative election data, therefore, the executive election results are compared with
the results of the legislative elections to make sure the results are consistent with regard
to the party in power as well as the victory margin. There are cases where the election
results are inconsistent and those elections are excluded from the sample. For example,
the 2004 election for Guinea-Bissau, leaving Guinea-Bissau out of the sample. Another
case is the Gambia, where the legislative elections took place in 2007 and the executive
elections in 2006. In this case, we assume that the legislative election takes place in 2006
since the results between the two elections are consistent.
Political leaders
Information on political leaders is obtained from the Archigos dataset (Goemans et al.,
2009), where the authors list all of the political leaders of each country as well as the date
they entered and exited office and listed whether their exit is regular, irregular, through
a direct imposition by another state or as a result of a natural death. A regular manner
occurs legally through elections, whereas an irregular manner occurs with a coup. For the
purposes of this analysis, leaders that were in power for less than 90 days are excluded
from the sample. For example, Moses Zeh Blah in Liberia became president for 40 days
when the president resigned, until a new president was sworn in.
Furthermore, there are cases where there is no available information on the ethnic group
of a political leader, such as for Armando Emilio Guebuza in Mozambique; or cases where
the birth region of a political leader falls outside the country, such as for Ian Khama of
Botswana who was born in the United Kingdom. In such cases, observations for the birth
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region and ethnic group variables are missing.
Ethnic groups
Some countries have information for only one ethnic group in the GeoEPR dataset as they
are not classified as being heterogeneous in terms of ethnicity. For example, Portuguese
is the only ethnic group in Cape Verde according to the GeoEPR dataset, Basotho is the
only ethnic group in Lesotho, and although Mauritius has nine different ethnic groups in
the GeoEPR dataset, the ethnic groups of the leaders (Hindu and French) cover the whole
of Mauritius.
Natural resources
Data on petroleum fields and mineral facilities include the year of discovery or the year
mining began in the different facilities. In this sample, no new fields are discovered and
mining did not begin at a new facility throughout the sample. As a result, these variables
are time-invariant although the datasets are dynamic.
C.3 Maps
Figure C.3.1 shows the allocation of Chinese aid flows. Ghana and Tanzania are the two
largest recipients of Chinese foreign aid (darker shades on the map).
Figure C.3.2 shows the polygons that correspond to the co-ethnic regions of the political
leaders in our sample. The blue polygons correspond to fully co-ethnic districts: districts
that have only one ethnic group and it is that of the political leader. The red polygons
correspond to partially co-ethnic districts: districts that have more than one ethnic group
and one of them is that of the political leader. The ethnicity dummy that is used as a
robustness check takes the value of 1 in all highlighted regions (partially or fully co-ethnic).
This map contains the co-ethnic regions of all political leaders of the countries examined.
If for example, a country has two political leaders over the period examined, the co-ethnic
districts for both leaders are shown.
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Figure C.3.1: Chinese aid commitments per district in Africa (total in million constant
2009USD, 2000 - 2011)
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Figure C.3.2: Co-ethnic districts in Africa
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C.4 Empirical results
Table C.4.1 shows the full regression coefficients of the regression with per capita WB aid as
the dependent variable when country-year fixed effects are included and interaction terms
between the victory margin and the two competition dummies. The relevant marginal
effects are shown in Table 4.5 of Section 4.5.1.
Table C.4.2 shows the full regression coefficients of the regression with per capita aggregate
aid as the dependent variable when country-year fixed effects are included and interac-
tion terms between the victory margin and the two competition dummies. The relevant
marginal effects are shown in Table 4.6 of Section 4.5.1.
Table C.4.3 shows the marginal effects of the political variables and the full co-ethnicity
dummy in different environments of electoral competition when the alternative method of
forwarding the political variables is used.
Table C.4.4 shows the marginal effects of the political variables and the full co-ethnicity
dummy in different environments of electoral competition when the four countries that
receive the least amount of aid are removed (Cape Verde, the Gambia, Mauritius and
Zimbabwe).
Table C.4.5 shows the marginal effects of the political variables and the full co-ethnicity
dummy in different environments of electoral competition when the dependent variable is
aggregate aid flows in levels and when the four countries that receive the least amount of
aid are removed.
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Table C.4.1: World Bank aid per capita (log) models: District-level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Victory margin*No competition 0.055 0.089 0.079 0.053 0.053
(0.079) (0.073) (0.076) (0.080) (0.080)
Victory margin*Competition -0.028 -0.058 -0.067 -0.070 -0.071
(0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.053)
Competition dummy -0.703 -0.693 -0.693 -0.697 -0.696
(0.591) (0.592) (0.596) (0.597) (0.597)
Capital regions 0.367*** 0.194 0.153 0.153
(0.095) (0.127) (0.133) (0.133)
Mineral facilities 0.179*** 0.178*** 0.189*** 0.189***
(0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047)
Petroleum fields 0.143 0.156 0.154 0.153
(0.098) (0.095) (0.094) (0.094)
Area (log) -0.041** 0.002 -0.001 -0.000
(0.018) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
Population (log) 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
Night-time lights (log) 0.222*** 0.229*** 0.231***
(0.066) (0.066) (0.066)
Birth regions -0.002 -0.003
(0.118) (0.119)
Fully co-ethnic regions*No competition 0.201* 0.200*
(0.111) (0.111)
Fully co-ethnic regions*Competition -0.175** -0.173**
(0.070) (0.070)
Chinese aid per capita (log) -0.019
(0.044)
R-squared 0.337 0.344 0.347 0.348 0.348
No. of districts 645 645 645 645 645
N 4999 4999 4999 4999 4999
Country-year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors clustered at the district level in parentheses. * p <0.10,
** p <0.05, *** p <0.01. Country-year fixed effects are included.
Table C.4.2: Aggregate aid per capita (log) models: District-level
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Victory margin*No competition 0.073 0.104 0.092 0.065
(0.085) (0.077) (0.079) (0.083)
Victory margin*Competition -0.071 -0.101* -0.110* -0.112**
(0.057) (0.056) (0.057) (0.056)
Competition dummy -0.695 -0.685 -0.684 -0.688
(0.592) (0.593) (0.598) (0.599)
Capital regions 0.412*** 0.208 0.175
(0.092) (0.129) (0.134)
Mineral facilities 0.171*** 0.170*** 0.178***
(0.048) (0.048) (0.047)
Petroleum fields 0.109 0.125 0.124
(0.097) (0.092) (0.092)
Area (log) -0.038** 0.014 0.013
(0.019) (0.022) (0.022)
Population (log) -0.006 -0.006
(0.021) (0.020)
Night-time lights (log) 0.269*** 0.275***
(0.066) (0.066)
Birth regions -0.022
(0.121)
Fully co-ethnic regions*No competition 0.202*
(0.112)
Fully co-ethnic regions*Competition -0.114
(0.080)
R-squared 0.358 0.365 0.368 0.369
No. of districts 645 645 645 645
N 4999 4999 4999 4999
Country-year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors clustered at the district level in parentheses. * p <0.10,
** p <0.05, *** p <0.01. Country-year fixed effects are included.
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Table C.4.3: Aggregate aid per capita (log) models - Marginal effects of electoral com-
petitiveness: District-level (future)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Victory margin*No competition -0.038 -0.005 -0.016 -0.045
(0.098) (0.090) (0.094) (0.098)
Victory margin*Competition -0.077 -0.108* -0.117** -0.117**
(0.055) (0.056) (0.056) (0.055)
Fully co-ethnic regions*No competition 0.235*
(0.124)
Fully co-ethnic regions*Competition -0.148*
(0.088)
R-squared 0.372 0.379 0.382 0.383
Incumbent vote share*No competition -0.055 0.023 0.013 -0.049
(0.190) (0.174) (0.181) (0.190)
Incumbent vote share*Competition -0.274** -0.330*** -0.337*** -0.332***
(0.110) (0.110) (0.110) (0.111)
Fully co-ethnic regions*No competition 0.228*
(0.126)
Fully co-ethnic regions*Competition -0.142
(0.088)
R-squared 0.373 0.380 0.383 0.384
Opposition vote share*No competition 0.073 -0.008 0.013 0.074
(0.191) (0.176) (0.184) (0.192)
Opposition vote share*Competition 0.127 0.193* 0.212* 0.212*
(0.111) (0.112) (0.112) (0.111)
Fully co-ethnic regions*No competition 0.234*
(0.125)
Fully co-ethnic regions*Competition -0.148*
(0.088)
R-squared 0.372 0.379 0.382 0.383
Country-year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographical controls No Yes Yes Yes
District controls No No Yes Yes
Regional favouritism No No No Yes
No. of districts 645 645 645 645
N 4670 4670 4670 4670
Standard errors clustered at the district level in parentheses. * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01. Country-
year fixed effects are included. Geographical controls include the capital region dummy, the area of the
district (log), the mineral facility dummy and the petroleum field dummy. District controls include night-
time light intensity (log) and the population of the district (log). Regional favouritism corresponds to the
birth region dummy and the full co-ethnicity dummy. An alternative way of forwarding the data is used
for this sample.
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Table C.4.4: Aggregate aid per capita (log) models - Marginal effects of electoral com-
petitiveness: District-level (aid importance)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Victory margin*No competition 0.096 0.121 0.101 0.057
(0.093) (0.085) (0.088) (0.092)
Victory margin*Competition -0.085 -0.118** -0.122** -0.119**
(0.058) (0.057) (0.058) (0.058)
Fully co-ethnic regions*No competition 0.408**
(0.174)
Fully co-ethnic regions*Competition -0.111
(0.080)
R-squared 0.340 0.347 0.351 0.353
Incumbent vote share*No competition 0.187 0.251 0.224 0.138
(0.185) (0.165) (0.172) (0.181)
Incumbent vote share*Competition -0.290** -0.350*** -0.345*** -0.333***
(0.113) (0.113) (0.114) (0.114)
Fully co-ethnic regions*No competition 0.399**
(0.175)
Fully co-ethnic regions*Competition -0.107
(0.079)
R-squared 0.340 0.348 0.352 0.353
Opposition vote share*No competition -0.186 -0.251 -0.213 -0.127
(0.184) (0.166) (0.173) (0.182)
Opposition vote share*Competition 0.166 0.236** 0.245** 0.239**
(0.114) (0.115) (0.116) (0.116)
Fully co-ethnic regions*No competition 0.405**
(0.174)
Fully co-ethnic regions*Competition -0.111
(0.080)
R-squared 0.340 0.347 0.351 0.353
Country-year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographical controls No Yes Yes Yes
District controls No No Yes Yes
Regional favouritism No No No Yes
No. of districts 551 551 551 551
N 4511 4511 4511 4511
Standard errors clustered at the district level in parentheses. * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01. Country-
year fixed effects are included. Geographical controls include the capital region dummy, the area of the
district (log), the mineral facility dummy and the petroleum field dummy. District controls include night-
time light intensity (log) and the population of the district (log). Regional favouritism corresponds to the
birth region dummy and the full co-ethnicity dummy. Cape Verde, Gambia, Mauritius and Zimbabwe are
removed from the sample.
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Table C.4.5: Aggregate aid in levels (log) models - Marginal effects of electoral compet-
itiveness: District-level
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Victory margin*No competition 1.088** 1.177** 1.070** 0.852*
(0.507) (0.463) (0.455) (0.471)
Victory margin*Competition -0.292 -0.491* -0.596** -0.593**
(0.289) (0.288) (0.282) (0.279)
Fully co-ethnic regions*No competition 1.962***
(0.703)
Fully co-ethnic regions*Competition -0.585*
(0.306)
R-squared 0.430 0.441 0.458 0.460
Incumbent vote share*No competition 2.018** 2.289** 2.203** 1.771*
(1.008) (0.914) (0.893) (0.929)
Incumbent vote share*Competition -1.120* -1.483** -1.608*** -1.574***
(0.574) (0.576) (0.557) (0.554)
Fully co-ethnic regions*No competition 1.919***
(0.706)
Fully co-ethnic regions*Competition -0.562*
(0.305)
R-squared 0.430 0.442 0.459 0.460
Opposition vote share*No competition -2.196** -2.472*** -2.232** -1.806*
(0.997) (0.910) (0.893) (0.927)
Opposition vote share*Competition 0.510 0.929 1.198** 1.190**
(0.567) (0.571) (0.563) (0.556)
Fully co-ethnic regions*No competition 1.940***
(0.705)
Fully co-ethnic regions*Competition -0.584*
(0.307)
R-squared 0.430 0.441 0.458 0.460
Country-year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographical controls No Yes Yes Yes
District controls No No Yes Yes
Regional favouritism No No No Yes
No. of districts 551 551 551 551
N 4511 4511 4511 4511
Standard errors clustered at the district level in parentheses. * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01. Country-
year fixed effects are included. Geographical controls include the capital region dummy, the area of the
district (log), the mineral facility dummy and the petroleum field dummy. District controls include night-
time light intensity (log) and the population of the district (log). Regional favouritism corresponds to the
birth region dummy and the full co-ethnicity dummy. Cape Verde, Gambia, Mauritius and Zimbabwe are
removed from the sample
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
5.1 Motivations and aims
Although foreign aid aims to build the necessary infrastructure for development by strength-
ening institutions and overcoming any ‘state capacity’ issues identified in the literature
(Besley and Persson, 2011), it can at the same time provide opportunities for illegal rent-
seeking activities and corruption (Bra¨utigam and Knack, 2004). Foreign aid is primarily
given to governments, therefore, the effectiveness of foreign aid is likely to depend on
the behaviour of recipient governments and how political leaders allocate aid (Morrissey,
2015a, McGillivray and Morrissey, 2000, Devarajan et al., 1999). The empirical literature
reaches no consensus on the effect of aid on growth (Dalgaard et al., 2004, Dalgaard and
Hansen, 2001, Hansen and Tarp, 2001, Burnside and Dollar, 2000).
Foreign aid may not be used as intended by the donor and the literature on foreign aid
argues that aid can be used for personal motives and political purposes (Bra¨utigam and
Knack, 2004, Knack, 2001). This raises the issue of ‘fungibility’, which is defined as aid
not being used as intended by the donor (McGillivray and Morrissey, 2000). For example,
aid could be financing tax reductions, reductions in spending or changes in the pattern of
spending, or leaders might be diverting aid flows into their private pockets (Wright and
Winters, 2010). On the other hand, aid may be fungible if it frees up public resources to
finance a project that would otherwise not be financed (Devarajan and Swaroop, 1998).
Fungibility could arise due to malicious intent, aid illusion or the optimal choice of recipient
governments.
Fungibility and the way aid is used by political leaders was central to this thesis, where
the allocation of foreign aid from different donors was examined both at the country level
and at the district level. This thesis aimed to identify whether aid is used as intended
with regard to spending and tax revenue patterns and whether aid is used as a political
tool to advance the personal agendas of political leaders.
The first study of this thesis aimed to investigate the effect of aid on general government
spending in an attempt to explore whether aid is used as intended. The empirical literature
on fungibility does not consider that aid might have a heterogeneous effect on spending
depending on institutional quality (Dieleman et al., 2013, Van de Sijpe, 2012, Lu et al.,
2010). Therefore, the degree of fungibility was examined to explore whether or not it
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depends on institutional quality. The hypothesis of this study was that institutional
quality would make aid more fungible. Following the literature, on- and off-budget aid
flows were considered by breaking down aid flows according to their modality (Van de
Sijpe, 2012). On- and off-budget aid was expected to impact spending in different ways.
On-budget aid is recorded in the governments’ accounts, therefore, a one-to-one effect
of on-budget aid to spending was expected. Off-budget aid was not expected to impact
spending since it is not recorded in the government’s accounts.
The second study of the thesis extended the first one and looked at the revenue side of the
budget constraint that recipient governments face. A newly constructed dataset on tax
revenues developed by the International Centre for Tax and Development was used, which
considers both central and general government data and collects tax revenue data from
various sources, such as international databases and country reports (Prichard et al., 2014).
This study aimed to investigate the effect of aid on general tax revenues in an attempt to
explore whether aid is used as intended or finances tax reductions. The same hypothesis
as for Chapter 2 was tested for total tax revenue and its sub-components. Following the
literature on tax revenues (Morrissey et al., 2014, Benedek et al., 2012, Gupta et al., 2003),
total aid flows were classified according to their type of finance, namely grants and loans.
The final study examined the sub-national allocation of foreign aid. The sub-national
allocation of aid across different districts could depend on political economy motives and
re-election prospects. Therefore, leaders can distribute aid flows across different districts
for their own personal and political agendas (Masaki, 2015, Jablonski, 2014). Furthermore,
leaders can exhibit ethnic favouritism by targeting co-ethnic districts (De Luca et al., 2015,
Hodler and Raschky, 2014). The effect of competitive elections was also examined. How
political leaders target aid may depend on the degree of electoral competitiveness and their
certainty of getting re-elected (Hicken, 2011). The literature investigating the motives
behind the sub-national allocation of aid flows is limited to a few studies of individual
countries (Masaki, 2015, Jablonski, 2014, Dionne et al., 2013, Briggs, 2012). The final
study examined the sub-national allocation of foreign aid from China and the World
Bank (WB) in 17 African countries using district-level data and Geographical Information
System software. A novel dataset on legislative election results is used at the constituency
level, which as been geo-coded at the district level for the purposes of this thesis (Kollman
et al., 2016).
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5.2 Summary of results
The results of the first study suggest that the fungibility of aid with regard to government
spending depends on institutional quality, especially for off-budget aid. On-budget aid
is found to be fully fungible at all levels of institutional quality suggesting that aid is
not used as intended, although alternative estimation techniques show that institutional
quality also matters for the fungibility of on-budget aid. The importance of considering
institutional quality is highlighted by these results, since in the absence of the interaction
term inferences on the extent of fungibility change. More precisely, off-budget aid would be
classified as partially fungible, whereas with the interaction term the results show that off-
budget aid is fully fungible in environments of low institutional quality and non-fungible
in environments of high institutional quality. These findings suggest that aid is not used
as intended in the context of government spending. Nevertheless, these fungibility results
could be explained by the recipient government behaving optimally and adjusting tax
revenues.
The results of the second study suggest that aid in the context of tax revenues is non-
fungible, where this finding holds for all levels of institutional quality and for aid given as
different types of finance. Based on the model developed by Chatterjee et al. (2012) and
the budget constraint recipient governments face (Gupta et al., 2003), these results could
still be explained by the optimal choice of recipient governments. Recipient governments
might respond to aid receipts by adjusting external borrowing or running a budget surplus.
Nevertheless, the results with regard to tax revenues indicate that the optimal choice of
recipient governments is not a plausible explanation.
The results of the final study suggest that in environments of strong electoral competi-
tion, where political leaders face the uncertainty of re-election, political economy motives
prevail. To this end, leaders are found to target aid away from districts of their core
voters and to district that support the opposition in an attempt to sway the opposition
voters into voting for them. These findings suggest that leaders prefer to target districts
that vote for the opposition to gain high electoral returns, rather than waste resources on
districts that are loyal and would thus vote for them. On the other hand, in environments
of no or low electoral competition without strong re-election motives, leaders are found to
target and favour their co-ethnic regions.
The first and second studies identify the effect of institutional quality and corruption on
the allocation of foreign aid by political leaders across the components of the budget con-
straint in developing countries. These show that aid is not used as intended in the context
of spending. Considering the findings of Chapters 2 and 3, the aid resources that did
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not have the anticipated effect on spending, did not impact tax revenues either. The fact
that institutional quality plays a role for fungibility, making aid more fungible could be an
indication that fungibility is caused by malicious intent. Political leaders might be divert-
ing aid into their private pockets to satisfy their own personal preferences. On the other
hand, aid illusion could also be exacerbated in environments of low institutional quality,
contradicting the argument that leaders aim to satisfy their own personal preferences.
The findings of the third study indicate that aid is used for political purposes. Aid is used
as a political tool to maximise the re-election prospects of political leaders in environments
of high electoral competition. In environments of low or no electoral competition, aid is
found to be used as a tool to favour co-ethnic districts.
Overall, the findings of the thesis support the idea that foreign aid is used for personal
and political reasons by the leaders of developing countries. Foreign aid is not found to
contribute to spending and is thus considered fungible. Based on the findings of this
thesis, the optimal choice of recipient government is not a plausible explanation for the
fungibility result. This suggests that malicious intent or aid illusion are possible causes
of fungibility, particularly since institutional quality is found to matter for the degree of
fungibility. Furthermore, the sub-national allocation of foreign aid flows across different
African countries suggests that it is indeed used for political economy reasons and ethnic
favouritism.
5.3 Future research
These results are largely dependent on the quality of the data used. Data for develop-
ing countries suffer the problem of a large number of missing values, especially in Africa
(Devarajan, 2013). The missing values proves to be a problem when dynamic models are
estimated with appropriate methods of moments that use past levels and past differences,
which further reduces the number of available observations. On the other hand, data for
foreign aid are of high quality and are becoming more detailed with time. For example,
the Creditor Reporting System of the Development Assistance Committee of the Organ-
isation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD-DAC) gives information on
the purpose of aid projects, its type of finance, its modality and others (OECD, 2013).
Furthermore, foreign aid flows have recently started becoming geo-coded by researchers
to identify where each project is delivered across the recipient country. This detail in the
foreign aid datasets signals the importance that donors place on foreign aid and research
done on foreign aid and its effects.
To further understand the extent of fungibility, the components of the budget constraint
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can be examined. As Chatterjee et al. (2012) show, recipient governments might be
behaving optimally and adjusting other components of the budget constraint. So far the
analysis of this thesis has focused on expenditures and tax revenues. Exploring the effect
of aid on spending, tax revenues, borrowing and the fiscal balance on a common sample of
observations can prove to be helpful in identifying the extent of fungibility and the cause
behind fungibility. Furthermore, the database of the OECD-DAC can be fully exploited
to investigate the effect aid for different purposes (sectors) and different aid modalities on
components of the budget constraint.
Moreover, with regard to the sub-national allocation of aid flows, the motives of ‘new’
and ‘emerging’ donors can now be examined with the recent geo-coding of aid flows, such
as India or Saudi Arabia. The AidData project website makes such datasets publicly
available and the database is frequently updated to include datasets from different donors
(Stewart and Russell, 2015). Due to the large availability of province or district-level
data, patterns in individual countries can also be examined. For example, the final study
of this thesis investigates ethnic favouritism and electoral strategies in a sample of 17
heterogeneous African countries. As a next step, individual countries can be examined to
identify whether different leaders behave in a different way by exploiting any changes in the
political regime. For example, Ghana experienced a change in the regime throughout the
period studied and examining the allocation of foreign aid using Difference-in-Difference
can prove important in identifying the causal effect of ethnicity or vote shares on aid
allocation. Furthermore, exploring the different characteristics of these heterogeneous
African countries is another interesting extension of the final study of the thesis. For
example, the electoral rules or electoral systems of countries could be driving how leaders
target aid.
5.4 Policy implications
The results of this thesis highlight the importance of institutional quality. Improving the
‘state capacities’ of developing countries, strengthening institutions and the legal system
should be a priority, since these characteristics are found to be associated with reduced
fungibility with regard to spending. According to Collier (2008), aid alone may not be
sufficient for sustainable growth; international institutions should aim at fighting corrup-
tion and strengthening institutions rather than diverting larger amounts of aid or else aid
funds disbursed will most likely be wasted. This trap of bad governance, as described
by Collier, leads to a vicious cycle: corruption and the ineffectiveness of aid could result
to income inequalities and to the under-provision of public services, thus damaging an
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economy even further.
Exploring the full extent of fungibility and the effect of aid on the different components
of the budget constraint could prove to be particularly useful for the international arena.
Donors divert large flows of their resources towards developing countries and have a target
of allocating 0.7% of their GNI as aid to developing countries (World Bank, 2015, Devel-
opment Initiatives, 2013). Furthermore, examining the effects of aid for various purposes,
different aid modalities and types of finance is important for policy makers and donors
when deciding how to allocate aid to developing countries. Understanding if aid is fungi-
ble, and which types of aid are more fungible than others is important for donor countries
since the resources devoted could have alternative uses that could be productive both in
the donor and recipient countries.
The findings of this thesis show that aid is fungible and that it is used as a political tool
to advance the re-election prospects of political leaders. This holds for bilateral flows
from OECD countries at the country level, aid from China, which is a ‘new’ donor, and
multilateral aid from the WB at the district level. These results suggest that there is a
need for better monitoring of aid projects, both where foreign aid is spent and how it is
allocated across regions.
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